A question (not a challenge) about this statement:
"These Bishops have in fact been consecrated validly and even, in our opinion (at least in certain cases) licitly; but nevertheless they are – in the most absolute way – deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that the Bishop receives jurisdiction from God only through the intermediary of the Pope, an intermediary excluded in our case.14 Being deprived of jurisdiction, they do not belong to the Church’s hierarchy of jurisdiction, which is why they are not members of the Council by right, and are therefore not qualified to validly elect the Pope – not even in extraordinary cases."
Questions:
1. Is it a matter of divine law that only members of the Council by right may validly elect a pope?
2. Even if so, why does necessity not dispense with this requirement, noting that in necessity, only divine negative law remains in effect:
“Not even God, the Supreme Legislator, is bound in the state of necessity ."That is why Christ Himself excuses David, who in grave danger ate the breads of proposition which the laity were forbidden to eat by Divine Law."5 According to this principle, not only do human laws cease to oblige in a state of necessity, but even divine-positive and affirmative divine-natural law cease (e.g., "Honor thy father and mother"; "Remember to keep holy the Sabbath Day"). The only law binding in the state of necessity is negative divine-natural law {e.g., "Thou shalt not kill," etc.) . This is because negative divine-natural law prohibits actions that are intrinsically evil and hence forbidden because they are evil, as opposed to actions which are evil only because they are forbidden, such as the consecration of bishops without pontifical mandate.”
"Cardinal Billot writes that Our Lord instituted the primacy, but left in some way the limits of episcopal power undefined, precisely because:
...it would not have been fitting that those things which are subject to change would be unchangeably fixed by divine law. Some things are indeed subject to change because of the variety of circumstances and of times and because of greater or lesser facility of recourse to the Apostolic See among other such-like things [De Ecclesia Christi, Q.XV, §2, p.713]
History confirms that the state of necessity extended not only the duties of bishops, but also their power of jurisdiction. Dom Grea whose attachment to the pope is above all suspicion testifies (De l’Eglise et de sa divine consitution, vol. I) that not only at the beginning of Christianity did the "necessity of the Church and the Gospel" demand that the power of the episcopal order be exercised in all its fullness without jurisdictional limitations, but that in successive ages extraordinary circumstances required" even more exceptional and more extraordinary manifestations" of episcopal power (ibid., p.218) in order "to apply a remedy to the current necessity of the Christian people" (ibid. and ƒƒ.), for whom there was no hope of aid on the part of the legitimate pastors nor from the Pope. In such circumstances, in which the common good of the Church is also at stake, the jurisdictional limitations vanish and "that which is universal" in episcopal power "comes directly to the aid of souls" (ibid., p.218):
Thus in the 4th century St. Eusebius of Samosata is seen passing through the Oriental Church devastated by the Arians and ordaining Catholic Bishops for them without having any special jurisdiction over them" (op. cit. p.218).
...today jurisdiction [over a diocese] is conferred [upon bishops] directly and expressly by the Pope…Formerly, however, it used to derive more indirectly from the Vicar of Christ as if from itself it flowed from the Pope onto those bishops, who were in union and peace with the Roman Church, mother and head of all churches [emphasis added].40"
Since we know that the Church is a perfect society, containing within itself all the means necessary to accomplish its mission at all times (even in a state of necessity or during an extended papal vacancy, which amounts to the same thing), I would like to learn more about why the rationale contained in the quotes above from the SSPX article regarding extraordinary manifestations of episcopal power such as were necessary in the early Church could not be reengaged by the situation in the Church today (eg., to legitimize the bishops of tradition in electing a legitimate pope).
I’m not saying it does. I’m just trying to understand why it doesn’t.
Perhaps the answer is as simple as noting that necessity may have EXTENDED the powers of bishops already possessing jurisdiction, but did not CONFER jurisdiction upon bishops who did not already possess it? But in that case, it would be necessary to also address why supplied jurisdiction would not engage (ie., +de Mallerais and Fr. Peter Scott have formerly argued that ecclesia supplet extends to all aspects necessary for the apostolate, from annulment tribunals, though in the same article, +de Mallerais explicitly rejects the possibility of electing a pope, for lack of authority).
Just curious how you would explain the clandestine episcopal consecrations which took place behind the Iron Curtain, and were later recognized (i.e., legitimate). Or the example of Cardinal Slipyj's consecrations against the policy of Paul VI (for which he received no censure, despite a latae sententiae excommunication being on the books since 1951), which were also legitimate, despite being forbidden?
Rogelio, you’re circling something important here—especially in recognizing that clandestine doesn’t automatically mean illegitimate. That’s a fair instinct, and it’s good you’re trying to ground it historically.
I’d just tighten the formulation so it stays fully aligned with the Church’s constitutional principles:
The key issue isn’t whether communication could have been secret, but whether a pontifical mandate can be publicly demonstrated or morally established. The Church’s structure isn’t built on unverifiable possibilities (“the pope might have secretly approved this”), but on a determinable juridical link to Peter.
So instead of saying “there may have been a secret mandate,” I’d frame it this way:
Even in clandestine situations, the Church has always maintained that episcopal mission must derive from the Roman Pontiff. If that connection cannot be established—even retrospectively through recognition—then the act cannot be treated as possessing lawful mission, regardless of speculation about secret communications.
That keeps your point about persecution intact, but removes the reliance on hypothetical mandates, which the Church has never used as a basis for recognizing authority.
In short: possibility doesn’t equal demonstrability—and the Church operates on the latter.
The examples you raise don’t establish what you think they do—they actually confirm the principle.
1) Iron Curtain consecrations
Those bishops were later recognized by a Roman Pontiff. That recognition is not decorative—it is the decisive point. Jurisdiction flows from Peter, and recognition is the public confirmation of that mission. Without that later ratification, they would have remained illicit acts with no lawful mission. Recognition does not “approve disobedience”; it supplies the missing juridical connection to the Apostolic See.
2) Slipyi case
Even here, you are still within a structure where a living pope exists, governs, and can tolerate, correct, or later regularize acts. That context changes everything. The question is not whether something occurred against policy, but whether it occurred within a system that still possessed a functioning source of jurisdiction.
3) The principle you’re missing
The Church has already defined the structure:
• Jurisdiction flows from the Roman Pontiff to bishops, not from consecration alone 
• No one can assume ecclesiastical authority on his own initiative without entering “by the door” 
So the real dividing line is simple:
Were those acts connected—either immediately or subsequently—to the authority of Peter?
If yes, they can be healed and recognized.
If no, they remain outside the Church’s juridical order.
4) Why this matters
Your examples depend on eventual recognition. But that presupposes a living authority capable of granting mission. Remove that, and the entire argument collapses.
That’s the fatal error: you’re taking cases that depended on the existence of papal authority—and using them to justify acting without it.
And that is precisely what the Church has never permitted.
The mechanism by which the pope is "elected" for lack of a better term, which by the way is the same phrase used to describe the selection of he who would become a bishop, particularly in the Greek churches, is a matter of human law. The Church being not just a supernatural society, but temporal one, as well, has the right to establish laws to specify how all manner of things are done within that temporal sphere. The basis for those laws may be divine law, but in other cases it is either prudence, charity, custom, or whatever.
This is no different to how secular societies operate. The people maintain the right to choose the form of governance; however, once that decision is made, authority is held by that form of government established. Because all power to rule, i.e., jurisdiction, comes from God and flows downward vertically, the people do not retain the right to change the means by which they are able to determine how they are governed. That is the sovereign's job by definition.
So similarly it is in the Church. The sovereign, i.e., the Pope, established how future sovereigns shall be determined, i.e., via election by the Cardinals. It is only the sovereign who can modify or reform that mechanism. As we do not have a sovereign, that cannot be done by the whims of a very small fraction of the ostensibly Catholic faithful.
Is it your opinion, therefore, that the Church is no longer a perfect society, possessing all the means necessary to accomplish her mission (eg., no mechanism by which to elect another pope)?
Recognizing this was impossible, St. Bellarmine and others wrote that in the absences of cardinals, the right to elect a pontiff would devolve either to an imperfect council, or the Roman clergy, or to the bishops, etc.
Unless I’m misunderstanding, this seems to contradict what you are saying?
Or are you suggesting there are still some cardinals left somewhere who could elect a pope?
The Church is a Perfect Society. If anyone says there is some instance or circumstance that would prevent the Church from electing Her next Vicar, or even the possibility of such a circumstance, then the logical conclusion is that person does not believe the Church is a Perfect society. You can't say the Church has within Herself the ability to always maintain Her existence and then say that some circumstance will prevent Her from existing.
You’re exactly right to locate the principle in the source of authority rather than the mechanism.
If jurisdiction flows from above, and if only the Roman Pontiff can determine or modify the means of succession, then the absence of a true pontiff does not authorize reconstruction from below—it exposes a real juridical rupture.
That is the point most are unwilling to face.
The conclusion is not that “we must fix it,” but that we cannot. The Church’s constitution remains intact, but its operation can be impeded in fact. That distinction preserves both indefectibility and reality.
Which leads to the practical consequence: we cannot attach ourselves to structures that claim authority without demonstrable mission. There is no safe middle ground of “working solutions.”
So the position is not activism, but custody.
We hold the faith, we refrain from false jurisdiction, and we wait—without attempting to supply what only Christ gives through Peter.
It's interesting that Blessed Anna Maria Taigi prophesied that Sts Peter & Paul will appear in Rome to the astonishment of all & appoint a pope after a long period with the Chair of Peter held by false popes.
This is from Feeneyite MHFM but I'd be interested in knowing what others think of it.
RosaryKnight — if someone rejects Baptism of Desire as salvific, you call them possibly Catholic—because the Church has never defined it as dogma. There are theological opinions, yes, but no binding teaching that it saves.
What is defined is the necessity of water baptism and incorporation into the Church.
So the real question isn’t labels—it’s whether you can produce a magisterial definition for your position.
And the same standard applies elsewhere: where do your clergymen receive mission to act in the Church?
Until that’s answered, the issue isn’t what we’re called—it’s what can actually be demonstrated.
The Council of Trent, in the same words as used for baptism, says that the sacrament of Penance is necessary for salvation: "CANON VI.--If any one denieth, either that sacramental confession was instituted, or is necessary to salvation, of divine right; or saith, that the manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, which the Church hath ever observed from the beginning, and doth observe, is alien from the institution and command of Christ, and is a human invention; let him be anathema." Notice that it specifically says SACRAMENTAL confession is necessary, even though perfect contrition is sufficient, just as it specifically says the "sacrament of Baptism" in the similar canon on Baptism.
RosaryKnight — you’re conflating two things Trent keeps distinct.
Yes, Trent teaches the necessity of sacramental confession—but it also explicitly allows for perfect contrition when confession is not possible. That’s a defined doctrine.
Where is the equivalent definition for Baptism of Desire? It’s not there. Trent speaks of the sacrament of Baptism—not a substitute.
So again, you’re appealing to analogy, not dogma.
And the deeper issue still stands unanswered: where do your clergymen receive mission to administer these sacraments at all?
Until that’s demonstrated, you’re arguing about mechanisms without establishing authority.
I believe the mission comes from Christ when there is no pope for a long time, as is the case today, but without governing a particular diocese. But I don't know for sure.
RosaryKnight — that’s not how the Church teaches mission at all.
Pius XII, Mystici Corporis: “They who are appointed bishops… receive their jurisdiction not directly from the Divine Redeemer, but from the Roman Pontiff.”
And Leo XIII, Satis Cognitum: “No one can have authority in the Church unless he is united with Peter.”
So mission does not arise “directly from Christ” apart from the papacy—even in difficult times.
Can you produce a single magisterial text that teaches what you just claimed?
I don’t think you can. And if you can’t, then you have to face the consequence: the clergy you’re adhering to cannot demonstrate mission, and therefore cannot be acting in the name of the Church.
These are unprecedented times. Either there are no canonically acting bishops & priests, in the Latin Rite at least, or "salus animarum seprema lex" is in effect whereby the few valid bishops & priests without a diocese carry out their ministry.
Who says I'm adhering to any clergy? Right now I'm a home aloner.
RosaryKnight — I respect that, and I’m in the same position myself.
But the issue isn’t personal adherence—it’s the principle being admitted. You’re allowing that “valid bishops & priests” may operate without a diocese under salus animarum, which still implies real mission somewhere.
Yet the Church is explicit: jurisdiction comes through the Roman Pontiff, not from necessity, not directly from Christ apart from Peter.
So where is that mission concretely conferred?
If it cannot be shown, then even that fallback position collapses—and we’re left not with hidden clergy, but with a real juridical deprivation.
Maybe that's why Sr Lucia said: "God is giving two last remedies to the world: the Holy Rosary [given more power] and devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. And, being the last remedies...there will be no others." (Sr Lucia, 1957; last public words before being "disappeared" and replaced by a now proven impostor) radtradthomist.chojnowski.me/2019/03/is-this-interview-that-caused-her.html; sisterlucytruth.org
On the Primacy of the Supernatural Common Good over Purely Material Continuity
Fr. Ricossa’s analysis, alongside the debate between Sean Johnson, Michael Pigg, and Kastrioti, highlights the need to clarify the distinction between ecclesiastical law and the Divine Constitution of the Church.
1. Refuting Static Legalism:
The argument that only a Pope can modify the electoral mechanism (Kastrioti) overlooks the nature of the Church as a "Perfect Society." As Michael Pigg observes, if any circumstance could prevent the Church from electing its Head, the Church would cease to be the perfect society instituted by Christ. Human law (cardinalitial election) can never supersede the Divine Right of the Church to its own preservation.
2. Devolution according to Cajetan:
Fr. Ricossa argues that "material" cardinals block any recourse. However, Cajetan (De Comparatione, cap. XIII, n. 204) teaches that if the ordinary electors "fail" (deficientibus electoribus), the right to elect devolves to the Church. This failure is moral and juridical when electors no longer profess the Catholic faith. In the light of Divine Law, a structure that can no longer fulfill its final cause is considered non-existent for that function.
3. On the Primacy of the Final Cause:
According to Suárez (De Legibus, Lib. IV, c. 7), every human law is subordinate to the Divine Right of the Church to preserve itself. If strict adherence to the electoral "letter" leads to a perpetual vacancy, it becomes a lex injusta. As a "perfect society," the Church must possess within itself the means for its own restoration.
4. The Nature of the Imperfect Council and the Law of Necessity:
An Imperfect Council does not claim ordinary authority over a Pope, but a ministerial authority over the election. As taught by Vitoria (Relectio de potestate Ecclesiae), in extreme necessity, the Church possesses the intrinsic power to provide for its own Head. As Johnson correctly notes, only negative divine law remains absolute; electing a Pope through the episcopate is not an intrinsically evil act, but an exercise of supplied jurisdiction (Ecclesia supplet).
5. Episcopal Legitimacy:
According to St. Thomas Aquinas (ST, IIa-IIae, q. 39, a. 3), the episcopal character confers a radical aptitude for government, which is activated by the necessity of the Universal Church to restore its visible Head.
Conclusion:
An Imperfect Council does not claim authority over a Pope but exercises an indispensable ministerial authority. Indefectibility cannot be reduced to a mere material lineage of occupied sees; it requires the Church's real capacity to provide itself with an effective Head.
Bibliographical References:
Cajetan: De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii, cap. XIII.
Suárez: De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, Lib. IV, cap. VII.
Vitoria: Relectio de Potestate Ecclesiae, q. 2, art. 1.
St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica, IIa-IIae, q. 39, a. 3.
I thank you for your careful intervention and for the reference you have provided. The seriousness of the question requires that it be considered not merely from the standpoint of disciplinary norms, but according to the deeper principles which govern both the sacramental order and the divine constitution of the Church.
For the Church is not first a juridical system, but a divine society, visible, hierarchical, and indefectible, whose essential principles cannot fail without the Church herself failing, which is impossible.
1. On Apostolic Succession and the Visibility of the Church
From the beginning, the Church has understood herself as essentially apostolic, not only in doctrine, but in a visible and continuous succession.
As Irenaeus teaches:
“Traditionem Apostolorum manifestatam in toto mundo… per successiones episcoporum custoditam.”
(The apostolic tradition, manifested throughout the whole world, is preserved through the succession of bishops.)
Thus, apostolic succession is not an accidental feature, but a constitutive principle of the Church’s visibility.
If this succession were to fail in reality, the Church would cease to be what Christ instituted—which is impossible.
2. On the Nature of the Episcopate: Order and Jurisdiction
It is therefore necessary to distinguish with precision what Catholic doctrine has always distinguished:
the power of Order (potestas ordinis)
and the power of Jurisdiction (potestas iurisdictionis)
As Thomas Aquinas teaches:
“Potestas ordinis et potestas iurisdictionis differunt.”
Episcopal consecration confers the fullness of the sacrament of Order and imprints an indelible character. It constitutes the subject within the apostolic order in a real and ontological manner.
But it does not confer jurisdiction.
Rather, it constitutes the subject as properly disposed to receive jurisdiction through mission, and establishes in him a radical ontological disposition ordering him to ecclesiastical governance, without conferring that governance itself.
As Cyprian of Carthage writes:
“Episcopatus unus est, cuius a singulis in solidum pars tenetur.”
Thus, the episcopate is not a mere functional delegation, but a participation in the very structure of the apostolic order.
3. On Sacramental Intention: Substance and Accident
Your argument rests largely on the question of intention.
Here, Catholic theology makes a decisive distinction between:
what is substantial to the sacrament
and what is accidental to it
The intention required for validity is the internal intention to perform the sacramental act itself, that is, to do what the Church does (facere quod facit Ecclesia), not a complete theological understanding of all its effects.
Thus, the efficacy of the sacrament depends on Christ, not on the theological precision of the minister.
It follows that:
An error regarding the non-essential effects of a sacrament does not vitiate the internal intention to perform the sacred rite itself.
The substantial intention is to “make a bishop” according to the rite of the Church.
Since jurisdiction is not the proper effect of the sacrament itself, an error concerning jurisdiction remains accidental and does not invalidate the consecration.
Otherwise, all sacramental certainty would collapse, and the Church would fall into Donatism.
4. On Law, Necessity, and the Hierarchy of Norms
You argue that one cannot do evil that good may come. This is entirely true.
But not every transgression of a human law constitutes a moral evil in the same sense.
The requirement of an Apostolic mandate belongs to ecclesiastical law, which is subordinate to divine law and ordered to a higher end: the preservation of the Church and the salvation of souls (salus animarum).
According to classical theology, laws are hierarchically ordered:
divine law
natural law
ecclesiastical (human) law
A lower law cannot invalidate or destroy a higher one.
As Thomas Aquinas teaches:
“Quando observatio legis est nociva bono communi, lex non est observanda.”
Thus, when the strict observance of a human law would lead to the disappearance of apostolic succession, the law must be understood according to its end. This does not imply any change in the nature of things, but concerns only the application of ecclesiastical law, which, as a human law, must be interpreted according to its final cause.
This is not doing evil—it is preserving the good for which the law exists.
5. On the Church as Societas Perfecta
At the root of the question lies a principle of the highest importance:
the Church is a Societas Perfecta, instituted by Christ, and therefore possessing within herself all the means necessary for her own preservation.
As Robert Bellarmine teaches, the Church is a visible and perpetual society.
Therefore:
The Church must possess within her own sacramental and hierarchical constitution the means necessary for her own visible perpetuation.
If the Church depended for her survival upon a purely administrative condition, such as the uninterrupted availability of a juridical mandate, she would no longer be a perfect society, but one dependent upon contingent human conditions.
This is incompatible with her divine institution.
6. Necessary Conclusion
It follows therefore with theological necessity:
that episcopal consecration can be valid without Apostolic mandate
that sacramental intention is not invalidated by doctrinal errors concerning jurisdiction
that the episcopal character constitutes a real and permanent ontological foundation of apostolic succession
that apostolic succession must remain visible in the Church
and that therefore there must exist, even in extraordinary circumstances, true bishops in whom this succession subsists
Final Consideration
The question, therefore, is not whether such bishops can exist.
It is whether one is prepared to affirm that the Church can lose the principle of her visible continuity.
For if that were admitted, the consequence would be grave:
the Church would no longer be a visible and apostolic society, but a reality dependent upon purely juridical conditions.
Thank you for your reply. I have indeed read the text of Abbé Belmont to which you refer, and I fully recognize the seriousness of the difficulty he raises regarding episcopal consecrations without Papal mandate.
However, it is necessary to determine with precision the proper level at which this difficulty is situated, in order to avoid any misunderstanding.
1. On Abbé Belmont and the level of the discussion
Abbé Belmont’s analysis brings to light a real tension within the juridical and hierarchical order of the Church.
But precisely for this reason, the question cannot be adequately resolved at the level of disciplinary or canonical analysis alone.
This is why my previous responses did not remain confined to that level: they sought to address the question at the level of principles, namely:
- the divine constitution of the Church,
- her indefectibility,
- and the nature of apostolic succession.
In this sense, what you attribute to Belmont has not been overlooked, but must be resolved by situating it within a higher theological framework.
2. On your central claim: the Papal mandate as constitutive necessity
You affirm that a bishop without Papal mandate is either non-Catholic or not a bishop at all, grounding this claim in the hierarchical nature of the episcopate, which you attribute to natural law.
This requires a precise clarification.
The hierarchical constitution of the Church, namely the subordination of the episcopate to the Roman Pontiff, belongs to divine positive law (ius divinum positivum), instituted by Christ, and not to natural law strictly speaking.
Natural law may indicate that every society requires a principle of unity, but the concrete form of ecclesiastical hierarchy is known only through revelation.
At the same time, the Papal mandate belongs to ecclesiastical law, which regulates the ordinary juridical exercise of this hierarchy.
Your argument therefore rests upon an identification that cannot be maintained:
- between what belongs to divine institution,
- and what belongs to juridical regulation.
3. On the nature of episcopal consecration
You further imply that, without juridical insertion into the hierarchy, episcopal consecration either produces no bishop or produces a non-Catholic bishop.
This conclusion does not follow from these principles, since it confuses the absence of juridical mission with the absence of sacramental reality.
Episcopal consecration:
- confers the fullness of the sacrament of Order,
- constitutes a true subject within the apostolic order.
It does not confer jurisdiction, which depends upon mission.
However, it establishes what is necessary for the Church’s continuity: a real subject capable of receiving and transmitting apostolic succession.
In this sense, it confers a radical aptitude for spiritual government (in potentia, not in actu), not as jurisdiction, but as an intrinsic disposition of the subject, remaining even when its exercise is canonically impeded.
Thus, the difficulty raised by Abbé Belmont concerns the juridical order, not the sacramental reality itself.
4. On visibility and objective criteria
You argue that without Papal mandate there is no objective way to distinguish who is Catholic.
This objection rests upon a confusion between juridical regularity and ecclesial visibility.
The Church is visible through objective and identifiable elements:
- the profession of the integral Catholic faith,
- the validity of the sacraments,
apostolic succession.
Thus, the distinction between a Catholic bishop and a schismatic does not rest solely upon canonical regularity, but upon:
- doctrinal profession,
- sacramental continuity,
- and ordination toward the Roman principle.
Visibility does not require universal agreement, but the presence of objective marks.
5. On law, necessity, and the Papal mandate
You insist that the Papal mandate is not a mere juridical obstacle, but pertains to the very constitution of the Church.
Here again, a distinction is necessary.
The Papal mandate is indeed essential to the ordinary juridical order of the Church.
However, it does not belong to the essence of the episcopate itself, nor to the divine constitution of apostolic succession.
If it did, then in circumstances where such mandate is morally or physically inaccessible, the continuation of apostolic succession would become impossible.
This leads directly to the decisive point.
6. Demonstration from principles
The Church is indefectible and must remain a visible and apostolic society.
Apostolic succession requires the existence of valid bishops capable of transmitting that succession.
If it is affirmed that no episcopal consecration is possible without Papal mandate in all circumstances, then, in the absence of access to such mandate, apostolic succession would cease in fact.
If apostolic succession ceases, the Church would lose her apostolicity and her visible hierarchical constitution.
This is theologically impossible.
Therefore, the absence of a Papal mandate, when such mandate is in fact inaccessible, cannot render impossible the continuation of apostolic succession.
Conclusion
In this light, the difficulty raised by Abbé Belmont is not denied, but resolved:
it expresses a real tension within the juridical order, but cannot negate what belongs to the divine constitution of the Church.
The question is not whether the Papal mandate belongs to the normal life of the Church, it does.
The question is whether its absence can make impossible what Christ instituted as perpetual.
This cannot be admitted without contradicting the very constitution of the Church.
Thank you for your clarification. Your position is now clearly expressed, which allows the question to be addressed at its proper theological level. Allow me, therefore, to respond according to the proper theological principles and distinctions.
1. On Sacramental Intention
You argue that episcopal consecrations performed with the intention not to confer jurisdiction are “against nature.” This does not correspond to Catholic sacramental theology. The intention required for validity is the intention to do what the Church does (facere quod facit Ecclesia), not a correct understanding of all the effects of the sacrament.
As St. Thomas Aquinas teaches (ST III, q. 64, a. 8), the minister need not have explicit knowledge of the effects of the sacrament. This principle is reaffirmed by Leo XIII in Apostolicae Curae. Therefore, an error concerning jurisdiction, which does not belong to the sacrament itself, does not invalidate the consecration. The sacramental effect (the episcopal character) is fully realized, even if jurisdiction, which belongs to a distinct order, is not currently conferred.
2. On Episcopacy and Authority
You rightly affirm that jurisdiction comes from mission and cannot be assumed by oneself. However, your position introduces a logical difficulty: If jurisdiction does not proceed from the sacrament, then the validity of the sacrament cannot depend on an intention to confer jurisdiction. To require such an intention while denying that jurisdiction comes from the sacrament is to conflate two distinct orders. Consecration constitutes a true subject in the apostolic order, capable of receiving jurisdiction, even if it does not grant it immediately.
3. On the Papal Mandate and Indefectibility
No one denies the necessity of the Papal mandate in the normal order of the Church. The question is whether its absence can render impossible what belongs to the Divine Constitution of the Church.
- If that were the case, apostolic succession would cease in certain historical circumstances.
- This would contradict the indefectibility of the Church.
- Visibility and apostolicity require that a real subject of succession subsist.
Without validly consecrated bishops, there would be no subject capable of receiving jurisdiction in the future, rendering any restoration of the hierarchical order impossible. The preservation of the episcopal character is a necessary condition for the continuity of the Church.
4. On the Juridical vs. Sacramental Order
Your rejection of this episcopacy presupposes that the juridical order must always remain fully operative. However, Catholic doctrine affirms that the sacramental structure of the Church can and must subsist even when the juridical order is impeded. The Church is a Societas Perfecta that possesses within herself the means of her own survival.
5. On Providence and Secondary Causes
To entrust everything to God is necessary, but divine Providence does not dispense us from acting according to the means God Himself has instituted. God governs His Church through visible and sacramental means. To neglect these means under the pretext of trusting in Providence is not an act of faith, but a failure to cooperate with the divine order.
Conclusion
The issue is not whether the Papal mandate is necessary in normal circumstances, it is.
The issue is whether its absence can render impossible what Christ instituted as perpetual.
This cannot be admitted without contradicting the indefectibility and visible apostolic continuity of the Church.
Thanks for this Serge. I think the primary point here is whether or not the principles that apply to true general councils – ie the claim that only those with jurisdiction have a strict right to attend and vote – apply also to imperfect general councils. I understood from Fr Ricossa's article that he concedes that any remaining ordinaries (or their equivalents) would indeed have a right to step in over the material cardinals. If he did not say it, I think it's implicit in the argument. It is asserted and argued, but not to my mind proved, that traditionalist bishops are equivalent to ordinaries.
Those, I think, are the two key points of this debate.
On the Law of Necessity, the Episcopal Habit, and the Principle of "Ecclesia Supplet"
« Thank you for this clarification, S.D. Wright. You have indeed identified the two pillars of the current impasse. I would like to offer some further thoughts on both.
Regarding your first point, the doctrine of the "Imperfect Council" (as seen in Cajetan and Vitoria) rests precisely on the principle that positive (human) laws must yield to the necessity of Divine Right. To restrict the right to vote solely to ordinaries when none remain would be to transform a protective rule into an instrument for the Church's own destruction. In a state of extreme necessity, the "strict right" is superseded by the "right of the Church to exist" as a visible society.
Regarding the second point, we must look at the ultimate finality of all jurisdiction: the Salus Animarum (salvation of souls), which is the Church's Lex Suprema. The challenge is perhaps not to prove that traditionalist bishops are "ordinaries" in the canonical sense, but that the episcopal character possesses a "radical aptitude" (habitus) for the government of the Universal Church.
St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that through his consecration, a bishop receives this aptitude. In normal times, its exercise is "bound" or restricted by human law (papal designation) for the sake of order. However, in an extraordinary vacancy that threatens the very survival of the Hierarchy, this restriction is lifted by the law of necessity.
The principle of "Ecclesia Supplet" does not create a new or "rebel" authority; rather, it unlocks this power already ontologically present in the episcopal character. Since the Church is a Perfect Society, it cannot be deprived by Christ of the means necessary for its own restoration. If ordinary jurisdiction is absent, supplied jurisdiction flows directly from Christ, the Church's invisible Head, to those bishops who profess the integrity of the Faith.
This is not "usurpation" but the fulfillment of a duty of charity toward the Church, which has a divine right to a visible Head.
To deny this would be to claim that Christ left His Church paralyzed, which is a theological impossibility. »
Attitude, that is predisposition, is not jurisdiction. The ordinaries' power of jurisdiction does not come from consecration, but directly from the Pope. Therefore, "traditionalist bishops" have no power that can be "unlocked".
Giuseppe, your objection relies on a total separation between Holy Orders and Jurisdiction that contradicts the organic nature of the Church. While the exercise of jurisdiction is normally regulated by the Pope, the radical capacity to govern is ontologically rooted in the Episcopal character.
To claim that an Bishop has no "unlocked" power in an emergency is to reduce the Successor of the Apostles to a mere "sacramental ghost." As a Perfect Society, the Church cannot be a circular trap where we need a Pope to grant jurisdiction, but need jurisdiction to elect a Pope. The "root" remains in the Episcopate for the very survival of the Apostolic See
I imagine you're familiar with the Church's teaching on this point. What comes directly from the Pope to bishops is THE POWER (of jurisdiction), not simply its exercise.
Ad Sinarum Gentem (1954)
12. By virtue of God's Will, the faithful are divided into two classes: the clergy and the laity. By virtue of the same Will is established the TWOFOLD sacred hierarchy, namely, of orders and jurisdiction. Besides - as has also been divinely established - the power of orders (through which the ecclesiastical hierarchy is composed of Bishops, priests, and ministers) comes from receiving the Sacrament of Holy Orders. But THE POWER OF JURISDICTION, which is conferred upon the Supreme Pontiff directly by divine rights, flows to the Bishops by the same right, but ONLY THROUGH the Successor of St. Peter, ....
Qua profecto divina voluntate christifideles in duos ordines distribuuntur, clericorum laicorumque ; eademque voluntate DUPLEX constituitur sacra potestas ordinis nempe et iurisdictionis. Ac praeterea — quod divinitus pariter statutum est — ad potestatem ordinis, qua Ecclesiastica Hierarchia ex Episcopis constat, presbyteris et administris, acceditur per acceptum sacri ordinis sacramentum; IURISDICTIONIS autem POTESTAS, quae Supremo Pontifici iure ipso divino directe confertur, EPISCOPIS ex eodem PROVENIT iure, AT NONNISI PER Petri Successorem, ... .
Mystici Corporis (1943)
Yet in exercising this office they [residential bishops] are not altogether independent, but are subordinate to the lawful authority of the Roman Pontiff, although enjoying THE ORDINARY POWER OF JURISDICTION which they receive directly from the same Supreme Pontiff.
id tamen dum faciunt, non plane sui iuris sunt, sed sub debita Romani Pontificis auctoritate positi, quamvis ordinaria iurisdictionis potestate fruantur, immediate sibi ab eodem Pontifice Summo impertita.
Giuseppe, your approach treats the Church as a dead mechanism rather than a Living Organism and a Perfect Society animated by the Holy Ghost. If, as you claim, the extinction of a legal channel of jurisdiction could paralyze the Church's vital functions, then the Church would be no more than a human institution.
But the Church is the Mystical Body of Christ. A living body is not a machine; it possesses an internal principle of life and restoration. Christ did not leave His Church as a "project on hold" or a legal orphan. Even in an extraordinary vacancy, the power to provide for the Head does not vanish into a legal void; it remains in the faithful Episcopate as a living root, ready to act for the salvation of souls. To deny this is to confuse the regulation of the law with the source of Life itself. We do not wait for a miracle from outside; we believe in the Indefectibility of the Life that dwells within the Church in actum today.
Further thought on the consistency of supplied jurisdiction:
« To conclude on the internal consistency of this position, one must note a striking paradox: most traditional clergy today (and the faithful who follow them) already act daily by virtue of this supplied jurisdiction. When a priest without an ordinary canonical mission hears confessions, confirms, or governs a community, he invokes the law of necessity and the principle of Ecclesia Supplet for the sake of souls.
If we admit that necessity "unlocks" the radical aptitude (habitus) of the priest for particular goods (the sacraments), how can we logically deny that this same necessity unlocks the radical aptitude of the episcopate for the universal common good of the Church? Christ could not have endowed His Church with the power to heal individual members while refusing her the power to restore her own Head. As Bellarmin teaches (De Conciliis, I, 14), the right to provide itself with a head is a right of natural preservation. If the Church is a Perfect Society, she must possess within herself, through Christ, the capacity to end her state of decapitation. »
We don't admit that the necessity unlocks the radical aptitude. We say that certain states of necessity trigger the supply of jurisdiction by the law - ie, something new is given, not something latent unlocked.
As for the head. Fr Ricossa argues there are no living ordinaries or their equivalents. I do not not. But if there are such living ordinaries, then the Church already enjoys the capacity to elect a new pope, without needing recourse to arguments about traditionalist bishops.
Thank you for this reply, S.D. Wright. Our disagreement reveals two very different visions of the Church.
Regarding the first point: by saying that jurisdiction is "something new" given by the law, you treat it as an external object, like a key handed to someone. But a law, which is a mere rule, cannot give what it does not possess. Thomistic theology suggests a deeper reality: the "Root" of jurisdiction is already present in the episcopal character received at consecration.
In normal times, this power is "bound" or dormant for the sake of order. But in a crisis, it is not "something new" that is added; rather, it is this ontological root that is "unlocked" by the necessity of the Church's survival. To deny this is to reduce the Bishop to a mere administrative shell, whereas he is, by his very nature, a Successor of the Apostles.
Regarding the second point: waiting for hypothetical "ordinaries" who have not manifested themselves in 60 years is, in my view, a form of theological paralysis. If the Church is a Perfect Society, she cannot be dependent on "administrative shadows" or bishops who no longer exist.
The right to provide a Head for the Church must reside in the living members who still profess the Faith. If we admit that necessity allows a priest to give absolution (a particular good), we must admit that it allows the Episcopate to provide a Pope (the common good). To deny the Church the means of its own restoration is to claim that Christ's promise has failed, which is a theological impossibility
Serge, my formation was stolen, so it's hard to follow everything. But your logic and goodness give me hope. I was born in 1960 and I would like to see a Pope before I die
Thank you very much for your kind words. I understand what you mean. Many of us have been deprived, in different ways, of a clear and peaceful Catholic formation in this crisis.
My only desire is to seek, as faithfully as possible, what the Church has always taught, without despair and without inventing solutions of our own.
May God grant His Church a true and visible shepherd again, in the way and at the time He wills, and may we have the grace to cooperate with His Providence rather than remain passive.
Mr. Wright, your two “key points” actually expose the problem rather than resolve it.
First, the principle you cite is decisive: only those with jurisdiction have the right to act in councils or elections. That is precisely why your position fails. You cannot extend that principle to “imperfect” situations while simultaneously admitting that jurisdiction comes only from the Roman Pontiff. Without mission, there is no right—strict or otherwise—to govern or elect.
Second, the claim that traditionalist bishops are “equivalent to ordinaries” is not merely unproven—it is impossible. An ordinary is defined by jurisdiction over a flock. A bishop without mission is not an ordinary in any sense, but only a bishop of orders.
So your argument depends on a category that does not exist: men without jurisdiction acting as if they possessed it.
The conclusion follows directly from your own premise: no jurisdiction, no right to act.
Serge, your entire argument hinges on a single unproven leap: that the Church’s nature as a “perfect society” includes the power to generate jurisdiction or election authority apart from the Roman Pontiff.
But that is precisely what the Church has never taught.
A “perfect society” means the Church possesses all the means instituted by Christ for her end—not that she can create new ones when those means are absent. Otherwise, divine constitution becomes elastic under pressure.
Cajetan’s “devolution” does not establish what you claim. It presupposes a juridical order still intact—not a universal loss of mission. You are extending a limited principle into a total reconstruction of authority.
Likewise, “Ecclesia supplet” applies to acts under common error—not to the creation of offices, jurisdiction, or the election of a pope.
And Aquinas’ “radical aptitude” is being misused. Aptitude is not power, and necessity does not actualize jurisdiction.
You are trying to preserve indefectibility by granting the Church a power Christ never gave her.
But indefectibility preserves the structure—it does not authorize its replacement.
1. The huge problem today (exploited BTW by neo-modernists occupying nowadays Vatican) is an anachronistic vision of the Church history being an effect of end of 19th century "hyperpapalism"
(which in some cases take a rather vicious character - like falsifying the English translation of Bellarmine's work regarding the councils because the saint dared to hold John XXIII as the lawful pope - which was by the way the view very often met in Catholic publications including Annuario Pontificio pope list up to the 1940's).
2. In fact the history of the Church provides many practical examples (and usages) of electing/choosing the bishop of Rome in ways other than the college of cardinals, in particular, in extraordinary situations (state of necessity) when the ordinary, positive election law cannot be applied (we do not have to consider the 1958 sedevacantist thesis here, we can for example, for speculation purposes, imagine a hypothetic but possible situation where all cardinals and the pope die suddenly in a plane crash - then what? does the hierarchy cease to exist because the legicoming back to the Church history we had popes elected/chosen by the clergy/faithful of Rome (ancient times), by Roman patricians/emperor (crisis of 10th/11th century) or by an elaborate extraordinary election mechanism (Council of Constance - no, it was not "gallicanism" that made Martin V pope but the state of necessity and the practical solution adopted to end the disastrous crisis) - all deemed valid/true popes in the Church history. At the same time we had popes elected with a violation of ordinary conclave rules (Urban VI when populus Romanus put cardinals under a violent pressure to force them to elect a "Roman") also deemed valid.
Thus, there are many historical cases that may be referred to and I am very amazed 1958 sedevacantists did nothing to elect the pope (Catholics in the past sometimes made mistakes like (hyper)conciliarism but at least they acted - showing the Catholic spirit and did not close eyes, tolerating prolonged sede vacante).
3. Unfortunately, the above article quotes the above mentioned anachronistic late viewpoint regarding for example the Council of Pisa with claims it was "schismatic". Well, as I said before, many Catholics up to choosing his name by Roncalli in 1958 did not think so. And AFAIR the Church has never pronounced a judgement against it. And Bellarmine in his De Conciliis, lib. I, cap. VIII says that it is an almost common opinion that Alexander (chosen in Pisa) and his successor - John were true Pontiffs (q u o d e s t f e r m e c o m m u n i s o p i n i o, A l e x a n d r u m, e t q u i e i s u c c e s s i t, J o a n n e m f u i s s e v e r o s P o n t i f i c e s)
« I am very grateful to VRS for these historical reminders. They provide the necessary "flesh" to the theological principle of the Habitus I mentioned earlier.
The "hyperpapalism" mentioned by VRS is precisely what "binds" the radical aptitude of our bishops today. By freezing the Church into a rigid legalism that only knows the 1945 or 1917 election laws, we end up denying the Church's nature as a Perfect Society.
The "plane crash" metaphor perfectly illustrates the difference between Ecclesiastical Right (the designation of electors) and Divine Right (the Church's power to preserve itself). As history shows—especially with the Council of Constance—when the ordinary law becomes an obstacle to the survival of the Papacy, the Law of Necessity must override positive laws.
To accept Ecclesia Supplet for the branches (the sacraments) while refusing it for the Root (the election of a Head) is a theological contradiction. If the Church is a Perfect Society, she must possess within herself, through Christ, the capacity to end her state of decapitation. »
You’re conflating irregular procedures with the source of authority.
Yes, history shows unusual elections—pressure, interference, imperfect mechanisms. But in every case, the Church later judged them valid precisely because jurisdiction ultimately derived from the Roman See, not because necessity created a new source of authority.
That distinction destroys your argument.
You’re arguing from disorder in the mode of election to a change in the principle of authority. The Church has never taught that necessity allows jurisdiction or papal election power to arise apart from the structure instituted by Christ.
Your hypothetical (all cardinals dead) proves nothing. It only shows a difficulty—not a permission to reconstruct the constitution.
And invoking “hyperpapalism” is a deflection. The issue is not exaggerating the papacy, but preserving the defined teaching: jurisdiction flows from Peter.
History shows irregularity can occur. It does not show the Church can generate authority without its source.
Otherwise, every crisis becomes a license to reinvent the Church.
"We say “imperfect” because in the absence of the Pope, a general Council is precisely imperfect (cf. De comparatione, n° 231, where it is spoken of the Council of Constance which met for the election of Martin V), in that it is deprived of its Head, who alone can convoke, direct and confirm an ecumenical Council"
---
The 2nd Council of Constantinople is recognised as general/ecumenical but it was convoked by the emperor and without participation of pope (or his legates), and was confirmed by the pope only after it had ended. So it ensues that it is sufficient if the pope confirms/approves acts of the council, even post factum.
« Thank you, VRS. This historical example is a powerful reminder of a key principle: the validity of an ecclesiastical act depends more on its finality and its subsequent confirmation by the Holy See than on the strict regularity of its initial convocation. In a state of necessity, the Episcopate's movement toward the Common Good is what matters, as it awaits the definitive seal of the Pope it will have elected. »
The Necessity of Action: Divine Right vs. Legal Paralysis
To provide a broader perspective on this issue, I believe we must return to the supreme law of the Church and the internal consistency of our position. A rigorous reasoning, based on the perennial teaching of the Church, rests on three pillars:
1. The Hierarchy of Norms (Divine Right vs. Ecclesiastical Right)
The Papacy is of Divine institution (Iure Divino), while the specific mode of election (via Cardinals) is of Ecclesiastical institution (Iure Ecclesiastico). St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that human law ceases to bind when it becomes an obstacle to the Common Good. To claim that an election is impossible due to a lack of Cardinals is to subordinate Christ’s will, that His Church have a Head, to a human administrative rule. Divine Right commands providing for the See, regardless of failing human modalities.
2. Indefectibility resides in Faith, not in "Shadows"
The thesis of a "material" hierarchy (occupying sees without the Faith) is a legal illusion. St. Robert Bellarmine is clear: a manifest heretic is not a member of the Church and cannot be the "matter" of its government. The Church is a living body; its indefectibility resides in the faithful episcopate that preserves both the Orders and the Faith. To wait for "administrative shadows" to convert before acting is an error: the Church must restore itself through its living and confessing members.
3. Epikeia as the Highest Act of Justice
Epikeia is not a "breach" of the law, but the fulfillment of the spirit of the law when the letter becomes deadly. As St. Thomas Aquinas teaches: "In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law; it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good" (Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 120, a. 1). If the letter of election law prevents any election from occurring, Epikeia commands us to bypass the letter to save the very existence of the Papacy. As moral theology teaches, necessity knows no law (Necessitas non habet legem) when the salvation of the Christian society is at stake.
In perspective:
If we accept supplied jurisdiction for confessions out of charity for a single soul, how can we deny it for the election of a Pope, which is charity for the entire Church? Inaction is not a virtue; it is a paralysis that contradicts the nature of the Church as a Perfect Society. The Church possesses within herself, through her faithful episcopate, the radical power to restore her Head. To deny this is to claim that Christ has left His Church paralyzed, which is a theological impossibility.
This is a very interesting discussion. Thank you to the various writers for considering the topic with intelligence and peace. I am not in the habit of posting comments, but I would like to say the following:
I think the heart of the problem lies within a confusion between LEX and JUS. Jus (right) is superior to lex (law). When you underline the JUS that the Church has to provide for a visible head, people oppose LEX to you, not considering that LEX (the laws) has been implemented to protect the JUS (the right). But there is a gradation from LEX to JUS to JUSTITIA. No legal consideration will ever be able to undermine the right the Church has to provide for a visible head, taking extraordinary means against the laws or rather over the laws (praeter legem) if necessary.
This would be the whole purpose of an Imperfect General Council : determine the vacancy of the Holy See; determine who are the lawful electors (if there are any) and if none can be found, consider carefully and eventually affirm the right of the assembly to make a decision on who they will be, make that decision and go ahead with the desired election. Such a decision on who are the rightful electors would make the men chosen by the assembled Church the lawful electors. For, if it is possible that there be no lawful elector, it is impossible that there be no rightful electors.
I wish everyone could consider that the Holy Ghost still dwells within the Church today in 2026.
Your Excellency, thank you for this luminous distinction between Lex and Jus. It is precisely here that the core of the debate lies. To prioritize the Lex (the specific mode of election) over the Jus (the Church's divine right to its Head) is to turn the protective fence of the Church into its own prison. Your reminder that the Church, as a Perfect Society, always retains the "rightful electors" even when "lawful electors" fail, is the only path that preserves the indefectibility of the Church in 2026. This is the very essence of Epikeia in its highest form.
And thank you for this passage, which is very powerful:
«If we accept supplied jurisdiction for confessions out of charity for a single soul, how can we deny it for the election of a Pope, which is charity for the entire Church? Inaction is not a virtue; it is a paralysis that contradicts the nature of the Church as a Perfect Society. The Church possesses within herself, through her faithful episcopate, the radical power to restore her Head. To deny this is to claim that Christ has left His Church paralyzed, which is a theological impossibility.»
In my interaction with various people, I have seen that everyone (or almost) accepts in principle the right of the Church to gather into an Imperfect General Council to remedy the very grave problem which affects Her head at the present, not to go further in our affirmations until the assembled Church has made a pronouncement. This includes the prominent tenants of the Thesis I have been in touch with. They have affirmed clearly that an Imperfect General Council is the solution.
The difference lies within the question : Where is the Church today? Who represents the authority of the Church today?
- While we are stating that the authority of the Church is where the true Faith is being professed today, accompanied by the Hierarchy of Holy Orders (and jurisdiction, but let us leave that aside for now);
- The tenants of the Thesis I have been in touch with seem to affirm that the authority of the Church is where the true Faith will be professed in the future when certain people who have some sort of apparent title will convert.
In other words, while we affirm that the Church has today in actum the power to provide for a visible head, they deny the existence of this power in actum today to provide for a visible head and reduce it to a power in potentia.
This opinion of the Thesis on who represents the authority of the Church today, in my humble opinion, undermines the nature of the Church as a perfect society, by making its vital operation depend on elements that are foreign to its essence : those who do not profess the Catholic Faith. It makes the vital operation of providing for a visible head depend on the future belonging to the Church of certain people whom they have decided must convert for God to perpetuate the divine mission of His Church on earth.
«Hence I am with you until the consummation of the world». If only we knew that Christ meant : «Hence I am with you in potentia until the consummation of the world.»
Your Excellency, your distinction between power in actum and power in potentia strikes at the very root of the error. To reduce the Church's ability to restore its Head to a mere "potentiality" dependent on the conversion of those outside the Faith is to deny the current visibility and life of the Mystical Body.
As a Perfect Society, the Church must possess the means of its restoration within its actual faithful members. To wait for "administrative shadows" to return to the Faith is to subordinate the divine mission of Christ to the free will of those who currently oppose it. The Church is a living reality today, not a project on hold. Your words remind us that Christ’s promise—"I am with you always"—is an active and present reality, not a suspended hope.
You’re identifying a real principle—the Church is a living society—but you’re misplacing where that life is manifested.
The Church’s visibility is not proven by the ability to act, but by the continuity of what was instituted. The Mystical Body remains visible through the profession of the true faith and adherence to the divine constitution—not through the uninterrupted exercise of jurisdiction.
You assume that if the Church cannot presently restore her Head, then her life is reduced to “potentiality.” That does not follow. A society can remain real while impeded in operation. Christ’s promise “I am with you always” guarantees indefectibility of constitution—not perpetual access to lawful governance in every moment.
Your position quietly introduces something the Church has never taught: that necessity activates jurisdiction or supplies the means of succession from within. But jurisdiction, by divine law, flows from the Roman Pontiff—not from the faithful, not from bishops acting without mandate, and not from a generalized “life” of the Church.
So the choice is stark: either divine constitution governs, or necessity does. It cannot be both.
The Church lives—but not by inventing authority she has not received.
You are separating jus from lex in a way the Church herself never permits.
The “right” to provide a visible head is not something the Church exercises apart from her own divinely constituted laws. Those laws are not arbitrary—they are the very means established to safeguard that right. You cannot appeal to jus to override the structure Christ instituted without dissolving that structure entirely.
There is no Catholic doctrine that permits the Church to act praeter legem in constituting a Pope. The election of a Roman Pontiff is not a flexible mechanism—it is tied to a determinate body (the cardinals) and a juridical process. If that structure is absent, it is not replaced by improvisation.
An “imperfect council” cannot create electors, because jurisdiction and the right to elect do not arise from assembly—they are derived from prior mission, which itself flows from the Roman Pontiff.
So your conclusion assumes what must first be proven: that there still exists a body with authority to act.
If no lawful electors remain, the answer is not self-constitution.
It is that we are enduring a real deprivation—not rewriting the Church’s constitution to escape it.
Please excuse the lateness of this reply; your objections seemed important enough to deserve a more considered response.
Thank you for your objections. I think they help bring the discussion to its proper level.
It seems to me that the disagreement is not about whether jurisdiction comes from Christ through Peter. On this point, I agree entirely. Nor am I claiming that bishops without mission possess universal jurisdiction, or that necessity can create a new source of authority.
The real question is different:
Can the laws governing the ordinary transmission of authority be interpreted in such a way that the Church would be indefinitely deprived of any concrete means of restoring the very head required by her divine constitution?
I do not see how this can be maintained.
The distinction between the positive juridical form (lex) and the underlying right and end it serves (jus) seems essential here, since classical theology holds that ecclesiastical law must be interpreted according to the end for which it exists.
This is precisely why theologians such as Cajetan and Suárez consider extraordinary questions arising in cases of extreme necessity: because the preservation of the Church cannot be understood as subordinated absolutely to contingent positive juridical forms.
The laws concerning papal election exist in order to secure the continuation of the Roman Pontiff, not to make that continuation impossible when the ordinary electors fail or become unusable.
Therefore, to say that no lawful electors remain cannot mean that the Church has no possible way, in principle, of determining rightful electors in a case of extreme necessity. Otherwise, ecclesiastical law would be interpreted against its own end.
This is not a reconstruction of the Church’s constitution. It is the refusal to make a contingent juridical mechanism superior to the divine finality it serves.
You rightly insist that authority is received and not invented. I agree. But designation is not collation of jurisdiction. The electors do not give the papacy. They designate the subject who, if legitimately designated and accepting, receives authority from Christ.
Thus, the question is not whether bishops without ordinary jurisdiction can create papal authority. They cannot.
The question is whether the Church, in a case of extreme necessity, retains a real and visible capacity to designate the subject of the papacy, so that Christ may confer the authority which He alone gives.
If the answer is no, then the Church remains a society in name, but without any actual means of restoring her visible principle of unity. That would reduce indefectibility to a merely abstract preservation of structure without vital operation.
In the line of classical theology represented by Suárez, the perfection of the Church does not imply that every power must always be exercised according to its ordinary mode, but that the Church permanently possesses, within the order willed by Christ, the means necessary for her preservation.
A perfect society cannot be understood as possessing all necessary means for its end only in theory, while being in practice indefinitely unable to use any of them.
This is why the episcopate matters. Not because it is an autonomous source of jurisdiction, and not because it replaces Peter, but because it appears to be the visible hierarchical subject most ordered to the head. Outside the episcopate, no merely private group, lay body, or self-appointed faction can plausibly represent the Church in her order of government.
So the true alternative is not:
“ordinary jurisdiction or revolution.”
The true distinction is between:
ordinary juridical operation, when the ordinary means exist;
and extraordinary, strictly ministerial action, when the ordinary means are morally or juridically impossible — not to create a new authority, but to restore the normal order.
This is why the accusation of self-constitution does not touch the argument if the act is properly limited.
A true extraordinary act would not claim to govern the Universal Church, define doctrine, or create jurisdiction. It would be ordered solely to the restoration of the head, and would remain ministerial, not constitutive.
Your position rightly fears conciliarism and ecclesiastical self-invention. So do I.
But there is an opposite danger: a juridical paralysis in which the laws of the Church are treated as if they could permanently prevent the Church from attaining the very end for which they exist.
That, too, seems difficult to reconcile with Catholic ecclesiology.
The Church does not invent authority. But neither can she be conceived as a visible, hierarchical, perfect society deprived of any actual visible means of restoring her head when the ordinary means fail.
That is, it seems to me, the precise point at issue.
You say you are not creating a new source of authority, yet the entire structure of your argument depends upon necessity permitting acts for which no demonstrable subject of jurisdiction presently exists. That is precisely the difficulty.
Notice where the shift occurs.
You move from: “The Church cannot be deprived indefinitely”
to: “Therefore some visible body must retain the practical capacity to restore the papacy.”
But that conclusion is not drawn from defined theology. It is drawn from what you personally believe indefectibility must look like in practice.
That is the leap.
The Church teaches that her divine constitution cannot fail. She does not teach that Catholics must always retain an operational mechanism capable of visibly restoring the hierarchy under every historical condition.
In fact, Scripture, the Fathers, and many approved theologians repeatedly contemplate profound eclipse, cessation, chastisement, and deprivation in the final crisis. Cardinal Manning himself notes the unanimous expectation among the Fathers that the Holy Sacrifice would cease in the latter days. The possibility of deprivation is not foreign to Catholic theology at all. What is foreign is the idea that deprivation itself authorizes extraordinary reconstruction of juridical order from below.
And this is the key point: you never actually demonstrate the existence of a body possessing the authority to designate electors or initiate restoration. You infer that such a body must exist because otherwise the crisis appears intolerable to your understanding of indefectibility.
But theology does not proceed from emotional necessity.
You say the episcopate is “most ordered to the head.” Granted. But bishops are not a floating reservoir of jurisdiction awaiting activation in emergencies. Catholic theology has always distinguished sacramental order from mission and jurisdiction. A bishop without mission does not become a juridical principle of restoration simply because the crisis becomes prolonged.
Otherwise the constitution quietly changes: Peter remains theoretically necessary, but the episcopate acquires practical power to perpetuate and restore the structure apart from demonstrable Petrine authorization whenever necessity is invoked.
That is not merely ministerial action. It becomes substitute ecclesiology.
You also separate lex from jus too sharply. Ecclesiastical law is not an arbitrary shell wrapped around a deeper invisible principle. In the Church, juridical form is part of the visible constitution itself. The laws governing succession are not accidental obstacles standing over against the Church’s divine end. They are among the very means through which Christ ordered His Church to continue visibly.
So when those means fail in practice, the answer is not automatically: “therefore extraordinary replacement mechanisms activate.”
That conclusion itself requires proof.
And this is the deepest problem with the entire necessity thesis: it begins by rejecting private invention of authority, but ends by inferring authority from what seems necessary for the Church to remain what one believes she must visibly look like.
But Christ never promised immunity from juridical deprivation. He promised indefectibility of the Church’s constitution.
Men may fail it. The structure itself cannot fail.
Thank you for your reply. I think it helps clarify the real point at issue.
I agree that the Church can undergo a real deprivation, even a terrible eclipse in her visible operation. I do not deny this. Nor do I claim that indefectibility means permanent ease of government, uninterrupted normality, or immunity from chastisement.
But the possibility of deprivation does not prove the impossibility of a remedy.
More precisely, it does not prove that the episcopate may not even gather to discern whether such a remedy exists according to the divine constitution of the Church.
Here, the distinction must be carefully maintained.
I am not saying that the episcopate, without the Roman Pontiff, possesses supreme jurisdiction. It does not.
I am not saying that bishops without canonical mission can create jurisdiction. They cannot.
I am not saying that necessity itself confers governing authority. It does not.
But the episcopate is not therefore a merely sacramental remnant with no ecclesial function. By divine institution, it belongs to the visible hierarchical constitution of the Church. It is the body most ordered to the head, and therefore the proper visible subject to examine a crisis affecting the head.
This is not conciliarism.
Conciliarism would make the episcopate a source of authority above or alongside Peter.
What I am describing is something different: the episcopate acting ministerially, not to replace Peter, but to discern how Peter may be restored.
To gather in order to examine the present state of the Church is not yet to govern the Universal Church.
To discern whether the Holy See is vacant is not yet to create jurisdiction.
To ask whether lawful or rightful electors remain is not yet to invent electors.
To examine whether an extraordinary act of designation is possible is not yet to confer the papacy.
And even designation itself, if it were eventually judged possible and legitimate, would not be the collation of jurisdiction. The electors do not give papal authority. They designate the subject who, upon legitimate designation and acceptance, receives authority from Christ.
This is why the question cannot be reduced to:
“No jurisdiction, therefore no action.”
That formula is true if “action” means governing the Universal Church, defining doctrine, or exercising jurisdiction.
But it is not sufficient if “action” means hierarchical discernment concerning the very restoration of the visible principle of unity.
Catholic ecclesiology does not treat the episcopate as a collection of private individuals. Nor does it reduce bishops to validly consecrated men who become ecclesially irrelevant whenever ordinary mission is impeded. The episcopate is part of the visible constitution of the Church: subordinate to Peter, but truly ordered to the teaching, governing, preservation, and unity of the Church.
Therefore the real question is not whether bishops can replace the pope.
They cannot.
The real question is whether, in an unprecedented crisis of the head, the episcopate is the proper hierarchical subject to gather, discern, and determine what the Church’s divine constitution permits or forbids.
If the answer is no, then one must explain what visible hierarchical subject remains capable of even examining the crisis.
If the answer is “none,” then the conclusion is no longer merely deprivation. It becomes a principle of ecclesial inaction.
That seems very difficult to reconcile with the Church as a visible, hierarchical, apostolic society.
Your appeal to eschatological deprivation is serious, and it rightly cautions against rash action. I accept that.
But it cannot justify refusing even hierarchical discernment.
The possibility that God permits an eclipse does not allow us to conclude that He forbids the remaining hierarchy to examine whether He wills to act through it as a secondary cause.
Providence does not exclude visible instruments. In the Church, it ordinarily works through them.
So I would state the point this way:
The episcopate does not possess the jurisdiction of Peter.
But by the divine constitution of the Church, it is the visible hierarchical body most competent to discern what must be done when the question concerns the absence, impediment, or restoration of Peter.
To deny this, it is not enough to say that bishops lack universal jurisdiction.
One would need to show that the divine constitution of the Church forbids the episcopate even to gather and discern how the visible head may be restored.
Thank you again for the careful tone of your reply. I agree the discussion deserves precision, because the issue is not whether bishops can replace Peter. They cannot. The issue is whether men lacking demonstrable mission may nonetheless constitute a competent hierarchical subject for restoration.
And I still believe your argument quietly assumes the very thing needing proof.
You repeatedly speak of: “the episcopate,” “the remaining hierarchy,” “the visible hierarchical subject,” and bishops acting “ministerially” to discern restoration.
But under Catholic theology, hierarchy is not merely sacramental. It is juridical.
A validly consecrated bishop is not thereby part of a juridically competent acting episcopate simply by existing during a crisis. Mission and authority are not produced by gathering, necessity, or proximity to the problem being discussed.
That is the distinction I believe your framework never fully crosses.
You correctly deny:
that bishops possess Peter’s jurisdiction,
that necessity creates authority,
that bishops may replace the pope,
that jurisdiction can be manufactured from below.
But then you still assign to the episcopate a visible ecclesial competence to gather, discern, identify possible electors, examine extraordinary designation mechanisms, and potentially initiate restoration procedures.
That is already an ecclesiological act.
And once such a body publicly acts as the Church’s competent visible organ for restoration, the question immediately becomes:
By what juridical principle did these particular bishops become a competent acting body of the Church rather than merely validly consecrated individuals lacking mission?
That point is never actually demonstrated.
Instead, the argument seems to proceed indirectly:
If no such competent visible body remains, then restoration appears impossible or ecclesial paralysis follows. Therefore some competent visible body must remain.
But that is not a theological proof. It is a conclusion drawn from the perceived intolerability of deprivation.
And this is precisely where I believe many modern restoration arguments drift unintentionally into necessity ecclesiology.
Catholic theology absolutely teaches the perpetual constitution of the Church. I affirm that fully.
But it never defined that there must always remain a visibly operative juridical mechanism capable of restoring the papacy during every conceivable chastisement.
Scripture repeatedly presents catastrophic deprivation: the scattering of the flock, the cessation language associated with the sacrifice, the eclipse themes contemplated by many Fathers and theologians, and prolonged conditions where fidelity consists not in reconstruction, but endurance.
Even Cardinal Manning acknowledged the unanimous expectation among the Fathers that the sacrifice would cease in the final crisis.
So the mere fact that deprivation appears severe, prolonged, or practically unbearable does not itself generate ecclesial competence where lawful mission has not been demonstrated.
And that is the central issue.
I do not deny the importance of bishops to the Church’s constitution.
I deny that sacramental continuity alone establishes a juridically competent episcopal subject capable of acting for the Church in the restoration of Peter without demonstrable mission already present.
Otherwise the continuity being sought is quietly presumed from the beginning.
And that is why I continue to believe the argument ultimately rests not on demonstrated ecclesiology, but on the conviction that the alternative simply feels impossible.
Thank you again for your careful reply. I think your objection helps isolate the precise point of disagreement.
I agree with your central caution: a validly consecrated bishop, considered simply as such, does not thereby possess ordinary jurisdiction, nor does he become competent to govern the Universal Church merely because a crisis continues. I do not deny the distinction between Orders, mission, and jurisdiction. On the contrary, that distinction is essential.
But it seems to me that your objection moves too quickly from a true premise to an excessive conclusion.
The true premise is this:
bishops without canonical mission do not possess ordinary jurisdiction and cannot govern the Universal Church.
I agree.
The excessive conclusion would be this:
therefore the remaining episcopate cannot even constitute the visible hierarchical subject competent to examine, discern, and determine whether the Church still possesses a legitimate means of restoring the Roman Pontiff.
That conclusion does not follow.
The act I am defending is not an act of universal jurisdiction. It is not the exercise of Peter’s authority. It is not the creation of mission from below. It is not the constitution of a new hierarchy.
It is a ministerial act of discernment concerning the restoration of the very principle without which ordinary jurisdiction cannot resume.
This distinction is crucial.
To gather in order to examine whether the Holy See is vacant is not yet to govern the Universal Church.
To examine whether ordinary electors remain is not yet to create electors.
To determine whether the ordinary mode has become morally impossible is not yet to invent jurisdiction.
To ask whether an extraordinary designation is permitted by the Church’s own divine constitution is not yet to confer the papacy.
And even if an act of designation were eventually judged possible, designation is not the collation of jurisdiction. The electors do not give papal authority. They designate the subject who, after legitimate designation and acceptance, receives authority from Christ.
You say that hierarchy in the Church is not merely sacramental but juridical. I agree.
But Catholic doctrine also teaches that the episcopate belongs by divine institution to the visible hierarchy of the Church. The Council of Trent teaches that, by divine ordination, there is in the Church a hierarchy composed of bishops, priests, and ministers.
Therefore the episcopate cannot be reduced to a collection of private individuals simply because ordinary mission is impeded.
Dom Gréa is particularly helpful here because he preserves both truths.
On the one hand, he clearly teaches that hierarchical communion — juridical communion — is given by the head and received by the members:
“La communion hiérarchique, synonyme parfait de la juridiction des modernes, est telle en effet qu’elle est donnée par le chef et reçue par les membres.”
And again:
“Le vicaire de Jésus-Christ est ce centre visible d’où découle immédiatement la communion épiscopale et avec elle la puissance des pasteurs.”
I fully accept this.
Jurisdiction is not produced by consecration, necessity, or assembly.
But Gréa does not then reduce the episcopate to a merely sacramental residue with no ecclesial competence. He writes:
“L’épiscopat est un dans tous les membres du collège, et tout entier dans chacun des évêques.”
And he explains that this cannot be understood only of the power exercised by bishops over the flock assigned to them by title, because otherwise the mystery of the episcopate would not clearly regard the Universal Church.
He continues:
“Mais les évêques, en vertu de cette union profonde et mystérieuse qui est leur ordre même et l’essence de l’épiscopat, agissent aussi, lorsqu’il convient qu’ils le fassent, au-delà même de ces limites étroites et comme associés au gouvernement et au mouvement de l’Église universelle.”
This is exactly the point.
The episcopate is not the source of jurisdiction. But it is not ecclesially insignificant when the crisis concerns the restoration of the head to whom all jurisdiction is ordered.
Aubry expresses the same principle from another angle. Christ did not leave behind isolated believers or merely isolated sacramental functions. He instituted:
“un corps de pasteurs, se renouvelant par parties, mais immortel dans son ensemble comme une personne morale,”
so that the succession of pastors would be the instrument for the conservation of the apostolic deposit.
Mgr de Salinis likewise describes the divine economy of the Church as involving:
“une hiérarchie partout présente; un enseignement qui est entendu de tous; un ministère…”
These are not accidental expressions. They describe the visible, apostolic, and hierarchical form in which Christ willed His Church to endure.
Here I think your argument draws too much from Pius XII.
Pius XII teaches that episcopal jurisdiction, in the ordinary order, comes to bishops through the Successor of Peter. I fully accept this. But it does not follow that, if the Roman See is vacant and the ordinary electors have failed, the Church possesses no visible hierarchical subject capable even of discerning how Peter’s successor might be restored.
That would turn a doctrine concerning the ordinary communication of jurisdiction into a principle of absolute paralysis.
The question is not whether necessity creates jurisdiction. It does not.
The question is whether necessity may reveal that the ordinary positive mode of exercising a right has failed, so that the Church must discern how that right remains exercisable without contradicting her divine constitution.
This is why the distinction between jus and lex matters.
I do not separate them as if law were arbitrary. Ecclesiastical law is sacred, visible, and binding. But it remains ordered to the end for which it exists. The laws of papal election exist in order to secure the continuation of the Roman Pontiff, not to make that continuation impossible if the ordinary electors disappear or become unusable.
If one says that, once the ordinary electoral mechanism fails, no hierarchical subject can even examine the possibility of restoration, then one is not merely admitting deprivation. One is making juridical inaction into a theological principle.
That is what I do not see demonstrated.
Your appeal to eschatological deprivation is serious, but it proves less than you suggest. Catholic tradition certainly admits terrible eclipses, chastisements, dispersions, and privations. I do not deny this. But the possibility of deprivation does not prove the impossibility of a remedy. Nor does it prove that the remaining hierarchy is forbidden to discern whether Providence may require action through secondary causes.
Endurance is sometimes a duty. But action is also a duty when the means are morally available and ordered to the conservation of the Church’s form.
So I am not reasoning from emotional intolerability. I am reasoning from the nature of the Church as a visible, apostolic, hierarchical, and perfect society.
If you deny that the episcopate can be the subject even of such ministerial discernment, then the question remains:
What visible hierarchical subject remains capable of examining the crisis?
If the answer is “none,” then the position becomes more than prudence. It becomes the claim that the Church can preserve the divine constitution of Peter while possessing no visible means, even in principle, to restore a successor of Peter.
That is precisely what must be proved.
My position is more limited:
The episcopate does not possess universal jurisdiction.
The episcopate does not replace Peter.
The episcopate does not create mission.
The episcopate does not confer papal authority.
But the episcopate, as the divinely instituted apostolic body most ordered to the head, is the proper visible hierarchical subject to discern whether and how the Church may restore her head when the ordinary means fail.
This is not an ecclesiology of substitution.
It is the refusal to treat the visible hierarchy as a mere sacramental remnant deprived of every ecclesial capacity when the crisis concerns the restoration of the very principle of jurisdiction.
May God keep us faithful to the constitution of the Church, without confusing prudence with paralysis, or necessity with revolution.
I will answer this once more, because I think the point has now become clear; but I do not think it is useful to continue indefinitely if my argument is repeatedly reformulated into something I am not saying.
You write that my argument “quietly crosses from ontology into jurisdiction while verbally denying that it has done so.”
That sentence illustrates the problem. It does not answer my distinction. It reclassifies it as jurisdiction and then rejects it.
I have not argued that episcopal consecration gives jurisdiction.
I have not argued that necessity creates jurisdiction.
I have not argued that bishops without canonical mission can govern the Universal Church.
I have not argued that the episcopate can replace Peter.
I have not argued that an assembly can create authority from below.
What I have argued is much more precise:
there is a distinction between jurisdictional government and hierarchical discernment.
You have not shown that the episcopate is forbidden to gather in order to discern.
You have not shown that every public act of hierarchical discernment is necessarily an act of jurisdictional government.
You have not shown that the texts cited from Dom Gréa, Aubry, Mgr de Salinis, or the Council of Trent are inapplicable to the question.
And you have not shown that the episcopate, as the divinely instituted visible apostolic body, must be treated as a collection of private individuals whenever ordinary mission is impeded.
Instead, you repeatedly reformulate my position as though I were saying:
“bishops without mission possess public jurisdictional competence because the crisis requires it.”
But that is not my argument.
My argument is that the episcopate has, by divine institution, an objective place in the visible hierarchical constitution of the Church. That place does not give the bishops Peter’s jurisdiction. It does not allow them to govern the Universal Church. It does not allow them to create mission or confer papal authority.
But it does mean that the episcopate is not ecclesially meaningless when the crisis concerns the restoration of the very head to whom all jurisdiction is ordered.
If by “competence” you mean jurisdictional authority to govern, define doctrine, impose laws, constitute offices, or exercise Peter’s power, then I deny that bishops without mission possess such competence.
But if by “competence” you mean the responsibility to gather, examine, testify, discern, and determine what the divine constitution of the Church permits or forbids in a crisis concerning the visible head, then this is not the same thing as jurisdictional government.
It is not a coercive or legislative competence. It is a public ecclesial responsibility of testimony and discernment, rooted in the episcopate’s own place within the visible apostolic hierarchy.
That is the distinction you keep refusing to address directly.
The crisis does not create this responsibility. It only makes the question of its exercise unavoidable.
You have repeatedly demonstrated points I already grant:
that jurisdiction comes through Peter;
that necessity does not create authority;
that consecration alone does not give ordinary mission;
that deprivation may be real.
But none of these proves the point you need to prove:
that the episcopate is forbidden even to gather and discern what the Church’s divine constitution permits when the crisis concerns the restoration of Peter.
That is the precise point you have not demonstrated.
Nor is it enough to say that deprivation is possible. I agree that deprivation is possible. But deprivation does not prove that no remedy may be examined. Deprivation does not prove that the remaining hierarchy is forbidden to discern. Deprivation does not turn the episcopate into a merely private aggregate.
A man stranded in darkness is not authorized to redraw the map. Agreed.
But if he has been entrusted with the map and with responsibility for the journey, he is not forbidden to examine it in order to find the way.
Likewise, I am not saying that the episcopate may redraw the constitution of the Church. I am saying that the episcopate, precisely because it belongs to that constitution, is the proper visible hierarchical subject to examine what that constitution permits in an unprecedented crisis of the head.
If you deny even this, then the question remains:
what visible hierarchical subject is competent even to examine the crisis of the visible head?
If the answer is “none,” then your position is no longer merely a warning against false jurisdiction. It becomes a principle of ecclesial inaction.
I do not find such a principle in Catholic doctrine.
I will therefore leave the matter here unless the distinction I am actually making is addressed directly, rather than being restated as a claim to jurisdiction which I have repeatedly denied.
I think we may finally be isolating the real point of disagreement, and I want to state it as carefully and fairly as I can, because I do not think either of us is approaching this lightly or merely polemically. I think both of us are genuinely trying to discern the limits of the Church’s visible constitution under conditions of extraordinary crisis — juridically, theologically, and historically.
So let me first state what I think you are saying, because I do not want to misrepresent you.
I do not think you are arguing:
* that necessity creates jurisdiction,
* that bishops can replace Peter,
* that consecration itself gives ordinary mission,
* or that the episcopate may simply manufacture authority from below.
I understand that your argument is narrower and more precise than that.
What I understand you to be saying is this:
because the episcopate belongs by divine institution to the visible apostolic constitution of the Church, it therefore possesses some real and non-private ecclesial responsibility to gather, discern, testify, and examine what the constitution itself permits when the crisis concerns the visible head to whom all jurisdiction is ordinarily ordered.
And I understand that you are attempting to distinguish this from jurisdictional government properly so called.
I do understand that distinction.
But what I come back to is this:
once that discernment becomes public, hierarchical, representative, and constitutional in character, I do not know how it avoids becoming an ecclesial act requiring the very mission whose demonstrability is under dispute.
That is why I keep pressing the question of competence.
Not because I think bishops become “mere private individuals” sacramentally or ontologically. I agree they do not. But because Catholic theology traditionally grounds public ecclesial function not merely in sacramental ontology, but in mission.
So I think the real question between us is not whether bishops may think, discuss, testify, study, or even gather materially.
The real question is:
at what point does collective episcopal discernment become a visible ecclesial act performed in the name of the Church’s hierarchy?
Because once a body presents itself publicly as the proper hierarchical subject competent to determine what remedies the constitution permits concerning the papacy itself, it seems to me that the body is already claiming a form of public ecclesial competence that still requires theological grounding.
And this leads directly to your final question:
what visible hierarchical subject is competent even to examine the crisis of the visible head?
I would answer carefully:
if by “examine” you mean study, testify, preserve doctrine, identify contradictions, refuse false solutions, and suffer the deprivation without inventing authority — then many men may do this, bishops included.
But if by “examine” you mean a visible hierarchical subject publicly competent to determine constitutional remedies for the restoration of the papacy itself, then I still do not see where the Church has positively identified such competence apart from mission ordered through the head.
And I think this is where our instincts diverge.
You fear that my position risks ecclesial paralysis.
I fear that yours risks introducing a real public ecclesial competence whose juridical foundation has not itself been demonstrated.
So I am not denying the gravity of the crisis, nor the episcopate’s place within the Church’s constitution.
I am questioning whether the deprivation itself may include the deprivation of publicly demonstrable competence to resolve the crisis from within the visible order.
That possibility is difficult, perhaps unbearable. But difficulty alone does not establish competence.
That, I think, is the exact point where we continue to differ. —Louis
Thank you for this clarification. I appreciate that you now state my position more accurately.
I agree that this is now the precise point:
at what point does collective episcopal discernment become a public ecclesial act requiring demonstrable mission?
That is indeed the question.
But I think your formulation still risks assuming what must be distinguished.
You say that you do not see where the Church has positively identified such competence apart from mission ordered through the head.
My answer is: nowhere — if by “competence” you mean jurisdictional government.
But that is not the competence I am asserting.
The competence I am speaking of is not “apart from the head.” It is rooted in the visible hierarchical constitution of the Church, which is itself ordered to the head.
Mission determines the ordinary exercise of jurisdiction. It does not create the episcopate’s belonging to the visible hierarchy of the Church.
This distinction seems decisive.
Catholic doctrine does not identify the episcopate as a merely sacramental residue, nor as a private aggregate of validly consecrated men. The Council of Trent teaches that the hierarchy of the Church, composed of bishops, priests, and ministers, is divinely instituted.
Dom Gréa preserves both truths. He fully maintains that hierarchical communion and jurisdiction come from the head. The Vicar of Christ is the visible center from which episcopal communion and pastoral power flow. This excludes conciliarism.
But Gréa does not conclude from this that the episcopate becomes a private sacramental remainder whenever ordinary mission is impeded. He distinguishes the hierarchical communion received from the head from the particular title assigning a bishop to a particular Church; and he insists that the mystery of the episcopate is not exhausted by the power exercised over a particular flock, because it also regards the Universal Church.
Aubry expresses the same principle when he describes apostolic Tradition as a body of pastors, renewed by parts but immortal as a moral person, so that the succession of pastors is the instrument for conserving the apostolic deposit.
These principles do not describe isolated private individuals. They describe the visible, apostolic, hierarchical form in which Christ willed His Church to endure.
The alternatives therefore cannot be reduced to only two:
private study, testimony, and endurance;
or public jurisdictional action already determining and imposing a remedy.
There is a third level which your reply does not sufficiently account for:
a public hierarchical inquiry ordered to discerning whether a remedy exists, where the competence would lie, and under what conditions it could be exercised.
That inquiry is not yet the imposition of a remedy.
It is not yet an election.
It is not the creation of jurisdiction.
It is not the government of the Universal Church.
It is the ordered examination, by the visible apostolic body, of what the Church’s own divine constitution permits or forbids when the crisis concerns the visible head itself.
If the episcopate may study, testify, preserve doctrine, identify contradictions, and refuse false solutions, then the question is why it may not also examine, as episcopate, whether the divine constitution of the Church permits a remedy to the crisis of the head.
That examination is not already a claim to resolve the crisis by decree.
It is the necessary inquiry into whether resolution is possible, by whom, and under what conditions.
You say that deprivation may include the deprivation of publicly demonstrable competence to resolve the crisis from within the visible order.
But that is precisely what must be proved.
It cannot simply be inferred from the absence of ordinary mission. The absence of ordinary mission proves the absence of ordinary jurisdictional exercise; it does not prove that the episcopate is forbidden to examine, as episcopate, whether the Church’s constitution provides a way to restore the head.
In other words, the Catholic question is not: how can we avoid paralysis?
The Catholic question is: what does the divine constitution of the Church actually permit or require?
And the principles already cited point to this: the episcopate is not the source of Peter’s jurisdiction, but it is the visible apostolic body most ordered to Peter. Therefore, when the crisis concerns Peter himself, the episcopate cannot be reduced to private study and passive endurance only.
I agree with you that deprivation does not create authorization.
But deprivation does not prove that the episcopate is forbidden to examine whether authorization exists, where it exists, and under what conditions it could be exercised.
If no visible hierarchical subject may even examine the crisis of the visible head, then the visible hierarchy of the Church is reduced, in practice, to passive preservation only, and is denied any hierarchical capacity even to inquire into the restoration of its own principle of unity.
That is not a conclusion I see required by Catholic doctrine. On the contrary, it seems difficult to reconcile with the Church as a visible, apostolic, hierarchical society.
So I would state the remaining disagreement this way:
You fear that public hierarchical inquiry already implies unauthorized jurisdictional competence.
I fear that denying even such inquiry leaves no visible hierarchical subject capable of discerning whether the Church has any remedy at all.
Between private study and unauthorized jurisdictional action, there remains hierarchical discernment.
Thank you again for the care and precision of your reply. I think the disagreement is now sufficiently isolated to identify clearly.
You are correct that I should not reformulate your position into a crude claim that bishops without mission simply possess ordinary jurisdiction or may replace Peter. That was not my intention.
I understand your distinction.
But I think the real issue is now even narrower and more decisive than either of us first stated.
The question is not whether the episcopate ontologically belongs to the Church.
Of course it does. We would never deny that.
Nor is the question whether bishops may preserve doctrine, testify, resist error, correspond, theologize, or even materially agree with one another concerning the crisis.
They may.
The question in my mind, and we think the mind of the Church, is whether materially consecrated men lacking demonstrable mission may publicly constitute themselves as a visible hierarchical subject competent to examine the constitution of the Church in the name of the Church.
That is the point I still do not see demonstrated.
Because the category itself — “public hierarchical inquiry” — already presupposes precisely what must be proved.
It already assumes:
a recognizable hierarchical subject, acting publicly, in a manner distinguishable from private theological discussion, concerning ecclesial constitution, with a competence proper to episcopacy rather than merely to learned Catholics.
But those are the very points under dispute.
This is why I do not think the distinction between “inquiry” and “government” finally resolves the problem.
The moment the act becomes public, ecclesial, and episcopal concerning the restoration, identification, or constitutional examination of the visible head, the question immediately arises:
what publicly demonstrates the authority of this body to act as episcopate in this matter?
That is the question I do not think your position answers.
Because I agree entirely that mission does not create the ontological reality of episcopacy.
But public ecclesial competence is not derived merely from ontology.
Otherwise every materially consecrated bishop would retain a standing public hierarchical competence simply by virtue of sacramental character.
And that would quietly relocate visible authority from demonstrable mission to sacramental ontology itself, even while verbally denying that conclusion.
You repeatedly and correctly deny that you are claiming jurisdiction.
But the difficulty is that the very category of “public hierarchical inquiry” already presupposes a publicly recognizable hierarchical competence requiring demonstration.
That is why I said your argument crosses from ontology into competence while verbally denying that it has done so.
Not because you explicitly claim jurisdiction — but because the act you are defending already assumes a visible ecclesial capacity proper to hierarchy.
And this becomes even clearer in your final question:
“what visible hierarchical subject is competent even to examine the crisis of the visible head?”
I think the answer may simply be:
no presently demonstrable subject possesses such public competence.
That is severe, yes.
But deprivation is severe.
And I do not think Catholic doctrine guarantees that the Church must always possess a publicly demonstrable internal mechanism capable of juridically examining or resolving every crisis from within the visible order itself.
The visibility of the Church consists primarily in the permanence of her divine constitution, doctrine, sacraments, and juridical principles — not necessarily in the uninterrupted demonstrability of competent officeholders in act.
So I do not deny that the episcopate belongs to the constitution of the Church.
I deny that this ontological belonging alone demonstrates a recognizable public hierarchical competence to act corporately concerning the restoration of the head apart from demonstrable mission ordered through that very head.
I'll put simply:
if they can act publicly as episcopate concerning restoration of the papacy, what publicly demonstrates their authority to do so?
That is the point I still do not think has been answered.
May God keep us both faithful under the weight of this crisis.
It seems to me that we have now reached the point where the disagreement is no longer really advancing.
You say that “public hierarchical inquiry” already presupposes what must be proved. But that statement itself presupposes that every public hierarchical inquiry is already an act of jurisdictional competence derived from demonstrable mission.
That is precisely what you have not demonstrated.
Before attributing to my position a lack of demonstration, I think each step of the argument I have proposed must first be taken into account.
I have recalled the following principles:
the Church is a visible, apostolic, and hierarchical society;
the episcopate belongs by divine institution to that visible hierarchy;
it is not a mere private aggregate of validly consecrated men;
it is ordered to Peter;
and the present crisis concerns precisely the restoration of that visible head.
From these principles, it is at least coherent to conclude that the episcopate is the proper visible subject to examine, as episcopate, what the divine constitution of the Church permits or forbids in such a crisis.
You may contest that conclusion. But then it is not enough simply to repeat that it has not been demonstrated. It must be shown why it is excluded by Catholic doctrine.
In other words, the burden of proof cannot always remain on the same side.
If the episcopate belongs by divine institution to the visible hierarchy of the Church, and if the crisis concerns the very head of that hierarchy, then the one who refuses to the episcopate even the right to discern publicly as episcopate must demonstrate that prohibition.
He must show, from the divine constitution of the Church, that in such a crisis the episcopate is reduced to private study, individual testimony, and passive endurance, without being able to constitute any visible hierarchical subject of discernment.
That is precisely what you have not demonstrated.
You have demonstrated points which I already grant:
that bishops without mission do not possess ordinary jurisdiction;
that necessity does not create authority;
that the episcopate does not replace Peter;
that deprivation may be real.
But none of these points demonstrates that the episcopate is forbidden to gather publicly and hierarchically in order to examine whether the Church possesses a remedy, where the authorization would lie, and under what conditions it could be exercised.
The logical difficulty, therefore, is this: you contest the conclusion without refuting the principles from which it follows at the level of discernment, and then ask me to prove again what those principles already establish, not in the order of jurisdictional government, but in the order of hierarchical discernment.
So the question remains simple:
Where does Catholic doctrine teach that the episcopate, precisely as the visible apostolic body instituted by Christ and ordered to Peter, is forbidden to examine publicly and hierarchically a crisis concerning the restoration of Peter?
Until that is shown, your position does not merely warn against false jurisdiction. It makes the episcopate a visible body, but one incapable of public hierarchical discernment in the very crisis that touches its visible head.
I do not find that conclusion in Catholic doctrine.
For this reason, it seems to me that this exchange has reached its natural limit. I do not see the value of continuing unless this precise point is addressed directly.
I think this may finally isolate the real point between us.
The issue is not whether bishops retain sacramental character or ontological belonging to the Church’s hierarchy. Of course they do.
Nor is the issue whether bishops may study, correspond, testify, preserve doctrine, resist error, or even materially agree with one another concerning the crisis.
They may.
The issue is whether materially consecrated men lacking demonstrable mission may publicly constitute themselves as a visible hierarchical subject competent to act as episcopate concerning the constitution and restoration of the papacy.
That is the point I still do not see demonstrated.
Because the category itself — “public hierarchical inquiry” — is not neutral.
It already assumes:
* a recognizable hierarchical subject,
* acting publicly,
* in a manner distinguishable from private theological discussion,
* concerning the constitution of the Church,
* with some competence proper to episcopacy itself.
But those are precisely the points requiring proof.
This is why I do not think the distinction between “inquiry” and “government” finally resolves the problem.
The moment men act publicly as episcopate concerning the restoration or constitutional examination of the visible head, the question immediately arises:
what publicly demonstrates their authority to do so?
That question cannot be answered merely by appealing to sacramental ontology.
Because Catholic theology consistently distinguished:
* sacramental power,
* lawful mission,
* jurisdiction,
* and public ecclesial authority.
Otherwise every materially consecrated bishop would retain a standing public hierarchical competence simply by virtue of consecration alone.
And historically the Church treated that idea with extreme caution precisely because valid sacramental power exercised apart from lawful mission could create the illusion of continuity while severing the juridical principle constituting the visible hierarchy.
So I do not deny that the episcopate belongs to the divine constitution of the Church.
I deny that ontological episcopacy alone demonstrates a publicly recognizable corporate competence to act as hierarchy concerning restoration of the papacy apart from demonstrable mission.
Giuseppe, I have already answered this, but I shall do so again with the necessary theological distinctions. You are confusing the ordinary exercise of law with the extraordinary requirements of the Church’s survival.
In the ordinary order, jurisdiction is indeed granted by the Pope. No one denies this. But in the extraordinary order of a prolonged vacancy, the Church, as a Perfect Society, does not lose her radical power to act for her own preservation.
As Suárez and Cajetan teach, when the ordinary channel is obstructed, the Church possesses a supplied jurisdiction (jurisdictio vicaria) for the sake of the common good. If the power to restore the Head did not reside radically in the Episcopate (as a secondary cause), the Church would be a divisible and destructible society, which contradicts the Faith.
To ask "Consecration or Pope?" is to ignore a third term: the Divine Right of the Church to exist. The law is for the Church, not the Church for the law. By refusing this distinction, you make the legal means an obstacle to the divine end.
Serge, you have said that, in normal times, the exercise of the aptitude received by a bishop through his consecration "is "bound" or restricted by human law (papal designation) for the sake of order" and that, in an extraordinary vacancy, "this restriction is lifted by the law of necessity".
You add that "The principle of "Ecclesia Supplet" does not create a new or "rebel" authority; rather, it unlocks this power already ontologically present in the episcopal character. [...] If ordinary jurisdiction is absent, supplied jurisdiction flows directly from Christ".
Suppleance of jurisdiction means that one subject gives to another subject the jurisdiction that the latter lacks.
Now, what jurisdiction can be supplied to a "traditional bishop" who, according to you, already has (by consecration) the power needed for the survival of the Church (a power which moreover is already free, if it's true that what restricts the exercise of this power is a [never received] papal designation) ?
If you want to say that it is what you call "supplied jurisdiction" to "unlock" the exercise of the 'aptitude' of bishop (thus recognizing that this aptitude has a different nature from jurisdiction, given that it does nothing but allow the exercise of a power already present), where is the power of jurisdiction -that is to say the authority- in all this?
If, instead, according to you, aptitude IS jurisdiction, how can you say that for you jurisdiction does not come from consecration?
To which I would add: if bishops have a universal jurisdiction to govern the Church that is normally locked, as I have seem some argue, what distinguishes this universal jurisdiction from that of the Pope?
And what need is there to elect a pope if we already have bishops with universal jurisdiction?
You’ve put your finger on the exact contradiction—and it exposes the entire position.
If bishops truly possessed a “universal jurisdiction” by virtue of consecration, even if “normally locked,” then nothing would distinguish their authority in kind from that of the Pope. At most, you would have a diffused papacy spread across many men. But this is foreign to Catholic doctrine.
The Church teaches the opposite: bishops receive jurisdiction only through the Roman Pontiff, not alongside him or in reserve. Pius XII states clearly that bishops “receive their jurisdictional power through the Roman Pontiff” (Mystici Corporis). That means no mandate, no jurisdiction—actual or “latent.”
So your second question answers the first: if bishops already had universal jurisdiction, a pope would be unnecessary. But the Church teaches that the Pope is necessary as the source and principle of jurisdiction.
Therefore, the “locked universal jurisdiction” theory collapses. It attempts to preserve function while severing the very source that gives that function reality.
Louis, you have made 9 comments in the last little while. I asked before whether you are using AI for your comments and you didn't reply. I am asking you again.
I am also pointing you in the direction of the comments policy. Thanks.
The dilemma you propose—"Does jurisdiction come from consecration or from the Pope?"—seeks to lock the Church’s life into a binary administrative choice that does not reflect her nature as a societas perfecta. To resolve this, we must return to the classical distinctions of Scholastic theology and the Angelic Doctor.
1. On the Distinction between Power of Order and Radical Aptitude
According to Dom Gréa (The Church and Her Divine Constitution) and Cardinal Billot (De Ecclesia Christi), episcopal consecration confers the fullness of the priesthood, which includes a radical aptitude for government.
In the ordinary order, this aptitude is "bound" by ecclesiastical laws for the sake of unity: the Pope "unlocks" its exercise by appointing a bishop to a see. It is crucial to understand that the Pope does not create the episcopal character ex nihilo; he authorizes the exercise of a power already ontologically present in the successor of the Apostles.
2. The Law of Necessity as the "Summit of Law" (St. Thomas, ST I-II, q. 96, a. 6)
Saint Thomas Aquinas provides the definitive answer. He teaches that "every law is ordained to the common welfare, and from this it derives its force and nature of law" (ST I-II, q. 96, a. 6). Human law can never foresee every particular circumstance. Therefore, if a situation arises where the observance of the letter of the law becomes "hurtful to the general welfare" (damnosa communi saluti), the law ceases to bind.
In the case of a prolonged vacancy, the law regarding the papal mandate, which is a means, cannot be used to deny the Church the right to restore her Head, which is the end.
To claim that the absence of the ordinary channel renders the Episcopate (the secondary cause) powerless is to transform a law of protection into an instrument of destruction.
This reveals the error of legal positivism (the text alone) versus Catholic realism (the finality).
For a theologian, the Law of Necessity is the summit of the law.
3. How Supplied Jurisdiction Acts on the Existing Aptitude
You ask how "supplied jurisdiction" acts upon an aptitude already present. It acts as a divine manifestation of a power that necessity makes active.
When ordinary electors fail, the right to ensure the survival of the Church is not lost. This "supply" is not a new creation of power, but the removal of the legal obstacle that prevented its exercise.
In times of crisis, it is the needs of the Church, and the will of her Divine Head, that "unlock" the mission inherent in the episcopal character.
4. To S.D. Wright: Distinction from Papal Jurisdiction
The difference is one of nature and finality. The Pope possesses a Universal and Ordinary jurisdiction. The Bishop in a state of necessity receives only a Supplied and Extraordinary jurisdiction, strictly limited to the necessity that justifies it. He cannot change laws or dogmas; he acts for necessary acts and, crucially, for the acts ordained to the election of a new Head.
5. Why elect a Pope? (Cajetan and Suarez)
We must elect a Pope because the bishops' power in this state is abnormal and precarious. The Church is a monarchy, not a "collegial" republic. As Cajetan teaches (De Comparatione, cap. XIII), when ordinary electors fail, the power of election devolves to the Church.
As Suarez notes (De Legibus), if the Church lacked this power to act as a secondary cause in the absence of the first human cause, Christ would have left His Bride a "defective" and "destructible" society, which is impossible.
Conclusion: Superior Obedience
The faithful Episcopate, in organizing an Imperfect General Council or exercising jurisdiction in a state of necessity, does not act out of rebellion. It acts through a superior obedience to the will of Christ for His Church.
The "just path" consists in recognizing that jurisdiction, in such times, is provided directly by Christ to the subject (the Bishop) because of the objective need of the Church. To reject this is to claim that legal "forms" are more important than the "life" of the Body. As Saint Thomas reminds us, the letter kills, but the Spirit, and the intention of the Divine Legislator, gives life.
the question "Does jurisdiction come from consecration or from the Pope?", addressed to you, has nothing to do with administrative choices that do not reflect the nature of the Church. It has nothing to do with human law, with positive law. And even less with the letter of the law. It is not a legal question, but a purely DOCTRINAL question. A question that concerns the divine will and our FAITH, and that it is made precisely to understand whether or not the path you propose is consistent with the nature of the Church.
The issue about the origin of episcopal jurisdiction was once debated, but it is no longer, as you can see from the magisterium I mentioned above for which the power of jurisdiction DIRECTLY and ENTIRELY comes from the pope.
Aptitude for government (radical or not) IS NOT power.
I note a contradiction, or at least a lack of clarity, in your words (which still refuse to answer the questions you were asked simply with "yes" or "no", BEFORE presenting any distinction or explication deemed useful), because on the one hand, you say that in normal times "[the Pope] authorizes the exercise of a POWER ALREADY ontologically PRESENT in the successor of the Apostles" (or that necessity "makes active" the power or that "This "supply" is not a new creation of power, but the removal of the legal obstacle that prevented its exercise") and, on the other, you say that "The Bishop in a state of necessity RECEIVES only a Supplied and Extraordinary JURISDICTION" and that "The "just path" consists in recognizing that jurisdiction, IN SUCH TIMES, IS PROVIDED directly by Christ to the subject (the Bishop)".
The power is either already present or it is provided and received, it cannot be both at the same time.
I thank you for your call for doctrinal clarity. However, I note that you have not yet answered the central question I previously asked: If the ordinary legal means are definitively lost, does the Church, as a perfect society, possess the internal resources to restore its Head, or is it condemned to a formal disappearance? To claim the latter would be to deny the indefectibility of the Church. To admit the former is to accept the necessity of the extraordinary path I am describing.
Allow me now to respond to your specific points and to your request for a "yes or no" answer.
Does the power of jurisdiction come entirely from the Pope in the ordinary order of the Church? Yes.
The teaching of the Magisterium is in no way contested, notably that of Pius XII (Mystici Corporis, Ad Sinarum Gentes), according to which jurisdiction in the Church is conferred according to the hierarchical order established by Christ and depends, in its ordinary exercise, on the canonical mission given by the Roman Pontiff.
The difficulty you raise, namely, that a power cannot be both "present" and "received", stems, however, from a confusion between two distinct levels that Aristetolian-Thomistic philosophy clearly distinguishes: potency and act.
Potency and Act
A power can be present in a subject as a radical aptitude (potency), while being received as to its legitimate exercise (act). Thus, the power of sight is present in a man who has his eyes closed: the faculty truly exists, even if its exercise is not currently in act.
In an analogous manner:
- Episcopal Consecration (Sacre) constitutes the bishop as a member of the apostolic hierarchy and a subject capable of receiving jurisdiction in the Church (Potency).
- Jurisdiction is the legitimate right to exercise ecclesiastical government (Act).
In normal times, the Pope provides the canonical mission that moves the bishop from potency to act. In a state of prolonged vacancy, it is Christ Himself, acting through the Law of Necessity, who moves the bishop from potency to act. There is therefore no contradiction: the episcopal character constitutes the subjective foundation, while jurisdiction constitutes the legal authorization to exercise that power.
Aptitude is not Power, but it is its Necessary Subject
You are correct to say that aptitude is not power itself. However, an aptitude is the necessary condition for receiving a specific power. A layman possesses no aptitude for episcopal jurisdiction; consequently, he cannot be the subject of an act of jurisdiction ordained to the government of the Church. Only a bishop, who possesses the episcopal character and belongs to the apostolic succession, can be the subject of an ecclesiastical jurisdiction of necessity.
Ecclesiastical Law and the Indefectibility of the Church
The Magisterium you cite defines the ordinary law. But this doctrine cannot be interpreted in a way that contradicts the divine constitution of the Church itself, which is indefectible. Ecclesiastical law is ordained to the common good. When the literal application of a positive law would peril the conservation of the Church, the law ceases to bind. In such a situation, the necessary authority proceeds from the higher order established by Christ Himself, the Supreme Legislator.
The Potestas Electiva according to Cajetan
Cajetan expresses this clearly (De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii, chap. XIII): "Deficientibus electoribus, potestas eligendi devolvitur ad Ecclesiam" (If the electors fail, the right to elect is devolved to the Church). The electors determined by ecclesiastical law are only the ordinary holders of this power; the elective power itself belongs radically to the Church to ensure its survival.
The Church as a Societas Perfecta
According to Suarez (De Legibus, IV, 7), the Church possesses in itself the means necessary for its own conservation. Since the Papacy belongs to its divine constitution, the Church can never lose the real capacity to restore the pontifical succession.
Indefectibility and the Visibility of the Real Subject
In Thomistic metaphysics, a real potency must be able to pass into act. If the Church retained a capacity to elect without any visible subject being able to exercise it, that power would be a fiction. This capacity must subsist in a real and identifiable subject. Now, if the Papacy is vacant and the ordinary electors are lacking, the only visible hierarchical body remaining in the Church is the episcopate, the depository of the uninterrupted apostolic succession, which constitutes the visible sign par excellence of the continuity of the Church. This is why several theologians have envisioned that, in extreme circumstances, the Church could act through an extraordinary episcopal organ, such as an Imperfect General Council, in order to restore the Papacy.
Nature of the Elective Act
Finally, it should be recalled that the election of the Pope is not an act of universal jurisdiction, but an act of designation of person (designatio personae). The electors do not confer pontifical jurisdiction: they designate the subject who will receive it directly from Christ upon his acceptance. This is why, historically, the clergy and the people were able to participate in the election without possessing universal jurisdiction. The elective act has never been understood as an act of government, but as the act by which the Church designates the one who will receive the Primacy.
Conclusion
The fundamental question remains: if the ordinary electors were truly to fail, must we conclude that the Church would be definitively incapable of electing a successor of Peter? If that were the case, the potestas electiva would be a dead abstraction and the Church would lose the means to restore its own visible constitution. Traditional theology teaches the opposite: the Church can never lose the means necessary for its conservation. It is in this perspective that the extraordinary intervention of the Church to restore the Papacy must be understood.
Regarding the jurisdiction of Bishops in our time, it seems to me that the best possible explanation is not that of «universal jurisdiction» (radical aptitude), although it should not be excluded completely, but rather the «implicit delegation of jurisdiction», according to which the pope (or the Church, the Holy See in time of vacancy) wills necessarily in time of great necessity to delegate jurisdiction to Bishops (principle of devolution) in order to govern the flock. Why? Because the power of jurisdiction being an element that constitutes the very nature of the Church, it cannot cease to exist and to be exerced in actum in the Church : there will always be Pastors in the Church who can be identified and followed.
A question that arises is the following : did Pius XII change the nature of the episcopacy and the nature of jurisdiction? To which question, I think we should all answer that he did not. Whatever Pius XII has said about Bishops applied to Bishops from the time of the Apostles until the time of Pius XII. If, therefore Pius XII said that the jurisdiction of Bishops comes only through the Sovereign Pontiff, this did not create a new situation in the Church. It means that the jurisdiction of St Gregory Thaumaturgus, the jurisdiction of St Eusebius of Samosate, the jurisdiction of St Basile the Great came only through the Sovereign Pontiff. Therefore, whatever has been possible in the early Church will always be possible if the circumstances that existed in the early Church arise again in the Church, namely the impossibility to have recourse to the Sovereign Pontiff.
Now, one would have to show that every single delegation of jurisdiction in the Church has always been made explicitly by the Sovereign Pontiff in order to show that explicit delegation from the Sovereign Pontiff is always necessary. I wish good luck to anyone to demonstrate that in the light of the history of the Church.
Thank you for your comment, Monseigneur. One thing I have wondered about this idea is how we know who among those consecrated to the episcopate at present have this implicit delegation?
This is a good question indeed, M. Wright. I can only give you my humble opinion.
The jurisdiction of Pastors is not well assured in a time like the one we are in. The fact to affirm jurisdiction in the remaining Shepherds does not mean that there is no crisis of authority. We need Peter to confirm his Brothers in the Faith, but also in their authority. We need him to clearly say who will from now on be a Shepherd and who will not. As long as this is not done, this authority will not be well assured, not in itself (quoad se), but in the perception men have of it (quoad nos). There will be disputes over this authority (as has happen locally to a lesser degree in the history of the Church) and the members of the flock will be free to go from one Shepherd to another they trust better.
But, as a matter of fact, there are on earth today Shepherds and flocks gathered around these Shepherds. These Shepherds have to feed these flocks. This is a fact. If these Shepherds stop feeding these flock for no good reason, I believe they will have to answer to God. Yet, God does not ask something from these Shepherds without giving them the necessary powers to accomplish it.
Everything is quite disorderly because the territoriality of this jurisdiction is not well established. We need territoriality to be clearly reinstated. I don’t think we can say that we need jurisdiction to be reinstated, because jurisdiction cannot disappear in the Church. We need territoriality to be reinstated clearly. This will be done by the Sovereign Pontiff in due time. All of our problems are linked to the absence of Peter. This is why this has to be the most important question to all and especially to the Shepherds: how can the Church today find back its visible head in a manner that will be recognized by all (moral unanimity) who still profess the Faith. But in the meantime, whenever a Shepherd exists who has kept the Faith and is there to feed the flock, the said flock can be assured that the implicit will of the pope (the Holy See, the Church in a time of prolonged vacancy) provides to this Shepherd the necessary means to accomplish his mission. Such a Shepherd could very well turn into a wolf, and the flock would have to separate from one who has proven to be a wolf, but in this scenario, the divine constitution of the Church is at least respected although there is much fog and mist.
To pretend that we are feeding the flock without being the legitimate Shepherds is to proclaim everywhere our illegitimacy, our status of impostors, which I cannot accept obviously. The consequence of this would necessarily be to cease all of our activities. Which I would do readily, but I have the evidence of the immediate damage it would do to souls.
So, in my position,
- either I believe I am a legitimate Shepherd of the Church and I accomplish my work of feeding the flock (whoever gathered around me) with the power (jurisdiction) granted by God to his Apostles and their successors through the pope (at least implicitly);
- or I come to the conclusion that I am not a legitimate Shepherd and then I have to leave the flock alone and look for the legitimate Shepherds of the Church to whom I myself have to be submitted.
Mgr Roy, you begin correctly: Pius XII did not change the nature of jurisdiction, and it comes only through the Roman Pontiff. But that principle is exactly what your conclusion contradicts.
You introduce “implicit delegation” or “devolution” in time of necessity—but where is this taught? Not assumed, not inferred—taught. Because jurisdiction is not a function that must always be exercised; it is a juridical mission that must be conferred.
Your appeal to the early Church does not establish your claim. Difficulty of access to Rome is not the same as the absence of a Roman Pontiff, nor does it prove jurisdiction arises without him.
You are also assuming what must be demonstrated: that the Church must always have identifiable pastors with jurisdiction in act. But indefectibility guarantees the structure, not uninterrupted operation.
Without Peter, there is no mission.
And without mission, there is no jurisdiction—implicit or otherwise.
- I have not answered your question for several reasons. One of these is that answering the question means changing the subject of the discussion (transferring it to the solutions that I would propose) without first reaching a conclusion about the current one. Here we are discussing a limited aspect of something you stated, indicating a "path" to get out to the current crisis. I have not proposed any solution to the current situation here. Even less have I stated, or in any way implied, that the Church does not possess the internal resources to restore its Head or that the Church is ended. To the question: "If the ordinary legal means are definitively lost, does the Church, as a perfect society, possess the internal resources to restore its Head, or is it condemned to a formal disappearance?" I can incidentally answer "yes, the Church possesses the internal resources to restore its visible Head. To think this does not mean to accept the necessity of the path you are describing". Whatever "my" solution to this crisis, right or wrong, remains completely irrelevant to what we are discussing now, namely, the exact terms of the "path" you affirm as good and their compatibility with the doctrine of the faith: even if "my" solution was completely wrong and we recognized it together, that would in no way help the goodness of the one you proposed;
- after hearing you say (against my assertion "A[p]titude, that is predisposition, is not jurisdiction. [...] "traditionalist bishops" have no power that can be "unlocked") that "[the Pope] authorizes the exercise of a POWER ALREADY ontologically PRESENT in the successor of the Apostles" and again that "The principle of "Ecclesia Supplet" [...] unlocks this power already ontologically present in the episcopal character", after all this, I am happy to hear you finally acknowledge that "Aptitude is not Power"/"aptitude is not power itself".
I think we can now more easily acknowledge together that "traditional bishops" (a generic notion that needs to be "defined" [but with what authority?], but this was not the subject of our discussion) have no power, no jurisdiction, no authority at all simply because of their consecration;
- it seems to me, however, that there are still some things that need to be clarified.
I invite you to note that the recourse to the distinction "potency" / "act" CONFIRMS that "traditional bishops" DO NOT HAVE any power of jurisdiction.
Indeed, having power "in potency" means having no power at all.
On the other hand, if one does not want or can not (for whatever reason) to exercise a power that he has, it does not mean that he has a power "in potency". It means that he has a power "in act", that he does not want or cannot EXERCISE (like the sighted person who keeps his eyes closed).
So when you say: "A power can be present in a subject as a radical aptitude (potency), while being received as to its legitimate exercise (act)", I invite you to consider: a) that the subject you are talking about, who has a power "in potency", does not have the power at all (and it is for this reason that it is you yourself who now rightly recognizes that "aptitude is not Power") and b) that having power "in act" is something independent from its legitimate exercise: exercise presupposes power, but power does not necessarily entail exercise. One may not exercise the power that he has and that power remains actual, but no one can exercise a power that he has not.
You say: "- Episcopal Consecration (Sacre) constitutes the bishop as a member of the apostolic hierarchy and a subject capable of receiving jurisdiction in the Church (Potency)".
I invite you to consider that consecration constitutes the bishop as a member of the apostolic hierarchy OF ORDERS, not as a member of the hierarchy OF JURISDICTION, because (it is you to confirm it with the following words) he is (only) "CAPABLE OF RECEIVING JURISDICTION", but not in possession of it.
You say again: "- Jurisdiction is the legitimate right to exercise ecclesiastical government (Act)", but then you also say that "In normal times, the Pope provides the canonical mission that moves the bishop from potency to act. In a state of prolonged vacancy, it is Christ Himself, acting through the Law of Necessity, who moves the bishop from potency to act. There is therefore no contradiction: the episcopal character constitutes the subjective foundation, WHILE JURISDICTION CONSTITUTES THE LEGAL AUTHORIZATION TO EXERCISE THAT POWER".
Here, it seems, the idea still persists that consecration prints jurisdictional power, instead of a simple aptitude, because papal intervention is described as a mere "authorization to exercise" a power already present.
If this is the case, the contradiction lies in this: if the power is already present (by consecration), it cannot be simultaneously stated that the pope authorizes the bishop to exercise this power already present and that, prior to the authorization to exercise it, the bishop does not have that very power (to avoid saying that it is not received by consecration). It cannot be simultaneously stated that power (I emphasize "power", not "exercise") is received both through consecration and through the pope.
When the pope confers the power of jurisdiction, the bishop, by definition, has not any power of jurisdiction before this attribution.
[Note that the pope can also confer the power of jurisdiction to one who is not yet consecrated bishop; he can suspend the exercise of power already conferred to a bishop (in this case, not in our, the power is present without the legitimate exercise existing), etc.].
I. Response to Mgr Roy - On the continuity of the apostolic mission
Your Excellency,
I thank you sincerely for your intervention, which rightly situates the present question within its proper ecclesiological framework: the indefectibility of the Church and the continuity of her mission throughout history.
You correctly recall that the Magisterium of Pius XII did not alter the nature of the episcopate, but clarified its mode of operation within the ordinary order of the Church. It follows that what was possible in earlier periods, when recourse to the Apostolic See was morally or physically impossible, cannot be declared impossible in principle under analogous circumstances.
It must, however, be specified, in order to avoid any ambiguity, that jurisdiction cannot be understood as contained in episcopal consecration nor as proceeding from it.
The constant teaching of the Church holds that consecration constitutes the subject within the apostolic order, but does not confer jurisdiction.
More precisely, consecration is not the cause of jurisdiction, but constitutes the subject as properly disposed to receive mission within the hierarchical structure of the Church Accordingly, the difficulty does not consist in positing a jurisdiction already present in an implicit or latent manner, but in determining how the Church, as a visible and hierarchical society, retains the real and effective capacity to restore the order of jurisdiction when the ordinary means fail.
On this point, your intuition remains fundamentally sound: the Church cannot be reduced to a merely juridical framework rendered inoperative. She remains a living body, ordered to the salvation of souls, and cannot be deprived of the means necessary for her own constitution.
II. Response to S.D. Wright - On the discernment of the ecclesial subject
Dear S.D. Wright,
Your question touches upon the most delicate and decisive point: the identification of the subject of authority in a time of crisis. Indeed, a jurisdiction that could not be attributed to any identifiable subject within the visible Church would, in practice, be nonexistent.
However, the criterion cannot be purely individual, such as the validity of consecration or personal orthodoxy, since jurisdiction in the Church is not a private or merely individual quality, but a principle of public and hierarchical order.
It is therefore necessary to seek not isolated individuals, but an ecclesial subject belonging to the visible and hierarchical constitution of the Church.
Now, in a Church deprived of her Head and of the ordinary electors, the only remaining visible hierarchical body is the episcopate, which is the depositary of apostolic succession and thus constitutes the visible sign of the Church’s continuity.
This does not mean that each bishop, taken individually, possesses a determinate jurisdiction, nor that jurisdiction is diffused among them.
Rather, it means that the continuity of the hierarchical principle subsists in this body. It is therefore within this ecclesial subject, and not in private initiatives, that the capacity of the Church to act for the restoration of order must be located.
Response to Giuseppe - On the nature of jurisdiction and the subject of the potestas electiva
Dear Giuseppe,
I thank you for your insistence on doctrinal clarity. I also take note of the decisive point you acknowledge: the Church possesses within herself the resources necessary to restore her visible Head.
On aptitude and jurisdiction
You are correct to affirm that aptitude is not jurisdiction. However, a necessary distinction must be made between:
- the absence of jurisdiction
- and the absence of disposition for ecclesiastical government
A layman possesses no disposition for ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
A bishop, by episcopal consecration, is constituted within the apostolic order as a subject properly disposed to receive jurisdiction.
This disposition is not a power of jurisdiction, nor any form of latent jurisdiction, but a real and intrinsic disposition of the subject to receive mission within the hierarchical structure of the Church.
On potency and act
In classical metaphysics, potency is not a pure negation, but a real and intrinsic capacity ordered to the reception of act.
To say that the bishop is in potency with respect to jurisdiction does not mean that he possesses jurisdiction, but that he is the proper subject in which it can be received through mission within the hierarchical structure of the Church.
There is therefore no contradiction:
- jurisdiction is not present prior to mission
- but the subject properly disposed to receive it is already constituted
On the origin of jurisdiction
It must be firmly maintained that jurisdiction does not proceed from consecration, but from mission. There is therefore no dual origin of jurisdiction. The present question concerns not the ordinary mode of transmission, on which we agree, but the situation in which the ordinary channels of mission are no longer accessible.
On the consequence of your position
You affirm that the Church retains the capacity to restore her Head.
However, a capacity that cannot be exercised by any determinate subject within the visible structure of the Church would remain purely abstract.
Now, in a society that is essentially visible and hierarchical, any real power must be reducible to act within the subject in which it subsists.
On the potestas electiva
Cajetan teaches:
“deficientibus electoribus, potestas eligendi devolvitur ad Ecclesiam”
Thus, the right to elect does not belong exclusively to the electors designated by positive law, but to the Church herself, in order to ensure her preservation.
On the subject of this power
The Church is not an abstraction, but a concrete, visible, hierarchical, and apostolic society.
This power must therefore subsist in a subject belonging to that structure. If the papacy is vacant and the ordinary electors are lacking, the only remaining visible hierarchical subject is the episcopate, the depositary of apostolic succession.
If this power is not found in the episcopate, which is the only remaining visible hierarchical subject, then it is not found anywhere within the visible structure of the Church.
This does not mean that bishops possess universal jurisdiction, nor that they may act individually. It means that the effective and operative capacity of the Church to act within her visible structure must subsist in this ecclesial subject.
On the nature of the electoral act
The election of the Roman Pontiff is not an act of universal jurisdiction, but an act of designation (designatio personae).
The electors do not confer papal jurisdiction; they designate the one who will receive it directly from Christ upon acceptance.
Conclusion
The fundamental question therefore remains:
if the ordinary electors were truly to fail, must we conclude that the Church would become incapable of electing a successor of Peter?
In that case, the potestas electiva would remain a purely abstract capacity, incapable of realization in history.
But the Church, as a societas perfecta and indefectible, cannot lose the means necessary for her own constitution.
Therefore, this capacity must subsist in a real, determinate, and visible subject belonging to her hierarchical structure.
If we say rightly that jurisdiction does not come from episcopal consecration, I think nevertheless that there is room to say that a form or another of jurisdiction (not the territorial one), or at least a disposition to jurisdiction, could be granted through the Sovereign Pontiff «at the occasion of» episcopal consecration when it is received within the frame of hierarchical communion, that is within the frame of communion with the Sovereign Pontiff. This form of jurisdiction would be an ability to come to the help of souls and individual Churches in situations of extreme necessity, would be dependant on communion with the Sovereign Pontiff and would cease to exist as soon as this communion is broken. By this we see that it comes ultimately from the Sovereign Pontiff.
It would be otherwise very difficult to explain the words of the Pontifical speaking of ruling the flock, teaching the flock, etc.. which would become a purely meanless liturgy, empty words, if they did not create something in the Bishop when his consecration is received in the frame of communion with the Sovereign Pontiff.
That being said, and no matter what we think of the above, I agree fully that jurisdiction comes from the Sovereign Pontiff at least implicitly in times of prolonged Sede Vacante.
I thank you for this important clarification, which rightly recalls the theological weight of the Roman Pontifical and helps to deepen the present discussion.
It must indeed be maintained that the Church does not speak in vain in her rites. However, it would seem necessary, in order to remain consistent with the common teaching of the Church, to clarify the precise theological meaning of the expressions used in the liturgy.
In the classical doctrine, jurisdiction proceeds solely from mission (cf. Pius XII, Mystici Corporis), and cannot be understood as contained in episcopal consecration, nor as proceeding from it, even in an indirect or occasional manner.
What is signified in episcopal consecration is therefore not the possession of jurisdiction, but the ordination of the bishop to acts of teaching and governing, and the constitution of the subject as properly disposed to receive mission within the hierarchical structure of the Church.
For this reason, it would seem preferable to avoid speaking of a “form of jurisdiction” granted at the occasion of consecration. Such a formulation risks introducing an ambiguity concerning the origin of jurisdiction, which, according to the common doctrine, does not arise, even indirectly, from the sacrament.
Rather, what consecration confers is a real and intrinsic disposition, proportioned to the reception of jurisdiction, which itself proceeds from mission, whether in the ordinary manner through the Sovereign Pontiff, or, in extraordinary circumstances, according to the principles traditionally admitted by theologians concerning the indefectibility of the Church (cf. Thomas Cajetan; Francisco Suárez).
Understood in this way, the liturgical expressions referring to governing and teaching the flock retain their full meaning: they signify not a jurisdiction already possessed, but the ordering of the bishop to such acts within the divine constitution of the Church.
In this perspective, I fully concur with your conclusion: in a prolonged state of necessity, the Church does not lose her capacity to act, but continues to act through the hierarchical subject which subsists within her, according to the implicit will of the Holy See and the higher law of the salus animarum.
You’re forcing a false dilemma that classical theology explicitly rejects.
No one is claiming that jurisdiction is received by consecration. The distinction is precise: consecration gives the subject capable of receiving jurisdiction; jurisdiction itself comes only from the Roman Pontiff.
But your error is this: you redefine “potency” as “nothing.”
That is not Catholic theology. A subject in potency is not non-existent—it is a real subject lacking actualization. Otherwise, your own framework collapses: a bishop before receiving jurisdiction would not merely lack authority—he would not even be capable of receiving it.
That is absurd.
More importantly, you smuggle in a second premise: that necessity can actualize jurisdiction without a pope. That is exactly what must be proven—and cannot be.
Because jurisdiction is not a latent power waiting to be “activated.” It is a juridical reality conferred by mission.
No pope → no mission → no jurisdiction.
So your conclusion is right for the wrong reason: traditional bishops have no jurisdiction—but not because potency is nothing, rather because no authority exists to actualize it.
You say: "A subject in potency is not non-existent—it is a real subject lacking actualization. Otherwise, your own framework collapses: a bishop before receiving jurisdiction would not merely lack authority—he would not even be capable of receiving it".
I said that if a subject has JURISDICTION IN POTENCY this subject exists, but he has not jurisdiction.
You say to me: "No pope → no mission → no jurisdiction.
So your conclusion is right for the wrong reason: traditional bishops have no jurisdiction—but not because potency is nothing, rather because no authority exists to actualize it".
That "traditional bishops" have no jurisdiction at all because there is not the pope, it is precisely what I think.
You say: "The Mass is not offered by a subject in potency.
It is offered by a priest acting in act, with real jurisdiction and mission in the Church.
[...]
without jurisdiction in act, there is no priest who can be publicly known to offer the Mass in the name of the Church
[...]
And that brings us back to the same unresolved question:
Where is the act of apostolic mission?
Because without that, everything remains in potency—but the Church operates through act".
In the Church "in order" jurisdiction (source of the missio canonica) is FOR the Mass (for the glory of God and the salvation of souls, that is the MISSIO of the Church: "Go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them ..."; "do this in memory of me"). Jurisdiction is FOR the Missio (including Mass). And Missio IS NOT FOR jurisdiction.
The Holy Sacrifice is celebrated today. It is not in potency. It is celebrated by the hierarchy of orders of the Church (hierarchy - note well - which is not rebellious to authority). The Missio continues (so not everything is in potency, jurisdiction is it). To claim that, now that there is no jurisdiction in act, the absence of jurisdiction means absence of Missio (including Mass) it is to claim that Missio is FOR jurisdiction. Which is not true.
I understand what you’re saying about being prolific. That part is fair. I do write a lot, and I’ve had some extra time lately, so the comments came closer together than they normally would.
But the similarity you’re noticing is intentional. In my view, everything in this discussion ultimately leads back to the same center, which is the papacy and the question of jurisdiction and mission. So when I respond to different points, I’m often bringing them back to that same foundation. That’s not repetition for its own sake, it’s because I think that’s where the issue actually resolves.
For context, I’m not just commenting casually. I’m an older guy, a boomer, I was born before the Council, went through the seminary system, and lived through what followed. That’s why I’m where I am on this. I’m currently working through a multi-volume project on this same subject, so I’m thinking about these things constantly. And I’m not alone in it. There’s a small group of us who hold to what we understand to be the Catholic faith in continuity, and we’re trying to work through these questions seriously.
I do make an effort to respond to what people are actually saying, but I also try to bring it back to what I see as the central issue, because otherwise it turns into arguments about things that don’t really resolve anything.
So with that in mind, what specifically would you want me to be most careful about when commenting here so that I stay within your expectations?
That’s fair, and I understand what you’re aiming at. If a more focused exchange leads to better engagement, I’m happy to work within that.
I also want to say I appreciate the level you’re operating at—these aren’t superficial questions, and that’s why I’ve taken the time to engage.
From my side, what may look scattered is actually intentional. I’ve worked through the Novus Ordo, the traditional Latin Mass circuit, and the various groups claiming continuity. So when I respond across threads, I’m not shifting topics—I’m testing whether any of those claims can actually demonstrate mission and jurisdiction.
That’s the point everything keeps returning to for me: not preference, not liturgy, but whether a real line of jurisdiction can be shown. If it cannot, then all these structures—however serious or well-intentioned—remain assertions without a source.
So I’m not trying to multiply points, but to bring each one back to that single question where, in my view, it either stands or falls.
If you’d prefer to focus that discussion in one place, I’m glad to do so.
Christ does—through the constitution He established.
But not immediately or privately, and not apart from the juridical order.
The Church teaches that the one elected receives authority when he is legitimately designated according to the Church’s law and accepts the office—that is the instrument Christ uses.
The electors do not “give” the papacy, but they designate the subject. Christ confers authority through that visible, juridical act.
That’s why the process matters.
No lawful designation → no reception of office.
So the question turns back again:
If there is no demonstrable, lawful election according to the Church’s constitution,
where is the instrument through which Christ confers that authority?
You say: "The electors do not “give” the papacy, but they designate the subject. Christ confers authority through that visible, juridical act".
I fully agree with this, but with one clarification (which perhaps is what you want to say): namely, that Christ does not confer authority THROUGH, i.e. WITH, that act, but ON THE BASIS of that act. If there is not a real acceptation from the one who is designated, there is designation, but not transmission of authority by Christ.
Now, a man elected to the papacy but who does not really accept the papacy (doing it however apparently) is still in a juridically different position from that of any other man with respect to the papacy.
If this man appoints electors (who must not exercise any act of jurisdiction, but only, one day, elect), what is it that prevents us from thinking that, having this man a colored title to do these appointments (and therefore not something that juridically is nonexistent), Christ's authority "cures" those acts, making them capables to fully achieve their goal?
If Christ confers authority on the basis of a juridical act, then that act must itself be valid and lawful. Otherwise, you are proposing that something lacking jurisdiction can later be “cured” into possessing it—which reverses the Church’s causal order.
Authority does not arise from defective acts.
“Bishops… receive their jurisdiction from the Roman Pontiff.” (Mystici Corporis)
So the question is:
where does the Church teach that acts without jurisdiction can become capable of conferring authority by a subsequent effect?
Or must the cause already possess what it transmits?
You say: "If Christ confers authority on the basis of a juridical act, then that act must itself be valid and lawful. Otherwise, you are proposing that something lacking jurisdiction can later be “cured” into possessing it—which reverses the Church’s causal order".
But we have said that THERE IS [real and lawful] DESIGNATION (which is the juridical act that does not give authority, but on the basis of which Christ confers authority).
You remember: "“Bishops… receive their jurisdiction from the Roman Pontiff.” (Mystici Corporis)".
But Roman Pontiff receive it directly from Christ and from any other ("The electors do not “give” the papacy").
This is a thoughtful clarification, but it introduces a problem.
If Christ confers authority only on the basis of a valid juridical act, then that act must itself be real and lawful. It cannot be “cured” afterward by the effect you’re trying to produce.
The Church teaches that authority is conferred, not presumed, and flows through legitimate mission—not through defective acts later justified by outcome (Pius XII, Mystici Corporis).
So the question is simple:
Where does the Church teach that acts lacking jurisdiction can be retroactively supplied to establish the very authority they require?
Otherwise, the order is reversed—effect preceding cause.
We’ve previously read your article and commented on it: your article proves too much and then tries to solve the problem by material occupation.
You correctly argue that only those in the hierarchy of jurisdiction can elect a pope, and that bishops without jurisdiction cannot do so. But then you preserve “electors” by appealing to men who hold offices only materially, not formally.
That is the contradiction.
If jurisdiction is required for the act, material occupation without formal authority cannot supply it. A merely material cardinal is not an elector in the Church’s juridical order simply by being there.
So the question remains:
where does the Church teach that a man lacking formal authority nonetheless retains the power to designate or elect by mere material occupation?
If nowhere, your solution does not solve the defect—it renames it.
Perhaps he will not be elected. As I believe the status of the papacy is not only 'sede vacante' but 'sede remota' (seat removed - 2 Thess. 2:7) then it follows that the papacy can only be returned by Heaven by appointment when such time arrives that the right appointee is found. How is this to be done ? Don't know. Doesn't matter; there are many things we don't know. But the thing is the devil does not know either so he can't forestall this.
You’ve correctly established a key principle: jurisdiction is required for participation in the Church’s governing acts, and bishops without papal mandate do not possess it .
But your conclusion breaks that same principle.
You argue that the Church must always retain the power to elect a pope and resolve this by positing “material” cardinals and bishops who retain elective capacity in potency . That is the rupture.
Jurisdiction is not a dormant quality that persists in heresy or outside mission. It flows from the Roman Pontiff as a living source, not from a material designation. If the source is absent, the effect is absent—not “latent.”
You also reject necessity as conferring jurisdiction (correct), yet your solution implicitly reintroduces it by allowing a future activation of authority without a demonstrated mandate.
The actual conclusion is simpler and more consistent:
If no one can be shown to possess jurisdiction, then no one currently possesses the power to elect.
That is not a defect in the Church—it is a condition of deprivation.
Indefectibility guarantees the permanence of the constitution, not the uninterrupted exercise of its powers.
Thank you for your reply. Several of the points you raise have already been addressed in my previous comment, particularly the distinction between designation and jurisdiction, as well as the precise scope of necessit, and I would refer back to them to avoid unnecessary repetition.
Here, I would like to focus on what seems to be the central point of our disagreement.
You argue, in substance, that the absence of jurisdiction implies the impossibility of any ecclesial act regarding election: no mission, therefore no right to act, therefore no possibility of electing. From this, you conclude that the only coherent position is one of waiting without intervention.
It is precisely this point that seems to me problematic.
Your reasoning assumes that any act ordered to the constitution of authority in the Church would already be an act of jurisdiction. But this is where the confusion lies.
Papal election is not, formally speaking, an act of jurisdiction. It is an act of designation (designatio personae), which does not confer jurisdiction, but designates the subject who will receive it from Christ.
To deny the possibility of such an act on the grounds that no prior jurisdiction exists is to require that jurisdiction already be in act in order to designate the one who is to receive it, thus introducing a circular difficulty.
On this point, the theological tradition makes a precise distinction between:
– what pertains to the collation of jurisdiction (which belongs to God),
– and what pertains to the designation of the subject (which may belong to the Church according to various modalities).
It is within this framework that Cajetan’s notion of “devolution” must be understood: not as a production of jurisdiction, but as the possibility, in the case of failure of the ordinary electors, for the Church to perform an act of designation ordered toward the reception of that jurisdiction.
You object that this would amount to “reconstructing” authority or introducing a new source of it. But this objection rests precisely on the conflation of designation and jurisdiction. Once this distinction is maintained, the difficulty disappears: the Church does not create anything, she designates.
Likewise, historical examples of irregular elections do not demonstrate a creation of jurisdiction by necessity, but rather that, in certain exceptional circumstances, the designation of the subject could occur outside ordinary forms, without altering the principle of authority.
Finally, your position, which you describe as one of “custody”, raises a real theological difficulty.
You state that indefectibility preserves the structure but not its exercise. This distinction requires clarification. While it may be admitted that a factual impossibility can temporarily affect the exercise of functions, it is much more difficult to maintain that a principled impossibility could indefinitely prevent any designation of the subject of the papacy.
A perfect society cannot be conceived as such if its own constitution renders impossible, in principle, the exercise of the functions necessary for its preservation.
Accordingly, if the Church did not possess within herself, at least radically (in radice), the capacity to provide for her head in an extreme situation, one would have to admit not merely a practical difficulty, but a structural impossibility affecting her visible principle of unity.
But the tradition does not admit such an impossibility. What is at stake here is not a “reconstruction” of authority, but the possibility, in exceptional circumstances, of an act of designation ordered toward the reception of jurisdiction, in order to preserve the visible form of the Church.
This, it seems to me, is the precise point on which our analyses diverge.
Surely will not ask Ricossa for canonic or papal questions… As for La Salette, as for Fatima, as for Rampolla and the judeo masonic infiltration, end of the list for now !
Your intervention raises an important point, but it rests on a methodological premise that requires clarification.
You seem to assume that only an explicit dogmatic definition can ground a binding doctrinal certainty. However, this reduction does not correspond either to the Catholic doctrine on the Magisterium or to the constant practice of theology.
On Baptism of Desire
The Council of Trent teaches that justification cannot take place “without the laver of regeneration or the desire thereof” (aut eius voto) (Session VI, chapter 4).
This text explicitly introduces the notion of votum baptismi, and it has been consistently interpreted in the theological tradition as affirming the possibility of justification through the desire for baptism when the sacrament cannot be received in act.
This interpretation is not an isolated opinion, but a common doctrine. Thomas Aquinas explicitly teaches that baptism can be received in voto (ST III, q. 68, a. 2), and this doctrine is consistently upheld in scholastic theology.
Moreover, the Holy Office (Letter to Cardinal Cushing, August 8, 1949) rejected the restrictive interpretation that excludes any form of belonging to the Church apart from water baptism received in act, affirming that one can belong to the Church in voto, even implicitly.
This is therefore not a freely disputable theological opinion, but a point belonging to the constant teaching of the Church and confirmed by Roman authority.
On the Nature of Doctrinal Assent
The main difficulty lies in the methodological principle you seem to adopt.
Catholic doctrine does not reduce the obligation of assent to solemn definitions alone. The Magisterium teaches at different levels.
Thus, Pius IX (Tuas Libenter, 1863) teaches that the faithful are bound to adhere not only to defined truths, but also to those taught by the ordinary Magisterium.
Likewise, Pius XII (Humani Generis, 1950) explains that teachings proposed by the ordinary Magisterium cannot be treated as mere opinions, even when not defined in a solemn manner.
Finally, classical theology (notably Francisco Suárez) distinguishes various degrees of assent, including that owed to doctrines held as certain in the Church without solemn definition.
Consequently, requiring an explicit definition for every doctrinal certainty amounts to misunderstanding the actual structure of the Church’s teaching.
Application to Jurisdiction and Mission
The same methodological approach appears in your other interventions, where you require an explicitly demonstrable juridical act in order to recognize any ecclesial action.
It is true that jurisdiction comes from the Roman Pontiff (Pius XII, Mystici Corporis; Leo XIII, Satis Cognitum). But it does not follow that every ecclesial reality depends formally on jurisdiction.
Tradition consistently distinguishes:
– jurisdiction (order of governance),
– and the power of orders (sacramental order).
Thus, the Mass depends on the priesthood, not on jurisdiction. A validly ordained priest offers a true sacrifice, independently of the question of canonical mission.
Likewise, valid sacraments do not become merely private acts due to the absence of jurisdiction in act. The Church is not only a juridical society, but also a sacramental one.
On Indefectibility
Your position leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of demonstrable jurisdiction, the Church can no longer act publicly, but only subsist in a form of conservation.
Such a conclusion transforms a factual difficulty into a principled impossibility.
Yet indefectibility implies that the Church is never deprived, in principle, of the means ordered to her visible constitution. To admit a structural impossibility of action would compromise this point.
Conclusion
On Baptism of Desire as on the other issues raised, the difficulty does not lie in an excess of affirmation, but in a methodological restriction.
The Catholic faith certainly rests on dogmas, but it is not limited to them. It also includes adherence to the constant teaching of the ordinary Magisterium and to the received theological tradition.
Therefore, the decisive question is not only whether a formal definition exists, but whether a doctrine belongs to the constant teaching of the Church.
This is indeed the case with Baptism of Desire, attested by the Council of Trent (aut eius voto), consistently taught in classical theology, and confirmed by the intervention of the Holy Office in 1949, not as a mere opinion, but as a point held as certain in the common theological tradition and confirmed by Roman authority.
The admirable Fr Ricossa's error in his critique is that while he intelligently acknowledges that an Imperfect General Council would have the right to elect the next pope in the absence of cardinals and Roman clergy ...
... he, unfortunately, confuses these two completely distinct Councils:
1.
The Ecumenical Council that must be convoked by a pope and to which only Cardinals, and residential bishops have a right to be called, and whose primary function is definitive promulgation of doctrines and disciplines in exercise of the Church’s Teaching and Ruling Authority.
2.
The Imperfect General Council that cannot be convoked by a pope in this case given the circumstances, and in which only "bishops of the entire Christian Church" come together, not as the Teaching or Ruling Church to define doctrines or institute disciplines, but as the representatives of the Universal Church to designate its head, and to whom the Universal Church will submit.
Having confused these truly distinct Councils, Fr Ricossa goes on to make erroneous conclusions by applying provisions of Canon Law for the Ecumenical Council to the Imperfect General Council which has no provisions whatsoever in law, which in fact is not recognised in any ecclesiastical law, and which has merely been proposed as a solution to what theologians have only ever considered as hypothetical.
The theologians who treat of the election of the pope in the absence of cardinals practically only require it be done in a manner that ensures the Universal Church is fully represented, just like at Constance.
At Constance, despite the final union of the cardinals created by the three papal claimants, twenty-three in total, such that there was no longer doubt as to the identity of the electors, it was nevertheless decided by the Council to add thirty more electors, prelates selected from various nations.
Pope Martin V was elected by a combination of cardinals who were not residential bishops, and cardinals who were residential bishops, and residential bishops who were not cardinals, abbots and deans and canons who were not even bishops,
The reason is sinple: if the election is done by true and full representatives of the Universal Church following unanimously agreed rules, the elect will be universally and peacefully accepted, guaranteeing the legitimacy of his papacy.
The distinction you make between an Ecumenical Council and an Imperfect General Council is indeed important, and it helps clarify part of the discussion.
However, it seems to me that a key point still requires clarification, because it touches the very foundation of the problem.
Your argument appears ultimately to rest on the idea that a sufficiently representative body of the Universal Church, acting according to commonly agreed rules, and followed by peaceful and universal acceptance, would thereby guarantee the legitimacy of the elected pope.
This, however, raises a fundamental difficulty.
On the nature of legitimacy
In Catholic theology, legitimacy does not arise from acceptance, but from a prior juridical cause.
Peaceful acceptance (universalis et pacifica acceptatio) is classically regarded as a certain sign of legitimacy, but not as its formal principle.
As noted by Robert Bellarmine, it presupposes a prior foundation and cannot replace it (De Romano Pontifice, IV, 9).
On the role of representation
The appeal to the “representation of the Universal Church” is understandable, especially in reference to Constance.
However, this notion must be properly understood: the Church is not a representative body in the political sense, but a hierarchical society of divine institution.
As explained by Thomas de Vio Cajetan, in the extreme case of failure of the ordinary electors (deficientibus electoribus), the right to elect may revert to the Church, not as an undifferentiated multitude, but according to its proper hierarchical order (De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii, ch. XIII).
The decisive question therefore remains:
what principle gives such an assembly the authority to designate the subject of the papacy?
Without a clear answer, the process risks resting on an implicit form of self-legitimation.
On the risk of circular reasoning
If one argues that the election is legitimate because it is accepted, and it is accepted because it is legitimate, then one falls into circular reasoning.
Universal reception confirms legitimacy, but does not produce it.
On the deeper issue (link with the broader discussion)
This connects to a broader question: whether the absence of a pontifical juridical act entails a total impossibility, or whether extraordinary modes of resolution may be considered within the limits of Catholic ecclesiology.
On this point, the theological tradition at least admits the possibility of extraordinary cases, without determining in advance all their concrete modalities.
As Charles Journet points out, the Church always retains, by virtue of her divine constitution, the means necessary for her own preservation, even if their concrete application may become obscured in times of crisis (The Church of the Word Incarnate, vol. I).
Within this framework, one requirement remains:
legitimacy must be grounded in a real principle of authority, and not merely in its effects.
In the order of this constitution, the episcopate appears as the most qualified human subject to act in an exceptional situation, precisely because it constitutes the hierarchical body ordered to the head.
This does not make it an autonomous source of authority, but recognizes that, apart from it, no other body seems capable of representing the Church in her order of governance.
It seems to me that this is precisely where the discussion should be focused.
You brilliantly state that the decisive question therefore remains: what principle gives such an assembly the authority to designate the subject of the papacy?
Cardinal Billot answers: the principle of devolution of powers in case of necessity, founded on what you already highlight, the Church’s as a perfect society and consequent permanent possession of all that is required for her perpetual preservation.
Fr Dutertre makes a further brilliant argument on this point. The Imperfect General Council in designating the head of the Church does not act as the Teaching Church since it is without the head and unable to promulgate any doctrines or disciplines to the Universal Church. Rather, it adequately represents the Learning Church which has passive infallibility that prevents her following a false rule of faith, or permanently not knowing her head, such that where necessity demands, the Learning Church is able to determine her head. Just stellar.
Consequently, to clarify what you point out could be circular reasoning.
The argument is that the Imperfect General Council is a sufficiently representative body of the Universal Church, acting according to commonly agreed rules and is itself radically competent to designate the head of the Church legitimately. This radical competence due to devolution of the powers to elect resulting from a state of necessity is itself the formal principle of legitimacy. The composition of the Imperfect General Council as sufficiently representative of the Universal Church also allows for a post-election peaceful and universal acceptance, that further infallibly confirms the legitimacy of the elected pope.
You put it so well: In the order of the divine hierarchical constitution of the Church, the episcopate appears as the most qualified human subject to act in an exceptional situation, precisely because it constitutes the hierarchical body ordered to the head ... [and] apart from it, no other body [is] capable of representing the Church in her order of governance.
The principle as applicable to our day seems to me incontrovertible. All that remains is resolving the practical difficulties around attaining this sufficiently universal representation to constitute the Imperfect General Council.
We only need to read the detailed history of the Great Western Schism to see that the practical difficulties we face on the subject today were no less present BEFORE, DURING and AFTER the Council of Constance! The Holy Ghost proved in concrete terms His ever present guidance of the Church in that crisis that could have destroyed the papacy forever. The difficulties we talk about today are nothing to this Divine Spouse of the Church! When He wills, He will crown our efforts of working towards a resolution with His ever gentle movement of the wills os all those who are now unwilling!
Thank you for your thoughtful and well-structured reply, it clearly helps bring the discussion to a deeper level.
However, it seems to me that an important clarification is still needed regarding the notion of a “devolution of power” in a state of necessity, and the conclusion drawn from it.
On the nature of the principle invoked
The appeal to authors such as Billot is certainly relevant.
However, it should be noted that the hypothesis of a devolution of the power to elect in cases of extreme necessity is presented in theological literature as a possibility, not as a fully determined juridical principle with clearly defined conditions and operative structure.
In other words, it remains within the domain of theologice disputata, not of established doctrine.
On “radical competence” and actual authority
The distinction you introduce is important, but it requires further precision.
To say that a body is “radically competent” does not yet establish that it possesses actual juridical authority.
– a subject capable of receiving or exercising authority
– and the actual possession of that authority through a juridical act
This distinction seems essential here; otherwise, one risks moving from potency to act without a clearly identified principle of actualization.
On the risk of implicit self-legitimation
If the assembly is said to be:
– sufficiently representative
– competent by necessity
– and thereby able to designate the head
then the question inevitably arises:
what determines, in a non-circular way, that this particular assembly truly possesses that competence?
Without a prior and identifiable principle, the risk is that the process itself becomes the source of its own legitimacy.
On the role of the “Learning Church”
The reference to the passive infallibility of the Church is significant.
However, classical theology attributes to the Church as a whole an indefectibility in adhering to the true faith, not an active juridical capacity to designate her head apart from the structures established by Christ.
This point seems to require further clarification before it can serve as a foundation for such a conclusion.
On the remaining difficulty
You conclude that “all that remains” is the practical realization of such a council.
It seems to me, rather, that the principal difficulty is not practical but theological:
namely, whether the principle invoked is sufficiently determined and grounded to support the conclusion drawn from it.
Until that point is clarified, the question cannot be considered resolved.
That said, I fully agree that the historical example of Constance deserves careful study, precisely because it illustrates both the possibility of extraordinary situations and the complexity of their resolution.
It seems to me that this is where the discussion should continue to be focused.
You’re appealing to a hypothetical that never solves the actual problem.
Yes—an “imperfect council” is discussed by theologians. But always under one condition: that the Church still possesses identifiable, lawful bishops who can act as representatives of the universal Church.
That’s exactly what you cannot demonstrate today.
At Constance, there were real claimants, real cardinals, real bishops—men with recognized standing in the Church. The crisis was which pope, not whether the structure itself still existed.
Your position assumes what must be proven:
that there are today “bishops of the universal Church” capable of assembling and acting for her.
But where is that body? Who recognizes them? By what mission do they act?
Without demonstrable jurisdiction and representation, the “imperfect council” remains a theoretical solution—not an executable one.
So the issue returns, unchanged:
Who today can publicly and juridically represent the Church to elect her head?
A question (not a challenge) about this statement:
"These Bishops have in fact been consecrated validly and even, in our opinion (at least in certain cases) licitly; but nevertheless they are – in the most absolute way – deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that the Bishop receives jurisdiction from God only through the intermediary of the Pope, an intermediary excluded in our case.14 Being deprived of jurisdiction, they do not belong to the Church’s hierarchy of jurisdiction, which is why they are not members of the Council by right, and are therefore not qualified to validly elect the Pope – not even in extraordinary cases."
Questions:
1. Is it a matter of divine law that only members of the Council by right may validly elect a pope?
2. Even if so, why does necessity not dispense with this requirement, noting that in necessity, only divine negative law remains in effect:
“Not even God, the Supreme Legislator, is bound in the state of necessity ."That is why Christ Himself excuses David, who in grave danger ate the breads of proposition which the laity were forbidden to eat by Divine Law."5 According to this principle, not only do human laws cease to oblige in a state of necessity, but even divine-positive and affirmative divine-natural law cease (e.g., "Honor thy father and mother"; "Remember to keep holy the Sabbath Day"). The only law binding in the state of necessity is negative divine-natural law {e.g., "Thou shalt not kill," etc.) . This is because negative divine-natural law prohibits actions that are intrinsically evil and hence forbidden because they are evil, as opposed to actions which are evil only because they are forbidden, such as the consecration of bishops without pontifical mandate.”
-See paragraph here containing footnote #5: https://www.sspxasia.com/Documents/SiSiNoNo/1999_September/The_1988_Consecrations.htm)?
And in Part I of the article just cited, we read:
"Cardinal Billot writes that Our Lord instituted the primacy, but left in some way the limits of episcopal power undefined, precisely because:
...it would not have been fitting that those things which are subject to change would be unchangeably fixed by divine law. Some things are indeed subject to change because of the variety of circumstances and of times and because of greater or lesser facility of recourse to the Apostolic See among other such-like things [De Ecclesia Christi, Q.XV, §2, p.713]
History confirms that the state of necessity extended not only the duties of bishops, but also their power of jurisdiction. Dom Grea whose attachment to the pope is above all suspicion testifies (De l’Eglise et de sa divine consitution, vol. I) that not only at the beginning of Christianity did the "necessity of the Church and the Gospel" demand that the power of the episcopal order be exercised in all its fullness without jurisdictional limitations, but that in successive ages extraordinary circumstances required" even more exceptional and more extraordinary manifestations" of episcopal power (ibid., p.218) in order "to apply a remedy to the current necessity of the Christian people" (ibid. and ƒƒ.), for whom there was no hope of aid on the part of the legitimate pastors nor from the Pope. In such circumstances, in which the common good of the Church is also at stake, the jurisdictional limitations vanish and "that which is universal" in episcopal power "comes directly to the aid of souls" (ibid., p.218):
Thus in the 4th century St. Eusebius of Samosata is seen passing through the Oriental Church devastated by the Arians and ordaining Catholic Bishops for them without having any special jurisdiction over them" (op. cit. p.218).
...today jurisdiction [over a diocese] is conferred [upon bishops] directly and expressly by the Pope…Formerly, however, it used to derive more indirectly from the Vicar of Christ as if from itself it flowed from the Pope onto those bishops, who were in union and peace with the Roman Church, mother and head of all churches [emphasis added].40"
https://www.sspxasia.com/Documents/SiSiNoNo/1999_July/The_1988_Consecrations.htm
Since we know that the Church is a perfect society, containing within itself all the means necessary to accomplish its mission at all times (even in a state of necessity or during an extended papal vacancy, which amounts to the same thing), I would like to learn more about why the rationale contained in the quotes above from the SSPX article regarding extraordinary manifestations of episcopal power such as were necessary in the early Church could not be reengaged by the situation in the Church today (eg., to legitimize the bishops of tradition in electing a legitimate pope).
I’m not saying it does. I’m just trying to understand why it doesn’t.
Perhaps the answer is as simple as noting that necessity may have EXTENDED the powers of bishops already possessing jurisdiction, but did not CONFER jurisdiction upon bishops who did not already possess it? But in that case, it would be necessary to also address why supplied jurisdiction would not engage (ie., +de Mallerais and Fr. Peter Scott have formerly argued that ecclesia supplet extends to all aspects necessary for the apostolate, from annulment tribunals, though in the same article, +de Mallerais explicitly rejects the possibility of electing a pope, for lack of authority).
https://sspx.org/en/supplied-jurisdiction-traditional-priests-30452
Just curious how you would explain the clandestine episcopal consecrations which took place behind the Iron Curtain, and were later recognized (i.e., legitimate). Or the example of Cardinal Slipyj's consecrations against the policy of Paul VI (for which he received no censure, despite a latae sententiae excommunication being on the books since 1951), which were also legitimate, despite being forbidden?
Rogelio, you’re circling something important here—especially in recognizing that clandestine doesn’t automatically mean illegitimate. That’s a fair instinct, and it’s good you’re trying to ground it historically.
I’d just tighten the formulation so it stays fully aligned with the Church’s constitutional principles:
The key issue isn’t whether communication could have been secret, but whether a pontifical mandate can be publicly demonstrated or morally established. The Church’s structure isn’t built on unverifiable possibilities (“the pope might have secretly approved this”), but on a determinable juridical link to Peter.
So instead of saying “there may have been a secret mandate,” I’d frame it this way:
Even in clandestine situations, the Church has always maintained that episcopal mission must derive from the Roman Pontiff. If that connection cannot be established—even retrospectively through recognition—then the act cannot be treated as possessing lawful mission, regardless of speculation about secret communications.
That keeps your point about persecution intact, but removes the reliance on hypothetical mandates, which the Church has never used as a basis for recognizing authority.
In short: possibility doesn’t equal demonstrability—and the Church operates on the latter.
Sean,
The examples you raise don’t establish what you think they do—they actually confirm the principle.
1) Iron Curtain consecrations
Those bishops were later recognized by a Roman Pontiff. That recognition is not decorative—it is the decisive point. Jurisdiction flows from Peter, and recognition is the public confirmation of that mission. Without that later ratification, they would have remained illicit acts with no lawful mission. Recognition does not “approve disobedience”; it supplies the missing juridical connection to the Apostolic See.
2) Slipyi case
Even here, you are still within a structure where a living pope exists, governs, and can tolerate, correct, or later regularize acts. That context changes everything. The question is not whether something occurred against policy, but whether it occurred within a system that still possessed a functioning source of jurisdiction.
3) The principle you’re missing
The Church has already defined the structure:
• Jurisdiction flows from the Roman Pontiff to bishops, not from consecration alone 
• No one can assume ecclesiastical authority on his own initiative without entering “by the door” 
So the real dividing line is simple:
Were those acts connected—either immediately or subsequently—to the authority of Peter?
If yes, they can be healed and recognized.
If no, they remain outside the Church’s juridical order.
4) Why this matters
Your examples depend on eventual recognition. But that presupposes a living authority capable of granting mission. Remove that, and the entire argument collapses.
That’s the fatal error: you’re taking cases that depended on the existence of papal authority—and using them to justify acting without it.
And that is precisely what the Church has never permitted.
The mechanism by which the pope is "elected" for lack of a better term, which by the way is the same phrase used to describe the selection of he who would become a bishop, particularly in the Greek churches, is a matter of human law. The Church being not just a supernatural society, but temporal one, as well, has the right to establish laws to specify how all manner of things are done within that temporal sphere. The basis for those laws may be divine law, but in other cases it is either prudence, charity, custom, or whatever.
This is no different to how secular societies operate. The people maintain the right to choose the form of governance; however, once that decision is made, authority is held by that form of government established. Because all power to rule, i.e., jurisdiction, comes from God and flows downward vertically, the people do not retain the right to change the means by which they are able to determine how they are governed. That is the sovereign's job by definition.
So similarly it is in the Church. The sovereign, i.e., the Pope, established how future sovereigns shall be determined, i.e., via election by the Cardinals. It is only the sovereign who can modify or reform that mechanism. As we do not have a sovereign, that cannot be done by the whims of a very small fraction of the ostensibly Catholic faithful.
Is it your opinion, therefore, that the Church is no longer a perfect society, possessing all the means necessary to accomplish her mission (eg., no mechanism by which to elect another pope)?
Recognizing this was impossible, St. Bellarmine and others wrote that in the absences of cardinals, the right to elect a pontiff would devolve either to an imperfect council, or the Roman clergy, or to the bishops, etc.
Unless I’m misunderstanding, this seems to contradict what you are saying?
Or are you suggesting there are still some cardinals left somewhere who could elect a pope?
The Church is a Perfect Society. If anyone says there is some instance or circumstance that would prevent the Church from electing Her next Vicar, or even the possibility of such a circumstance, then the logical conclusion is that person does not believe the Church is a Perfect society. You can't say the Church has within Herself the ability to always maintain Her existence and then say that some circumstance will prevent Her from existing.
You’re exactly right to locate the principle in the source of authority rather than the mechanism.
If jurisdiction flows from above, and if only the Roman Pontiff can determine or modify the means of succession, then the absence of a true pontiff does not authorize reconstruction from below—it exposes a real juridical rupture.
That is the point most are unwilling to face.
The conclusion is not that “we must fix it,” but that we cannot. The Church’s constitution remains intact, but its operation can be impeded in fact. That distinction preserves both indefectibility and reality.
Which leads to the practical consequence: we cannot attach ourselves to structures that claim authority without demonstrable mission. There is no safe middle ground of “working solutions.”
So the position is not activism, but custody.
We hold the faith, we refrain from false jurisdiction, and we wait—without attempting to supply what only Christ gives through Peter.
It's interesting that Blessed Anna Maria Taigi prophesied that Sts Peter & Paul will appear in Rome to the astonishment of all & appoint a pope after a long period with the Chair of Peter held by false popes.
This is from Feeneyite MHFM but I'd be interested in knowing what others think of it.
"Did The Bible Predict 70 Years Without A Pope?"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2xYLg0M2LY&t=774s
To call them feenyite is to cast hypocritical aspersions…
What do you call those who reject baptism of desire & of blood?
RosaryKnight — if someone rejects Baptism of Desire as salvific, you call them possibly Catholic—because the Church has never defined it as dogma. There are theological opinions, yes, but no binding teaching that it saves.
What is defined is the necessity of water baptism and incorporation into the Church.
So the real question isn’t labels—it’s whether you can produce a magisterial definition for your position.
And the same standard applies elsewhere: where do your clergymen receive mission to act in the Church?
Until that’s answered, the issue isn’t what we’re called—it’s what can actually be demonstrated.
The Council of Trent, in the same words as used for baptism, says that the sacrament of Penance is necessary for salvation: "CANON VI.--If any one denieth, either that sacramental confession was instituted, or is necessary to salvation, of divine right; or saith, that the manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, which the Church hath ever observed from the beginning, and doth observe, is alien from the institution and command of Christ, and is a human invention; let him be anathema." Notice that it specifically says SACRAMENTAL confession is necessary, even though perfect contrition is sufficient, just as it specifically says the "sacrament of Baptism" in the similar canon on Baptism.
A few sources:
https://stevensperay.wordpress.com/2022/11/06/baptism-of-desire-and-the-fathers-of-trent-the-nail-in-the-feeneyite-coffin ++
http://baptismofdesire.com/
https://cmri.org/articles-on-the-traditional-catholic-faith/baptism-of-blood-and-of-desire
RosaryKnight — you’re conflating two things Trent keeps distinct.
Yes, Trent teaches the necessity of sacramental confession—but it also explicitly allows for perfect contrition when confession is not possible. That’s a defined doctrine.
Where is the equivalent definition for Baptism of Desire? It’s not there. Trent speaks of the sacrament of Baptism—not a substitute.
So again, you’re appealing to analogy, not dogma.
And the deeper issue still stands unanswered: where do your clergymen receive mission to administer these sacraments at all?
Until that’s demonstrated, you’re arguing about mechanisms without establishing authority.
I believe the mission comes from Christ when there is no pope for a long time, as is the case today, but without governing a particular diocese. But I don't know for sure.
RosaryKnight — that’s not how the Church teaches mission at all.
Pius XII, Mystici Corporis: “They who are appointed bishops… receive their jurisdiction not directly from the Divine Redeemer, but from the Roman Pontiff.”
And Leo XIII, Satis Cognitum: “No one can have authority in the Church unless he is united with Peter.”
So mission does not arise “directly from Christ” apart from the papacy—even in difficult times.
Can you produce a single magisterial text that teaches what you just claimed?
I don’t think you can. And if you can’t, then you have to face the consequence: the clergy you’re adhering to cannot demonstrate mission, and therefore cannot be acting in the name of the Church.
These are unprecedented times. Either there are no canonically acting bishops & priests, in the Latin Rite at least, or "salus animarum seprema lex" is in effect whereby the few valid bishops & priests without a diocese carry out their ministry.
Who says I'm adhering to any clergy? Right now I'm a home aloner.
RosaryKnight — I respect that, and I’m in the same position myself.
But the issue isn’t personal adherence—it’s the principle being admitted. You’re allowing that “valid bishops & priests” may operate without a diocese under salus animarum, which still implies real mission somewhere.
Yet the Church is explicit: jurisdiction comes through the Roman Pontiff, not from necessity, not directly from Christ apart from Peter.
So where is that mission concretely conferred?
If it cannot be shown, then even that fallback position collapses—and we’re left not with hidden clergy, but with a real juridical deprivation.
Maybe that's why Sr Lucia said: "God is giving two last remedies to the world: the Holy Rosary [given more power] and devotion to the Immaculate Heart of Mary. And, being the last remedies...there will be no others." (Sr Lucia, 1957; last public words before being "disappeared" and replaced by a now proven impostor) radtradthomist.chojnowski.me/2019/03/is-this-interview-that-caused-her.html; sisterlucytruth.org
On the Primacy of the Supernatural Common Good over Purely Material Continuity
Fr. Ricossa’s analysis, alongside the debate between Sean Johnson, Michael Pigg, and Kastrioti, highlights the need to clarify the distinction between ecclesiastical law and the Divine Constitution of the Church.
1. Refuting Static Legalism:
The argument that only a Pope can modify the electoral mechanism (Kastrioti) overlooks the nature of the Church as a "Perfect Society." As Michael Pigg observes, if any circumstance could prevent the Church from electing its Head, the Church would cease to be the perfect society instituted by Christ. Human law (cardinalitial election) can never supersede the Divine Right of the Church to its own preservation.
2. Devolution according to Cajetan:
Fr. Ricossa argues that "material" cardinals block any recourse. However, Cajetan (De Comparatione, cap. XIII, n. 204) teaches that if the ordinary electors "fail" (deficientibus electoribus), the right to elect devolves to the Church. This failure is moral and juridical when electors no longer profess the Catholic faith. In the light of Divine Law, a structure that can no longer fulfill its final cause is considered non-existent for that function.
3. On the Primacy of the Final Cause:
According to Suárez (De Legibus, Lib. IV, c. 7), every human law is subordinate to the Divine Right of the Church to preserve itself. If strict adherence to the electoral "letter" leads to a perpetual vacancy, it becomes a lex injusta. As a "perfect society," the Church must possess within itself the means for its own restoration.
4. The Nature of the Imperfect Council and the Law of Necessity:
An Imperfect Council does not claim ordinary authority over a Pope, but a ministerial authority over the election. As taught by Vitoria (Relectio de potestate Ecclesiae), in extreme necessity, the Church possesses the intrinsic power to provide for its own Head. As Johnson correctly notes, only negative divine law remains absolute; electing a Pope through the episcopate is not an intrinsically evil act, but an exercise of supplied jurisdiction (Ecclesia supplet).
5. Episcopal Legitimacy:
According to St. Thomas Aquinas (ST, IIa-IIae, q. 39, a. 3), the episcopal character confers a radical aptitude for government, which is activated by the necessity of the Universal Church to restore its visible Head.
Conclusion:
An Imperfect Council does not claim authority over a Pope but exercises an indispensable ministerial authority. Indefectibility cannot be reduced to a mere material lineage of occupied sees; it requires the Church's real capacity to provide itself with an effective Head.
Bibliographical References:
Cajetan: De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii, cap. XIII.
Suárez: De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, Lib. IV, cap. VII.
Vitoria: Relectio de Potestate Ecclesiae, q. 2, art. 1.
St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica, IIa-IIae, q. 39, a. 3.
Dear Rogelio,
I thank you for your careful intervention and for the reference you have provided. The seriousness of the question requires that it be considered not merely from the standpoint of disciplinary norms, but according to the deeper principles which govern both the sacramental order and the divine constitution of the Church.
For the Church is not first a juridical system, but a divine society, visible, hierarchical, and indefectible, whose essential principles cannot fail without the Church herself failing, which is impossible.
1. On Apostolic Succession and the Visibility of the Church
From the beginning, the Church has understood herself as essentially apostolic, not only in doctrine, but in a visible and continuous succession.
As Irenaeus teaches:
“Traditionem Apostolorum manifestatam in toto mundo… per successiones episcoporum custoditam.”
(The apostolic tradition, manifested throughout the whole world, is preserved through the succession of bishops.)
Thus, apostolic succession is not an accidental feature, but a constitutive principle of the Church’s visibility.
If this succession were to fail in reality, the Church would cease to be what Christ instituted—which is impossible.
2. On the Nature of the Episcopate: Order and Jurisdiction
It is therefore necessary to distinguish with precision what Catholic doctrine has always distinguished:
the power of Order (potestas ordinis)
and the power of Jurisdiction (potestas iurisdictionis)
As Thomas Aquinas teaches:
“Potestas ordinis et potestas iurisdictionis differunt.”
Episcopal consecration confers the fullness of the sacrament of Order and imprints an indelible character. It constitutes the subject within the apostolic order in a real and ontological manner.
But it does not confer jurisdiction.
Rather, it constitutes the subject as properly disposed to receive jurisdiction through mission, and establishes in him a radical ontological disposition ordering him to ecclesiastical governance, without conferring that governance itself.
As Cyprian of Carthage writes:
“Episcopatus unus est, cuius a singulis in solidum pars tenetur.”
Thus, the episcopate is not a mere functional delegation, but a participation in the very structure of the apostolic order.
3. On Sacramental Intention: Substance and Accident
Your argument rests largely on the question of intention.
Here, Catholic theology makes a decisive distinction between:
what is substantial to the sacrament
and what is accidental to it
The intention required for validity is the internal intention to perform the sacramental act itself, that is, to do what the Church does (facere quod facit Ecclesia), not a complete theological understanding of all its effects.
As Augustine of Hippo teaches:
“Petrus baptizat, Christus baptizat; Iudas baptizat, Christus baptizat.”
Thus, the efficacy of the sacrament depends on Christ, not on the theological precision of the minister.
It follows that:
An error regarding the non-essential effects of a sacrament does not vitiate the internal intention to perform the sacred rite itself.
The substantial intention is to “make a bishop” according to the rite of the Church.
Since jurisdiction is not the proper effect of the sacrament itself, an error concerning jurisdiction remains accidental and does not invalidate the consecration.
Otherwise, all sacramental certainty would collapse, and the Church would fall into Donatism.
4. On Law, Necessity, and the Hierarchy of Norms
You argue that one cannot do evil that good may come. This is entirely true.
But not every transgression of a human law constitutes a moral evil in the same sense.
The requirement of an Apostolic mandate belongs to ecclesiastical law, which is subordinate to divine law and ordered to a higher end: the preservation of the Church and the salvation of souls (salus animarum).
According to classical theology, laws are hierarchically ordered:
divine law
natural law
ecclesiastical (human) law
A lower law cannot invalidate or destroy a higher one.
As Thomas Aquinas teaches:
“Quando observatio legis est nociva bono communi, lex non est observanda.”
Thus, when the strict observance of a human law would lead to the disappearance of apostolic succession, the law must be understood according to its end. This does not imply any change in the nature of things, but concerns only the application of ecclesiastical law, which, as a human law, must be interpreted according to its final cause.
This is not doing evil—it is preserving the good for which the law exists.
5. On the Church as Societas Perfecta
At the root of the question lies a principle of the highest importance:
the Church is a Societas Perfecta, instituted by Christ, and therefore possessing within herself all the means necessary for her own preservation.
As Robert Bellarmine teaches, the Church is a visible and perpetual society.
Therefore:
The Church must possess within her own sacramental and hierarchical constitution the means necessary for her own visible perpetuation.
If the Church depended for her survival upon a purely administrative condition, such as the uninterrupted availability of a juridical mandate, she would no longer be a perfect society, but one dependent upon contingent human conditions.
This is incompatible with her divine institution.
6. Necessary Conclusion
It follows therefore with theological necessity:
that episcopal consecration can be valid without Apostolic mandate
that sacramental intention is not invalidated by doctrinal errors concerning jurisdiction
that the episcopal character constitutes a real and permanent ontological foundation of apostolic succession
that apostolic succession must remain visible in the Church
and that therefore there must exist, even in extraordinary circumstances, true bishops in whom this succession subsists
Final Consideration
The question, therefore, is not whether such bishops can exist.
It is whether one is prepared to affirm that the Church can lose the principle of her visible continuity.
For if that were admitted, the consequence would be grave:
the Church would no longer be a visible and apostolic society, but a reality dependent upon purely juridical conditions.
But this is not the faith of the Church.
May God guide us all in the love of truth.
Dear Rogelio,
Thank you for your reply. I have indeed read the text of Abbé Belmont to which you refer, and I fully recognize the seriousness of the difficulty he raises regarding episcopal consecrations without Papal mandate.
However, it is necessary to determine with precision the proper level at which this difficulty is situated, in order to avoid any misunderstanding.
1. On Abbé Belmont and the level of the discussion
Abbé Belmont’s analysis brings to light a real tension within the juridical and hierarchical order of the Church.
But precisely for this reason, the question cannot be adequately resolved at the level of disciplinary or canonical analysis alone.
This is why my previous responses did not remain confined to that level: they sought to address the question at the level of principles, namely:
- the divine constitution of the Church,
- her indefectibility,
- and the nature of apostolic succession.
In this sense, what you attribute to Belmont has not been overlooked, but must be resolved by situating it within a higher theological framework.
2. On your central claim: the Papal mandate as constitutive necessity
You affirm that a bishop without Papal mandate is either non-Catholic or not a bishop at all, grounding this claim in the hierarchical nature of the episcopate, which you attribute to natural law.
This requires a precise clarification.
The hierarchical constitution of the Church, namely the subordination of the episcopate to the Roman Pontiff, belongs to divine positive law (ius divinum positivum), instituted by Christ, and not to natural law strictly speaking.
Natural law may indicate that every society requires a principle of unity, but the concrete form of ecclesiastical hierarchy is known only through revelation.
At the same time, the Papal mandate belongs to ecclesiastical law, which regulates the ordinary juridical exercise of this hierarchy.
Your argument therefore rests upon an identification that cannot be maintained:
- between what belongs to divine institution,
- and what belongs to juridical regulation.
3. On the nature of episcopal consecration
You further imply that, without juridical insertion into the hierarchy, episcopal consecration either produces no bishop or produces a non-Catholic bishop.
This conclusion does not follow from these principles, since it confuses the absence of juridical mission with the absence of sacramental reality.
Episcopal consecration:
- confers the fullness of the sacrament of Order,
- constitutes a true subject within the apostolic order.
It does not confer jurisdiction, which depends upon mission.
However, it establishes what is necessary for the Church’s continuity: a real subject capable of receiving and transmitting apostolic succession.
In this sense, it confers a radical aptitude for spiritual government (in potentia, not in actu), not as jurisdiction, but as an intrinsic disposition of the subject, remaining even when its exercise is canonically impeded.
Thus, the difficulty raised by Abbé Belmont concerns the juridical order, not the sacramental reality itself.
4. On visibility and objective criteria
You argue that without Papal mandate there is no objective way to distinguish who is Catholic.
This objection rests upon a confusion between juridical regularity and ecclesial visibility.
The Church is visible through objective and identifiable elements:
- the profession of the integral Catholic faith,
- the validity of the sacraments,
apostolic succession.
Thus, the distinction between a Catholic bishop and a schismatic does not rest solely upon canonical regularity, but upon:
- doctrinal profession,
- sacramental continuity,
- and ordination toward the Roman principle.
Visibility does not require universal agreement, but the presence of objective marks.
5. On law, necessity, and the Papal mandate
You insist that the Papal mandate is not a mere juridical obstacle, but pertains to the very constitution of the Church.
Here again, a distinction is necessary.
The Papal mandate is indeed essential to the ordinary juridical order of the Church.
However, it does not belong to the essence of the episcopate itself, nor to the divine constitution of apostolic succession.
If it did, then in circumstances where such mandate is morally or physically inaccessible, the continuation of apostolic succession would become impossible.
This leads directly to the decisive point.
6. Demonstration from principles
The Church is indefectible and must remain a visible and apostolic society.
Apostolic succession requires the existence of valid bishops capable of transmitting that succession.
If it is affirmed that no episcopal consecration is possible without Papal mandate in all circumstances, then, in the absence of access to such mandate, apostolic succession would cease in fact.
If apostolic succession ceases, the Church would lose her apostolicity and her visible hierarchical constitution.
This is theologically impossible.
Therefore, the absence of a Papal mandate, when such mandate is in fact inaccessible, cannot render impossible the continuation of apostolic succession.
Conclusion
In this light, the difficulty raised by Abbé Belmont is not denied, but resolved:
it expresses a real tension within the juridical order, but cannot negate what belongs to the divine constitution of the Church.
The question is not whether the Papal mandate belongs to the normal life of the Church, it does.
The question is whether its absence can make impossible what Christ instituted as perpetual.
This cannot be admitted without contradicting the very constitution of the Church.
God bless.
Dear Rogelio,
Thank you for your clarification. Your position is now clearly expressed, which allows the question to be addressed at its proper theological level. Allow me, therefore, to respond according to the proper theological principles and distinctions.
1. On Sacramental Intention
You argue that episcopal consecrations performed with the intention not to confer jurisdiction are “against nature.” This does not correspond to Catholic sacramental theology. The intention required for validity is the intention to do what the Church does (facere quod facit Ecclesia), not a correct understanding of all the effects of the sacrament.
As St. Thomas Aquinas teaches (ST III, q. 64, a. 8), the minister need not have explicit knowledge of the effects of the sacrament. This principle is reaffirmed by Leo XIII in Apostolicae Curae. Therefore, an error concerning jurisdiction, which does not belong to the sacrament itself, does not invalidate the consecration. The sacramental effect (the episcopal character) is fully realized, even if jurisdiction, which belongs to a distinct order, is not currently conferred.
2. On Episcopacy and Authority
You rightly affirm that jurisdiction comes from mission and cannot be assumed by oneself. However, your position introduces a logical difficulty: If jurisdiction does not proceed from the sacrament, then the validity of the sacrament cannot depend on an intention to confer jurisdiction. To require such an intention while denying that jurisdiction comes from the sacrament is to conflate two distinct orders. Consecration constitutes a true subject in the apostolic order, capable of receiving jurisdiction, even if it does not grant it immediately.
3. On the Papal Mandate and Indefectibility
No one denies the necessity of the Papal mandate in the normal order of the Church. The question is whether its absence can render impossible what belongs to the Divine Constitution of the Church.
- If that were the case, apostolic succession would cease in certain historical circumstances.
- This would contradict the indefectibility of the Church.
- Visibility and apostolicity require that a real subject of succession subsist.
Without validly consecrated bishops, there would be no subject capable of receiving jurisdiction in the future, rendering any restoration of the hierarchical order impossible. The preservation of the episcopal character is a necessary condition for the continuity of the Church.
4. On the Juridical vs. Sacramental Order
Your rejection of this episcopacy presupposes that the juridical order must always remain fully operative. However, Catholic doctrine affirms that the sacramental structure of the Church can and must subsist even when the juridical order is impeded. The Church is a Societas Perfecta that possesses within herself the means of her own survival.
5. On Providence and Secondary Causes
To entrust everything to God is necessary, but divine Providence does not dispense us from acting according to the means God Himself has instituted. God governs His Church through visible and sacramental means. To neglect these means under the pretext of trusting in Providence is not an act of faith, but a failure to cooperate with the divine order.
Conclusion
The issue is not whether the Papal mandate is necessary in normal circumstances, it is.
The issue is whether its absence can render impossible what Christ instituted as perpetual.
This cannot be admitted without contradicting the indefectibility and visible apostolic continuity of the Church.
God bless.
Thanks for this Serge. I think the primary point here is whether or not the principles that apply to true general councils – ie the claim that only those with jurisdiction have a strict right to attend and vote – apply also to imperfect general councils. I understood from Fr Ricossa's article that he concedes that any remaining ordinaries (or their equivalents) would indeed have a right to step in over the material cardinals. If he did not say it, I think it's implicit in the argument. It is asserted and argued, but not to my mind proved, that traditionalist bishops are equivalent to ordinaries.
Those, I think, are the two key points of this debate.
On the Law of Necessity, the Episcopal Habit, and the Principle of "Ecclesia Supplet"
« Thank you for this clarification, S.D. Wright. You have indeed identified the two pillars of the current impasse. I would like to offer some further thoughts on both.
Regarding your first point, the doctrine of the "Imperfect Council" (as seen in Cajetan and Vitoria) rests precisely on the principle that positive (human) laws must yield to the necessity of Divine Right. To restrict the right to vote solely to ordinaries when none remain would be to transform a protective rule into an instrument for the Church's own destruction. In a state of extreme necessity, the "strict right" is superseded by the "right of the Church to exist" as a visible society.
Regarding the second point, we must look at the ultimate finality of all jurisdiction: the Salus Animarum (salvation of souls), which is the Church's Lex Suprema. The challenge is perhaps not to prove that traditionalist bishops are "ordinaries" in the canonical sense, but that the episcopal character possesses a "radical aptitude" (habitus) for the government of the Universal Church.
St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that through his consecration, a bishop receives this aptitude. In normal times, its exercise is "bound" or restricted by human law (papal designation) for the sake of order. However, in an extraordinary vacancy that threatens the very survival of the Hierarchy, this restriction is lifted by the law of necessity.
The principle of "Ecclesia Supplet" does not create a new or "rebel" authority; rather, it unlocks this power already ontologically present in the episcopal character. Since the Church is a Perfect Society, it cannot be deprived by Christ of the means necessary for its own restoration. If ordinary jurisdiction is absent, supplied jurisdiction flows directly from Christ, the Church's invisible Head, to those bishops who profess the integrity of the Faith.
This is not "usurpation" but the fulfillment of a duty of charity toward the Church, which has a divine right to a visible Head.
To deny this would be to claim that Christ left His Church paralyzed, which is a theological impossibility. »
Attitude, that is predisposition, is not jurisdiction. The ordinaries' power of jurisdiction does not come from consecration, but directly from the Pope. Therefore, "traditionalist bishops" have no power that can be "unlocked".
Giuseppe, your objection relies on a total separation between Holy Orders and Jurisdiction that contradicts the organic nature of the Church. While the exercise of jurisdiction is normally regulated by the Pope, the radical capacity to govern is ontologically rooted in the Episcopal character.
To claim that an Bishop has no "unlocked" power in an emergency is to reduce the Successor of the Apostles to a mere "sacramental ghost." As a Perfect Society, the Church cannot be a circular trap where we need a Pope to grant jurisdiction, but need jurisdiction to elect a Pope. The "root" remains in the Episcopate for the very survival of the Apostolic See
I imagine you're familiar with the Church's teaching on this point. What comes directly from the Pope to bishops is THE POWER (of jurisdiction), not simply its exercise.
Ad Sinarum Gentem (1954)
12. By virtue of God's Will, the faithful are divided into two classes: the clergy and the laity. By virtue of the same Will is established the TWOFOLD sacred hierarchy, namely, of orders and jurisdiction. Besides - as has also been divinely established - the power of orders (through which the ecclesiastical hierarchy is composed of Bishops, priests, and ministers) comes from receiving the Sacrament of Holy Orders. But THE POWER OF JURISDICTION, which is conferred upon the Supreme Pontiff directly by divine rights, flows to the Bishops by the same right, but ONLY THROUGH the Successor of St. Peter, ....
Qua profecto divina voluntate christifideles in duos ordines distribuuntur, clericorum laicorumque ; eademque voluntate DUPLEX constituitur sacra potestas ordinis nempe et iurisdictionis. Ac praeterea — quod divinitus pariter statutum est — ad potestatem ordinis, qua Ecclesiastica Hierarchia ex Episcopis constat, presbyteris et administris, acceditur per acceptum sacri ordinis sacramentum; IURISDICTIONIS autem POTESTAS, quae Supremo Pontifici iure ipso divino directe confertur, EPISCOPIS ex eodem PROVENIT iure, AT NONNISI PER Petri Successorem, ... .
Mystici Corporis (1943)
Yet in exercising this office they [residential bishops] are not altogether independent, but are subordinate to the lawful authority of the Roman Pontiff, although enjoying THE ORDINARY POWER OF JURISDICTION which they receive directly from the same Supreme Pontiff.
id tamen dum faciunt, non plane sui iuris sunt, sed sub debita Romani Pontificis auctoritate positi, quamvis ordinaria iurisdictionis potestate fruantur, immediate sibi ab eodem Pontifice Summo impertita.
Giuseppe, your approach treats the Church as a dead mechanism rather than a Living Organism and a Perfect Society animated by the Holy Ghost. If, as you claim, the extinction of a legal channel of jurisdiction could paralyze the Church's vital functions, then the Church would be no more than a human institution.
But the Church is the Mystical Body of Christ. A living body is not a machine; it possesses an internal principle of life and restoration. Christ did not leave His Church as a "project on hold" or a legal orphan. Even in an extraordinary vacancy, the power to provide for the Head does not vanish into a legal void; it remains in the faithful Episcopate as a living root, ready to act for the salvation of souls. To deny this is to confuse the regulation of the law with the source of Life itself. We do not wait for a miracle from outside; we believe in the Indefectibility of the Life that dwells within the Church in actum today.
Further thought on the consistency of supplied jurisdiction:
« To conclude on the internal consistency of this position, one must note a striking paradox: most traditional clergy today (and the faithful who follow them) already act daily by virtue of this supplied jurisdiction. When a priest without an ordinary canonical mission hears confessions, confirms, or governs a community, he invokes the law of necessity and the principle of Ecclesia Supplet for the sake of souls.
If we admit that necessity "unlocks" the radical aptitude (habitus) of the priest for particular goods (the sacraments), how can we logically deny that this same necessity unlocks the radical aptitude of the episcopate for the universal common good of the Church? Christ could not have endowed His Church with the power to heal individual members while refusing her the power to restore her own Head. As Bellarmin teaches (De Conciliis, I, 14), the right to provide itself with a head is a right of natural preservation. If the Church is a Perfect Society, she must possess within herself, through Christ, the capacity to end her state of decapitation. »
We don't admit that the necessity unlocks the radical aptitude. We say that certain states of necessity trigger the supply of jurisdiction by the law - ie, something new is given, not something latent unlocked.
As for the head. Fr Ricossa argues there are no living ordinaries or their equivalents. I do not not. But if there are such living ordinaries, then the Church already enjoys the capacity to elect a new pope, without needing recourse to arguments about traditionalist bishops.
Thank you for this reply, S.D. Wright. Our disagreement reveals two very different visions of the Church.
Regarding the first point: by saying that jurisdiction is "something new" given by the law, you treat it as an external object, like a key handed to someone. But a law, which is a mere rule, cannot give what it does not possess. Thomistic theology suggests a deeper reality: the "Root" of jurisdiction is already present in the episcopal character received at consecration.
In normal times, this power is "bound" or dormant for the sake of order. But in a crisis, it is not "something new" that is added; rather, it is this ontological root that is "unlocked" by the necessity of the Church's survival. To deny this is to reduce the Bishop to a mere administrative shell, whereas he is, by his very nature, a Successor of the Apostles.
Regarding the second point: waiting for hypothetical "ordinaries" who have not manifested themselves in 60 years is, in my view, a form of theological paralysis. If the Church is a Perfect Society, she cannot be dependent on "administrative shadows" or bishops who no longer exist.
The right to provide a Head for the Church must reside in the living members who still profess the Faith. If we admit that necessity allows a priest to give absolution (a particular good), we must admit that it allows the Episcopate to provide a Pope (the common good). To deny the Church the means of its own restoration is to claim that Christ's promise has failed, which is a theological impossibility
Serge, my formation was stolen, so it's hard to follow everything. But your logic and goodness give me hope. I was born in 1960 and I would like to see a Pope before I die
John,
Thank you very much for your kind words. I understand what you mean. Many of us have been deprived, in different ways, of a clear and peaceful Catholic formation in this crisis.
My only desire is to seek, as faithfully as possible, what the Church has always taught, without despair and without inventing solutions of our own.
May God grant His Church a true and visible shepherd again, in the way and at the time He wills, and may we have the grace to cooperate with His Providence rather than remain passive.
May God keep us faithful
Mr. Wright, your two “key points” actually expose the problem rather than resolve it.
First, the principle you cite is decisive: only those with jurisdiction have the right to act in councils or elections. That is precisely why your position fails. You cannot extend that principle to “imperfect” situations while simultaneously admitting that jurisdiction comes only from the Roman Pontiff. Without mission, there is no right—strict or otherwise—to govern or elect.
Second, the claim that traditionalist bishops are “equivalent to ordinaries” is not merely unproven—it is impossible. An ordinary is defined by jurisdiction over a flock. A bishop without mission is not an ordinary in any sense, but only a bishop of orders.
So your argument depends on a category that does not exist: men without jurisdiction acting as if they possessed it.
The conclusion follows directly from your own premise: no jurisdiction, no right to act.
Serge, your entire argument hinges on a single unproven leap: that the Church’s nature as a “perfect society” includes the power to generate jurisdiction or election authority apart from the Roman Pontiff.
But that is precisely what the Church has never taught.
A “perfect society” means the Church possesses all the means instituted by Christ for her end—not that she can create new ones when those means are absent. Otherwise, divine constitution becomes elastic under pressure.
Cajetan’s “devolution” does not establish what you claim. It presupposes a juridical order still intact—not a universal loss of mission. You are extending a limited principle into a total reconstruction of authority.
Likewise, “Ecclesia supplet” applies to acts under common error—not to the creation of offices, jurisdiction, or the election of a pope.
And Aquinas’ “radical aptitude” is being misused. Aptitude is not power, and necessity does not actualize jurisdiction.
You are trying to preserve indefectibility by granting the Church a power Christ never gave her.
But indefectibility preserves the structure—it does not authorize its replacement.
1. The huge problem today (exploited BTW by neo-modernists occupying nowadays Vatican) is an anachronistic vision of the Church history being an effect of end of 19th century "hyperpapalism"
(which in some cases take a rather vicious character - like falsifying the English translation of Bellarmine's work regarding the councils because the saint dared to hold John XXIII as the lawful pope - which was by the way the view very often met in Catholic publications including Annuario Pontificio pope list up to the 1940's).
2. In fact the history of the Church provides many practical examples (and usages) of electing/choosing the bishop of Rome in ways other than the college of cardinals, in particular, in extraordinary situations (state of necessity) when the ordinary, positive election law cannot be applied (we do not have to consider the 1958 sedevacantist thesis here, we can for example, for speculation purposes, imagine a hypothetic but possible situation where all cardinals and the pope die suddenly in a plane crash - then what? does the hierarchy cease to exist because the legicoming back to the Church history we had popes elected/chosen by the clergy/faithful of Rome (ancient times), by Roman patricians/emperor (crisis of 10th/11th century) or by an elaborate extraordinary election mechanism (Council of Constance - no, it was not "gallicanism" that made Martin V pope but the state of necessity and the practical solution adopted to end the disastrous crisis) - all deemed valid/true popes in the Church history. At the same time we had popes elected with a violation of ordinary conclave rules (Urban VI when populus Romanus put cardinals under a violent pressure to force them to elect a "Roman") also deemed valid.
Thus, there are many historical cases that may be referred to and I am very amazed 1958 sedevacantists did nothing to elect the pope (Catholics in the past sometimes made mistakes like (hyper)conciliarism but at least they acted - showing the Catholic spirit and did not close eyes, tolerating prolonged sede vacante).
3. Unfortunately, the above article quotes the above mentioned anachronistic late viewpoint regarding for example the Council of Pisa with claims it was "schismatic". Well, as I said before, many Catholics up to choosing his name by Roncalli in 1958 did not think so. And AFAIR the Church has never pronounced a judgement against it. And Bellarmine in his De Conciliis, lib. I, cap. VIII says that it is an almost common opinion that Alexander (chosen in Pisa) and his successor - John were true Pontiffs (q u o d e s t f e r m e c o m m u n i s o p i n i o, A l e x a n d r u m, e t q u i e i s u c c e s s i t, J o a n n e m f u i s s e v e r o s P o n t i f i c e s)
.
« I am very grateful to VRS for these historical reminders. They provide the necessary "flesh" to the theological principle of the Habitus I mentioned earlier.
The "hyperpapalism" mentioned by VRS is precisely what "binds" the radical aptitude of our bishops today. By freezing the Church into a rigid legalism that only knows the 1945 or 1917 election laws, we end up denying the Church's nature as a Perfect Society.
The "plane crash" metaphor perfectly illustrates the difference between Ecclesiastical Right (the designation of electors) and Divine Right (the Church's power to preserve itself). As history shows—especially with the Council of Constance—when the ordinary law becomes an obstacle to the survival of the Papacy, the Law of Necessity must override positive laws.
To accept Ecclesia Supplet for the branches (the sacraments) while refusing it for the Root (the election of a Head) is a theological contradiction. If the Church is a Perfect Society, she must possess within herself, through Christ, the capacity to end her state of decapitation. »
I noticed that a part of the comment was lost during text formatting.
It should go as follows:
"Does the hierarchy cease to exist because the legislator did not provide for such an extreme situation? Certainly not.
So, coming back to the Church history, etc."
You’re conflating irregular procedures with the source of authority.
Yes, history shows unusual elections—pressure, interference, imperfect mechanisms. But in every case, the Church later judged them valid precisely because jurisdiction ultimately derived from the Roman See, not because necessity created a new source of authority.
That distinction destroys your argument.
You’re arguing from disorder in the mode of election to a change in the principle of authority. The Church has never taught that necessity allows jurisdiction or papal election power to arise apart from the structure instituted by Christ.
Your hypothetical (all cardinals dead) proves nothing. It only shows a difficulty—not a permission to reconstruct the constitution.
And invoking “hyperpapalism” is a deflection. The issue is not exaggerating the papacy, but preserving the defined teaching: jurisdiction flows from Peter.
History shows irregularity can occur. It does not show the Church can generate authority without its source.
Otherwise, every crisis becomes a license to reinvent the Church.
"We say “imperfect” because in the absence of the Pope, a general Council is precisely imperfect (cf. De comparatione, n° 231, where it is spoken of the Council of Constance which met for the election of Martin V), in that it is deprived of its Head, who alone can convoke, direct and confirm an ecumenical Council"
---
The 2nd Council of Constantinople is recognised as general/ecumenical but it was convoked by the emperor and without participation of pope (or his legates), and was confirmed by the pope only after it had ended. So it ensues that it is sufficient if the pope confirms/approves acts of the council, even post factum.
« Thank you, VRS. This historical example is a powerful reminder of a key principle: the validity of an ecclesiastical act depends more on its finality and its subsequent confirmation by the Holy See than on the strict regularity of its initial convocation. In a state of necessity, the Episcopate's movement toward the Common Good is what matters, as it awaits the definitive seal of the Pope it will have elected. »
The Necessity of Action: Divine Right vs. Legal Paralysis
To provide a broader perspective on this issue, I believe we must return to the supreme law of the Church and the internal consistency of our position. A rigorous reasoning, based on the perennial teaching of the Church, rests on three pillars:
1. The Hierarchy of Norms (Divine Right vs. Ecclesiastical Right)
The Papacy is of Divine institution (Iure Divino), while the specific mode of election (via Cardinals) is of Ecclesiastical institution (Iure Ecclesiastico). St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that human law ceases to bind when it becomes an obstacle to the Common Good. To claim that an election is impossible due to a lack of Cardinals is to subordinate Christ’s will, that His Church have a Head, to a human administrative rule. Divine Right commands providing for the See, regardless of failing human modalities.
2. Indefectibility resides in Faith, not in "Shadows"
The thesis of a "material" hierarchy (occupying sees without the Faith) is a legal illusion. St. Robert Bellarmine is clear: a manifest heretic is not a member of the Church and cannot be the "matter" of its government. The Church is a living body; its indefectibility resides in the faithful episcopate that preserves both the Orders and the Faith. To wait for "administrative shadows" to convert before acting is an error: the Church must restore itself through its living and confessing members.
3. Epikeia as the Highest Act of Justice
Epikeia is not a "breach" of the law, but the fulfillment of the spirit of the law when the letter becomes deadly. As St. Thomas Aquinas teaches: "In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law; it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good" (Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 120, a. 1). If the letter of election law prevents any election from occurring, Epikeia commands us to bypass the letter to save the very existence of the Papacy. As moral theology teaches, necessity knows no law (Necessitas non habet legem) when the salvation of the Christian society is at stake.
In perspective:
If we accept supplied jurisdiction for confessions out of charity for a single soul, how can we deny it for the election of a Pope, which is charity for the entire Church? Inaction is not a virtue; it is a paralysis that contradicts the nature of the Church as a Perfect Society. The Church possesses within herself, through her faithful episcopate, the radical power to restore her Head. To deny this is to claim that Christ has left His Church paralyzed, which is a theological impossibility.
This is a very interesting discussion. Thank you to the various writers for considering the topic with intelligence and peace. I am not in the habit of posting comments, but I would like to say the following:
I think the heart of the problem lies within a confusion between LEX and JUS. Jus (right) is superior to lex (law). When you underline the JUS that the Church has to provide for a visible head, people oppose LEX to you, not considering that LEX (the laws) has been implemented to protect the JUS (the right). But there is a gradation from LEX to JUS to JUSTITIA. No legal consideration will ever be able to undermine the right the Church has to provide for a visible head, taking extraordinary means against the laws or rather over the laws (praeter legem) if necessary.
This would be the whole purpose of an Imperfect General Council : determine the vacancy of the Holy See; determine who are the lawful electors (if there are any) and if none can be found, consider carefully and eventually affirm the right of the assembly to make a decision on who they will be, make that decision and go ahead with the desired election. Such a decision on who are the rightful electors would make the men chosen by the assembled Church the lawful electors. For, if it is possible that there be no lawful elector, it is impossible that there be no rightful electors.
I wish everyone could consider that the Holy Ghost still dwells within the Church today in 2026.
Your Excellency, thank you for this luminous distinction between Lex and Jus. It is precisely here that the core of the debate lies. To prioritize the Lex (the specific mode of election) over the Jus (the Church's divine right to its Head) is to turn the protective fence of the Church into its own prison. Your reminder that the Church, as a Perfect Society, always retains the "rightful electors" even when "lawful electors" fail, is the only path that preserves the indefectibility of the Church in 2026. This is the very essence of Epikeia in its highest form.
And thank you for this passage, which is very powerful:
«If we accept supplied jurisdiction for confessions out of charity for a single soul, how can we deny it for the election of a Pope, which is charity for the entire Church? Inaction is not a virtue; it is a paralysis that contradicts the nature of the Church as a Perfect Society. The Church possesses within herself, through her faithful episcopate, the radical power to restore her Head. To deny this is to claim that Christ has left His Church paralyzed, which is a theological impossibility.»
In my interaction with various people, I have seen that everyone (or almost) accepts in principle the right of the Church to gather into an Imperfect General Council to remedy the very grave problem which affects Her head at the present, not to go further in our affirmations until the assembled Church has made a pronouncement. This includes the prominent tenants of the Thesis I have been in touch with. They have affirmed clearly that an Imperfect General Council is the solution.
The difference lies within the question : Where is the Church today? Who represents the authority of the Church today?
- While we are stating that the authority of the Church is where the true Faith is being professed today, accompanied by the Hierarchy of Holy Orders (and jurisdiction, but let us leave that aside for now);
- The tenants of the Thesis I have been in touch with seem to affirm that the authority of the Church is where the true Faith will be professed in the future when certain people who have some sort of apparent title will convert.
In other words, while we affirm that the Church has today in actum the power to provide for a visible head, they deny the existence of this power in actum today to provide for a visible head and reduce it to a power in potentia.
This opinion of the Thesis on who represents the authority of the Church today, in my humble opinion, undermines the nature of the Church as a perfect society, by making its vital operation depend on elements that are foreign to its essence : those who do not profess the Catholic Faith. It makes the vital operation of providing for a visible head depend on the future belonging to the Church of certain people whom they have decided must convert for God to perpetuate the divine mission of His Church on earth.
«Hence I am with you until the consummation of the world». If only we knew that Christ meant : «Hence I am with you in potentia until the consummation of the world.»
Your Excellency, your distinction between power in actum and power in potentia strikes at the very root of the error. To reduce the Church's ability to restore its Head to a mere "potentiality" dependent on the conversion of those outside the Faith is to deny the current visibility and life of the Mystical Body.
As a Perfect Society, the Church must possess the means of its restoration within its actual faithful members. To wait for "administrative shadows" to return to the Faith is to subordinate the divine mission of Christ to the free will of those who currently oppose it. The Church is a living reality today, not a project on hold. Your words remind us that Christ’s promise—"I am with you always"—is an active and present reality, not a suspended hope.
Serge,
You’re identifying a real principle—the Church is a living society—but you’re misplacing where that life is manifested.
The Church’s visibility is not proven by the ability to act, but by the continuity of what was instituted. The Mystical Body remains visible through the profession of the true faith and adherence to the divine constitution—not through the uninterrupted exercise of jurisdiction.
You assume that if the Church cannot presently restore her Head, then her life is reduced to “potentiality.” That does not follow. A society can remain real while impeded in operation. Christ’s promise “I am with you always” guarantees indefectibility of constitution—not perpetual access to lawful governance in every moment.
Your position quietly introduces something the Church has never taught: that necessity activates jurisdiction or supplies the means of succession from within. But jurisdiction, by divine law, flows from the Roman Pontiff—not from the faithful, not from bishops acting without mandate, and not from a generalized “life” of the Church.
So the choice is stark: either divine constitution governs, or necessity does. It cannot be both.
The Church lives—but not by inventing authority she has not received.
Agree! Thank you, Your Excellency.
Thank you for your comments, Mgr Roy. You are most welcome here in the comment box, and we are honoured to have you.
You are separating jus from lex in a way the Church herself never permits.
The “right” to provide a visible head is not something the Church exercises apart from her own divinely constituted laws. Those laws are not arbitrary—they are the very means established to safeguard that right. You cannot appeal to jus to override the structure Christ instituted without dissolving that structure entirely.
There is no Catholic doctrine that permits the Church to act praeter legem in constituting a Pope. The election of a Roman Pontiff is not a flexible mechanism—it is tied to a determinate body (the cardinals) and a juridical process. If that structure is absent, it is not replaced by improvisation.
An “imperfect council” cannot create electors, because jurisdiction and the right to elect do not arise from assembly—they are derived from prior mission, which itself flows from the Roman Pontiff.
So your conclusion assumes what must first be proven: that there still exists a body with authority to act.
If no lawful electors remain, the answer is not self-constitution.
It is that we are enduring a real deprivation—not rewriting the Church’s constitution to escape it.
Louis,
Please excuse the lateness of this reply; your objections seemed important enough to deserve a more considered response.
Thank you for your objections. I think they help bring the discussion to its proper level.
It seems to me that the disagreement is not about whether jurisdiction comes from Christ through Peter. On this point, I agree entirely. Nor am I claiming that bishops without mission possess universal jurisdiction, or that necessity can create a new source of authority.
The real question is different:
Can the laws governing the ordinary transmission of authority be interpreted in such a way that the Church would be indefinitely deprived of any concrete means of restoring the very head required by her divine constitution?
I do not see how this can be maintained.
The distinction between the positive juridical form (lex) and the underlying right and end it serves (jus) seems essential here, since classical theology holds that ecclesiastical law must be interpreted according to the end for which it exists.
This is precisely why theologians such as Cajetan and Suárez consider extraordinary questions arising in cases of extreme necessity: because the preservation of the Church cannot be understood as subordinated absolutely to contingent positive juridical forms.
The laws concerning papal election exist in order to secure the continuation of the Roman Pontiff, not to make that continuation impossible when the ordinary electors fail or become unusable.
Therefore, to say that no lawful electors remain cannot mean that the Church has no possible way, in principle, of determining rightful electors in a case of extreme necessity. Otherwise, ecclesiastical law would be interpreted against its own end.
This is not a reconstruction of the Church’s constitution. It is the refusal to make a contingent juridical mechanism superior to the divine finality it serves.
You rightly insist that authority is received and not invented. I agree. But designation is not collation of jurisdiction. The electors do not give the papacy. They designate the subject who, if legitimately designated and accepting, receives authority from Christ.
Thus, the question is not whether bishops without ordinary jurisdiction can create papal authority. They cannot.
The question is whether the Church, in a case of extreme necessity, retains a real and visible capacity to designate the subject of the papacy, so that Christ may confer the authority which He alone gives.
If the answer is no, then the Church remains a society in name, but without any actual means of restoring her visible principle of unity. That would reduce indefectibility to a merely abstract preservation of structure without vital operation.
In the line of classical theology represented by Suárez, the perfection of the Church does not imply that every power must always be exercised according to its ordinary mode, but that the Church permanently possesses, within the order willed by Christ, the means necessary for her preservation.
A perfect society cannot be understood as possessing all necessary means for its end only in theory, while being in practice indefinitely unable to use any of them.
This is why the episcopate matters. Not because it is an autonomous source of jurisdiction, and not because it replaces Peter, but because it appears to be the visible hierarchical subject most ordered to the head. Outside the episcopate, no merely private group, lay body, or self-appointed faction can plausibly represent the Church in her order of government.
So the true alternative is not:
“ordinary jurisdiction or revolution.”
The true distinction is between:
ordinary juridical operation, when the ordinary means exist;
and extraordinary, strictly ministerial action, when the ordinary means are morally or juridically impossible — not to create a new authority, but to restore the normal order.
This is why the accusation of self-constitution does not touch the argument if the act is properly limited.
A true extraordinary act would not claim to govern the Universal Church, define doctrine, or create jurisdiction. It would be ordered solely to the restoration of the head, and would remain ministerial, not constitutive.
Your position rightly fears conciliarism and ecclesiastical self-invention. So do I.
But there is an opposite danger: a juridical paralysis in which the laws of the Church are treated as if they could permanently prevent the Church from attaining the very end for which they exist.
That, too, seems difficult to reconcile with Catholic ecclesiology.
The Church does not invent authority. But neither can she be conceived as a visible, hierarchical, perfect society deprived of any actual visible means of restoring her head when the ordinary means fail.
That is, it seems to me, the precise point at issue.
Serge,
You say you are not creating a new source of authority, yet the entire structure of your argument depends upon necessity permitting acts for which no demonstrable subject of jurisdiction presently exists. That is precisely the difficulty.
Notice where the shift occurs.
You move from: “The Church cannot be deprived indefinitely”
to: “Therefore some visible body must retain the practical capacity to restore the papacy.”
But that conclusion is not drawn from defined theology. It is drawn from what you personally believe indefectibility must look like in practice.
That is the leap.
The Church teaches that her divine constitution cannot fail. She does not teach that Catholics must always retain an operational mechanism capable of visibly restoring the hierarchy under every historical condition.
In fact, Scripture, the Fathers, and many approved theologians repeatedly contemplate profound eclipse, cessation, chastisement, and deprivation in the final crisis. Cardinal Manning himself notes the unanimous expectation among the Fathers that the Holy Sacrifice would cease in the latter days. The possibility of deprivation is not foreign to Catholic theology at all. What is foreign is the idea that deprivation itself authorizes extraordinary reconstruction of juridical order from below.
And this is the key point: you never actually demonstrate the existence of a body possessing the authority to designate electors or initiate restoration. You infer that such a body must exist because otherwise the crisis appears intolerable to your understanding of indefectibility.
But theology does not proceed from emotional necessity.
You say the episcopate is “most ordered to the head.” Granted. But bishops are not a floating reservoir of jurisdiction awaiting activation in emergencies. Catholic theology has always distinguished sacramental order from mission and jurisdiction. A bishop without mission does not become a juridical principle of restoration simply because the crisis becomes prolonged.
Otherwise the constitution quietly changes: Peter remains theoretically necessary, but the episcopate acquires practical power to perpetuate and restore the structure apart from demonstrable Petrine authorization whenever necessity is invoked.
That is not merely ministerial action. It becomes substitute ecclesiology.
You also separate lex from jus too sharply. Ecclesiastical law is not an arbitrary shell wrapped around a deeper invisible principle. In the Church, juridical form is part of the visible constitution itself. The laws governing succession are not accidental obstacles standing over against the Church’s divine end. They are among the very means through which Christ ordered His Church to continue visibly.
So when those means fail in practice, the answer is not automatically: “therefore extraordinary replacement mechanisms activate.”
That conclusion itself requires proof.
And this is the deepest problem with the entire necessity thesis: it begins by rejecting private invention of authority, but ends by inferring authority from what seems necessary for the Church to remain what one believes she must visibly look like.
But Christ never promised immunity from juridical deprivation. He promised indefectibility of the Church’s constitution.
Men may fail it. The structure itself cannot fail.
Louis,
Thank you for your reply. I think it helps clarify the real point at issue.
I agree that the Church can undergo a real deprivation, even a terrible eclipse in her visible operation. I do not deny this. Nor do I claim that indefectibility means permanent ease of government, uninterrupted normality, or immunity from chastisement.
But the possibility of deprivation does not prove the impossibility of a remedy.
More precisely, it does not prove that the episcopate may not even gather to discern whether such a remedy exists according to the divine constitution of the Church.
Here, the distinction must be carefully maintained.
I am not saying that the episcopate, without the Roman Pontiff, possesses supreme jurisdiction. It does not.
I am not saying that bishops without canonical mission can create jurisdiction. They cannot.
I am not saying that necessity itself confers governing authority. It does not.
But the episcopate is not therefore a merely sacramental remnant with no ecclesial function. By divine institution, it belongs to the visible hierarchical constitution of the Church. It is the body most ordered to the head, and therefore the proper visible subject to examine a crisis affecting the head.
This is not conciliarism.
Conciliarism would make the episcopate a source of authority above or alongside Peter.
What I am describing is something different: the episcopate acting ministerially, not to replace Peter, but to discern how Peter may be restored.
To gather in order to examine the present state of the Church is not yet to govern the Universal Church.
To discern whether the Holy See is vacant is not yet to create jurisdiction.
To ask whether lawful or rightful electors remain is not yet to invent electors.
To examine whether an extraordinary act of designation is possible is not yet to confer the papacy.
And even designation itself, if it were eventually judged possible and legitimate, would not be the collation of jurisdiction. The electors do not give papal authority. They designate the subject who, upon legitimate designation and acceptance, receives authority from Christ.
This is why the question cannot be reduced to:
“No jurisdiction, therefore no action.”
That formula is true if “action” means governing the Universal Church, defining doctrine, or exercising jurisdiction.
But it is not sufficient if “action” means hierarchical discernment concerning the very restoration of the visible principle of unity.
Catholic ecclesiology does not treat the episcopate as a collection of private individuals. Nor does it reduce bishops to validly consecrated men who become ecclesially irrelevant whenever ordinary mission is impeded. The episcopate is part of the visible constitution of the Church: subordinate to Peter, but truly ordered to the teaching, governing, preservation, and unity of the Church.
Therefore the real question is not whether bishops can replace the pope.
They cannot.
The real question is whether, in an unprecedented crisis of the head, the episcopate is the proper hierarchical subject to gather, discern, and determine what the Church’s divine constitution permits or forbids.
If the answer is no, then one must explain what visible hierarchical subject remains capable of even examining the crisis.
If the answer is “none,” then the conclusion is no longer merely deprivation. It becomes a principle of ecclesial inaction.
That seems very difficult to reconcile with the Church as a visible, hierarchical, apostolic society.
Your appeal to eschatological deprivation is serious, and it rightly cautions against rash action. I accept that.
But it cannot justify refusing even hierarchical discernment.
The possibility that God permits an eclipse does not allow us to conclude that He forbids the remaining hierarchy to examine whether He wills to act through it as a secondary cause.
Providence does not exclude visible instruments. In the Church, it ordinarily works through them.
So I would state the point this way:
The episcopate does not possess the jurisdiction of Peter.
But by the divine constitution of the Church, it is the visible hierarchical body most competent to discern what must be done when the question concerns the absence, impediment, or restoration of Peter.
To deny this, it is not enough to say that bishops lack universal jurisdiction.
One would need to show that the divine constitution of the Church forbids the episcopate even to gather and discern how the visible head may be restored.
That, to me, has not been shown.
May God keep us faithful.
Serge,
Thank you again for the careful tone of your reply. I agree the discussion deserves precision, because the issue is not whether bishops can replace Peter. They cannot. The issue is whether men lacking demonstrable mission may nonetheless constitute a competent hierarchical subject for restoration.
And I still believe your argument quietly assumes the very thing needing proof.
You repeatedly speak of: “the episcopate,” “the remaining hierarchy,” “the visible hierarchical subject,” and bishops acting “ministerially” to discern restoration.
But under Catholic theology, hierarchy is not merely sacramental. It is juridical.
A validly consecrated bishop is not thereby part of a juridically competent acting episcopate simply by existing during a crisis. Mission and authority are not produced by gathering, necessity, or proximity to the problem being discussed.
That is the distinction I believe your framework never fully crosses.
You correctly deny:
that bishops possess Peter’s jurisdiction,
that necessity creates authority,
that bishops may replace the pope,
that jurisdiction can be manufactured from below.
But then you still assign to the episcopate a visible ecclesial competence to gather, discern, identify possible electors, examine extraordinary designation mechanisms, and potentially initiate restoration procedures.
That is already an ecclesiological act.
And once such a body publicly acts as the Church’s competent visible organ for restoration, the question immediately becomes:
By what juridical principle did these particular bishops become a competent acting body of the Church rather than merely validly consecrated individuals lacking mission?
That point is never actually demonstrated.
Instead, the argument seems to proceed indirectly:
If no such competent visible body remains, then restoration appears impossible or ecclesial paralysis follows. Therefore some competent visible body must remain.
But that is not a theological proof. It is a conclusion drawn from the perceived intolerability of deprivation.
And this is precisely where I believe many modern restoration arguments drift unintentionally into necessity ecclesiology.
Catholic theology absolutely teaches the perpetual constitution of the Church. I affirm that fully.
But it never defined that there must always remain a visibly operative juridical mechanism capable of restoring the papacy during every conceivable chastisement.
Scripture repeatedly presents catastrophic deprivation: the scattering of the flock, the cessation language associated with the sacrifice, the eclipse themes contemplated by many Fathers and theologians, and prolonged conditions where fidelity consists not in reconstruction, but endurance.
Even Cardinal Manning acknowledged the unanimous expectation among the Fathers that the sacrifice would cease in the final crisis.
So the mere fact that deprivation appears severe, prolonged, or practically unbearable does not itself generate ecclesial competence where lawful mission has not been demonstrated.
And that is the central issue.
I do not deny the importance of bishops to the Church’s constitution.
I deny that sacramental continuity alone establishes a juridically competent episcopal subject capable of acting for the Church in the restoration of Peter without demonstrable mission already present.
Otherwise the continuity being sought is quietly presumed from the beginning.
And that is why I continue to believe the argument ultimately rests not on demonstrated ecclesiology, but on the conviction that the alternative simply feels impossible.
Thank you again for your careful reply. I think your objection helps isolate the precise point of disagreement.
I agree with your central caution: a validly consecrated bishop, considered simply as such, does not thereby possess ordinary jurisdiction, nor does he become competent to govern the Universal Church merely because a crisis continues. I do not deny the distinction between Orders, mission, and jurisdiction. On the contrary, that distinction is essential.
But it seems to me that your objection moves too quickly from a true premise to an excessive conclusion.
The true premise is this:
bishops without canonical mission do not possess ordinary jurisdiction and cannot govern the Universal Church.
I agree.
The excessive conclusion would be this:
therefore the remaining episcopate cannot even constitute the visible hierarchical subject competent to examine, discern, and determine whether the Church still possesses a legitimate means of restoring the Roman Pontiff.
That conclusion does not follow.
The act I am defending is not an act of universal jurisdiction. It is not the exercise of Peter’s authority. It is not the creation of mission from below. It is not the constitution of a new hierarchy.
It is a ministerial act of discernment concerning the restoration of the very principle without which ordinary jurisdiction cannot resume.
This distinction is crucial.
To gather in order to examine whether the Holy See is vacant is not yet to govern the Universal Church.
To examine whether ordinary electors remain is not yet to create electors.
To determine whether the ordinary mode has become morally impossible is not yet to invent jurisdiction.
To ask whether an extraordinary designation is permitted by the Church’s own divine constitution is not yet to confer the papacy.
And even if an act of designation were eventually judged possible, designation is not the collation of jurisdiction. The electors do not give papal authority. They designate the subject who, after legitimate designation and acceptance, receives authority from Christ.
You say that hierarchy in the Church is not merely sacramental but juridical. I agree.
But Catholic doctrine also teaches that the episcopate belongs by divine institution to the visible hierarchy of the Church. The Council of Trent teaches that, by divine ordination, there is in the Church a hierarchy composed of bishops, priests, and ministers.
Therefore the episcopate cannot be reduced to a collection of private individuals simply because ordinary mission is impeded.
Dom Gréa is particularly helpful here because he preserves both truths.
On the one hand, he clearly teaches that hierarchical communion — juridical communion — is given by the head and received by the members:
“La communion hiérarchique, synonyme parfait de la juridiction des modernes, est telle en effet qu’elle est donnée par le chef et reçue par les membres.”
And again:
“Le vicaire de Jésus-Christ est ce centre visible d’où découle immédiatement la communion épiscopale et avec elle la puissance des pasteurs.”
I fully accept this.
Jurisdiction is not produced by consecration, necessity, or assembly.
But Gréa does not then reduce the episcopate to a merely sacramental residue with no ecclesial competence. He writes:
“L’épiscopat est un dans tous les membres du collège, et tout entier dans chacun des évêques.”
And he explains that this cannot be understood only of the power exercised by bishops over the flock assigned to them by title, because otherwise the mystery of the episcopate would not clearly regard the Universal Church.
He continues:
“Mais les évêques, en vertu de cette union profonde et mystérieuse qui est leur ordre même et l’essence de l’épiscopat, agissent aussi, lorsqu’il convient qu’ils le fassent, au-delà même de ces limites étroites et comme associés au gouvernement et au mouvement de l’Église universelle.”
This is exactly the point.
The episcopate is not the source of jurisdiction. But it is not ecclesially insignificant when the crisis concerns the restoration of the head to whom all jurisdiction is ordered.
Aubry expresses the same principle from another angle. Christ did not leave behind isolated believers or merely isolated sacramental functions. He instituted:
“un corps de pasteurs, se renouvelant par parties, mais immortel dans son ensemble comme une personne morale,”
so that the succession of pastors would be the instrument for the conservation of the apostolic deposit.
Mgr de Salinis likewise describes the divine economy of the Church as involving:
“une hiérarchie partout présente; un enseignement qui est entendu de tous; un ministère…”
These are not accidental expressions. They describe the visible, apostolic, and hierarchical form in which Christ willed His Church to endure.
Here I think your argument draws too much from Pius XII.
Pius XII teaches that episcopal jurisdiction, in the ordinary order, comes to bishops through the Successor of Peter. I fully accept this. But it does not follow that, if the Roman See is vacant and the ordinary electors have failed, the Church possesses no visible hierarchical subject capable even of discerning how Peter’s successor might be restored.
That would turn a doctrine concerning the ordinary communication of jurisdiction into a principle of absolute paralysis.
The question is not whether necessity creates jurisdiction. It does not.
The question is whether necessity may reveal that the ordinary positive mode of exercising a right has failed, so that the Church must discern how that right remains exercisable without contradicting her divine constitution.
This is why the distinction between jus and lex matters.
I do not separate them as if law were arbitrary. Ecclesiastical law is sacred, visible, and binding. But it remains ordered to the end for which it exists. The laws of papal election exist in order to secure the continuation of the Roman Pontiff, not to make that continuation impossible if the ordinary electors disappear or become unusable.
If one says that, once the ordinary electoral mechanism fails, no hierarchical subject can even examine the possibility of restoration, then one is not merely admitting deprivation. One is making juridical inaction into a theological principle.
That is what I do not see demonstrated.
Your appeal to eschatological deprivation is serious, but it proves less than you suggest. Catholic tradition certainly admits terrible eclipses, chastisements, dispersions, and privations. I do not deny this. But the possibility of deprivation does not prove the impossibility of a remedy. Nor does it prove that the remaining hierarchy is forbidden to discern whether Providence may require action through secondary causes.
Endurance is sometimes a duty. But action is also a duty when the means are morally available and ordered to the conservation of the Church’s form.
So I am not reasoning from emotional intolerability. I am reasoning from the nature of the Church as a visible, apostolic, hierarchical, and perfect society.
If you deny that the episcopate can be the subject even of such ministerial discernment, then the question remains:
What visible hierarchical subject remains capable of examining the crisis?
If the answer is “none,” then the position becomes more than prudence. It becomes the claim that the Church can preserve the divine constitution of Peter while possessing no visible means, even in principle, to restore a successor of Peter.
That is precisely what must be proved.
My position is more limited:
The episcopate does not possess universal jurisdiction.
The episcopate does not replace Peter.
The episcopate does not create mission.
The episcopate does not confer papal authority.
But the episcopate, as the divinely instituted apostolic body most ordered to the head, is the proper visible hierarchical subject to discern whether and how the Church may restore her head when the ordinary means fail.
This is not an ecclesiology of substitution.
It is the refusal to treat the visible hierarchy as a mere sacramental remnant deprived of every ecclesial capacity when the crisis concerns the restoration of the very principle of jurisdiction.
May God keep us faithful to the constitution of the Church, without confusing prudence with paralysis, or necessity with revolution.
Louis,
I will answer this once more, because I think the point has now become clear; but I do not think it is useful to continue indefinitely if my argument is repeatedly reformulated into something I am not saying.
You write that my argument “quietly crosses from ontology into jurisdiction while verbally denying that it has done so.”
That sentence illustrates the problem. It does not answer my distinction. It reclassifies it as jurisdiction and then rejects it.
I have not argued that episcopal consecration gives jurisdiction.
I have not argued that necessity creates jurisdiction.
I have not argued that bishops without canonical mission can govern the Universal Church.
I have not argued that the episcopate can replace Peter.
I have not argued that an assembly can create authority from below.
What I have argued is much more precise:
there is a distinction between jurisdictional government and hierarchical discernment.
You have not shown that the episcopate is forbidden to gather in order to discern.
You have not shown that every public act of hierarchical discernment is necessarily an act of jurisdictional government.
You have not shown that the texts cited from Dom Gréa, Aubry, Mgr de Salinis, or the Council of Trent are inapplicable to the question.
And you have not shown that the episcopate, as the divinely instituted visible apostolic body, must be treated as a collection of private individuals whenever ordinary mission is impeded.
Instead, you repeatedly reformulate my position as though I were saying:
“bishops without mission possess public jurisdictional competence because the crisis requires it.”
But that is not my argument.
My argument is that the episcopate has, by divine institution, an objective place in the visible hierarchical constitution of the Church. That place does not give the bishops Peter’s jurisdiction. It does not allow them to govern the Universal Church. It does not allow them to create mission or confer papal authority.
But it does mean that the episcopate is not ecclesially meaningless when the crisis concerns the restoration of the very head to whom all jurisdiction is ordered.
If by “competence” you mean jurisdictional authority to govern, define doctrine, impose laws, constitute offices, or exercise Peter’s power, then I deny that bishops without mission possess such competence.
But if by “competence” you mean the responsibility to gather, examine, testify, discern, and determine what the divine constitution of the Church permits or forbids in a crisis concerning the visible head, then this is not the same thing as jurisdictional government.
It is not a coercive or legislative competence. It is a public ecclesial responsibility of testimony and discernment, rooted in the episcopate’s own place within the visible apostolic hierarchy.
That is the distinction you keep refusing to address directly.
The crisis does not create this responsibility. It only makes the question of its exercise unavoidable.
The order is not:
crisis → authority.
The order is:
divinely instituted episcopate → hierarchical responsibility → crisis requiring discernment.
You have repeatedly demonstrated points I already grant:
that jurisdiction comes through Peter;
that necessity does not create authority;
that consecration alone does not give ordinary mission;
that deprivation may be real.
But none of these proves the point you need to prove:
that the episcopate is forbidden even to gather and discern what the Church’s divine constitution permits when the crisis concerns the restoration of Peter.
That is the precise point you have not demonstrated.
Nor is it enough to say that deprivation is possible. I agree that deprivation is possible. But deprivation does not prove that no remedy may be examined. Deprivation does not prove that the remaining hierarchy is forbidden to discern. Deprivation does not turn the episcopate into a merely private aggregate.
A man stranded in darkness is not authorized to redraw the map. Agreed.
But if he has been entrusted with the map and with responsibility for the journey, he is not forbidden to examine it in order to find the way.
Likewise, I am not saying that the episcopate may redraw the constitution of the Church. I am saying that the episcopate, precisely because it belongs to that constitution, is the proper visible hierarchical subject to examine what that constitution permits in an unprecedented crisis of the head.
If you deny even this, then the question remains:
what visible hierarchical subject is competent even to examine the crisis of the visible head?
If the answer is “none,” then your position is no longer merely a warning against false jurisdiction. It becomes a principle of ecclesial inaction.
I do not find such a principle in Catholic doctrine.
I will therefore leave the matter here unless the distinction I am actually making is addressed directly, rather than being restated as a claim to jurisdiction which I have repeatedly denied.
May God keep us faithful.
Serge,
I think we may finally be isolating the real point of disagreement, and I want to state it as carefully and fairly as I can, because I do not think either of us is approaching this lightly or merely polemically. I think both of us are genuinely trying to discern the limits of the Church’s visible constitution under conditions of extraordinary crisis — juridically, theologically, and historically.
So let me first state what I think you are saying, because I do not want to misrepresent you.
I do not think you are arguing:
* that necessity creates jurisdiction,
* that bishops can replace Peter,
* that consecration itself gives ordinary mission,
* or that the episcopate may simply manufacture authority from below.
I understand that your argument is narrower and more precise than that.
What I understand you to be saying is this:
because the episcopate belongs by divine institution to the visible apostolic constitution of the Church, it therefore possesses some real and non-private ecclesial responsibility to gather, discern, testify, and examine what the constitution itself permits when the crisis concerns the visible head to whom all jurisdiction is ordinarily ordered.
And I understand that you are attempting to distinguish this from jurisdictional government properly so called.
I do understand that distinction.
But what I come back to is this:
once that discernment becomes public, hierarchical, representative, and constitutional in character, I do not know how it avoids becoming an ecclesial act requiring the very mission whose demonstrability is under dispute.
That is why I keep pressing the question of competence.
Not because I think bishops become “mere private individuals” sacramentally or ontologically. I agree they do not. But because Catholic theology traditionally grounds public ecclesial function not merely in sacramental ontology, but in mission.
So I think the real question between us is not whether bishops may think, discuss, testify, study, or even gather materially.
The real question is:
at what point does collective episcopal discernment become a visible ecclesial act performed in the name of the Church’s hierarchy?
Because once a body presents itself publicly as the proper hierarchical subject competent to determine what remedies the constitution permits concerning the papacy itself, it seems to me that the body is already claiming a form of public ecclesial competence that still requires theological grounding.
And this leads directly to your final question:
what visible hierarchical subject is competent even to examine the crisis of the visible head?
I would answer carefully:
if by “examine” you mean study, testify, preserve doctrine, identify contradictions, refuse false solutions, and suffer the deprivation without inventing authority — then many men may do this, bishops included.
But if by “examine” you mean a visible hierarchical subject publicly competent to determine constitutional remedies for the restoration of the papacy itself, then I still do not see where the Church has positively identified such competence apart from mission ordered through the head.
And I think this is where our instincts diverge.
You fear that my position risks ecclesial paralysis.
I fear that yours risks introducing a real public ecclesial competence whose juridical foundation has not itself been demonstrated.
So I am not denying the gravity of the crisis, nor the episcopate’s place within the Church’s constitution.
I am questioning whether the deprivation itself may include the deprivation of publicly demonstrable competence to resolve the crisis from within the visible order.
That possibility is difficult, perhaps unbearable. But difficulty alone does not establish competence.
That, I think, is the exact point where we continue to differ. —Louis
Louis,
Thank you for this clarification. I appreciate that you now state my position more accurately.
I agree that this is now the precise point:
at what point does collective episcopal discernment become a public ecclesial act requiring demonstrable mission?
That is indeed the question.
But I think your formulation still risks assuming what must be distinguished.
You say that you do not see where the Church has positively identified such competence apart from mission ordered through the head.
My answer is: nowhere — if by “competence” you mean jurisdictional government.
But that is not the competence I am asserting.
The competence I am speaking of is not “apart from the head.” It is rooted in the visible hierarchical constitution of the Church, which is itself ordered to the head.
Mission determines the ordinary exercise of jurisdiction. It does not create the episcopate’s belonging to the visible hierarchy of the Church.
This distinction seems decisive.
Catholic doctrine does not identify the episcopate as a merely sacramental residue, nor as a private aggregate of validly consecrated men. The Council of Trent teaches that the hierarchy of the Church, composed of bishops, priests, and ministers, is divinely instituted.
Dom Gréa preserves both truths. He fully maintains that hierarchical communion and jurisdiction come from the head. The Vicar of Christ is the visible center from which episcopal communion and pastoral power flow. This excludes conciliarism.
But Gréa does not conclude from this that the episcopate becomes a private sacramental remainder whenever ordinary mission is impeded. He distinguishes the hierarchical communion received from the head from the particular title assigning a bishop to a particular Church; and he insists that the mystery of the episcopate is not exhausted by the power exercised over a particular flock, because it also regards the Universal Church.
Aubry expresses the same principle when he describes apostolic Tradition as a body of pastors, renewed by parts but immortal as a moral person, so that the succession of pastors is the instrument for conserving the apostolic deposit.
These principles do not describe isolated private individuals. They describe the visible, apostolic, hierarchical form in which Christ willed His Church to endure.
The alternatives therefore cannot be reduced to only two:
private study, testimony, and endurance;
or public jurisdictional action already determining and imposing a remedy.
There is a third level which your reply does not sufficiently account for:
a public hierarchical inquiry ordered to discerning whether a remedy exists, where the competence would lie, and under what conditions it could be exercised.
That inquiry is not yet the imposition of a remedy.
It is not yet an election.
It is not the creation of jurisdiction.
It is not the government of the Universal Church.
It is the ordered examination, by the visible apostolic body, of what the Church’s own divine constitution permits or forbids when the crisis concerns the visible head itself.
If the episcopate may study, testify, preserve doctrine, identify contradictions, and refuse false solutions, then the question is why it may not also examine, as episcopate, whether the divine constitution of the Church permits a remedy to the crisis of the head.
That examination is not already a claim to resolve the crisis by decree.
It is the necessary inquiry into whether resolution is possible, by whom, and under what conditions.
You say that deprivation may include the deprivation of publicly demonstrable competence to resolve the crisis from within the visible order.
But that is precisely what must be proved.
It cannot simply be inferred from the absence of ordinary mission. The absence of ordinary mission proves the absence of ordinary jurisdictional exercise; it does not prove that the episcopate is forbidden to examine, as episcopate, whether the Church’s constitution provides a way to restore the head.
In other words, the Catholic question is not: how can we avoid paralysis?
The Catholic question is: what does the divine constitution of the Church actually permit or require?
And the principles already cited point to this: the episcopate is not the source of Peter’s jurisdiction, but it is the visible apostolic body most ordered to Peter. Therefore, when the crisis concerns Peter himself, the episcopate cannot be reduced to private study and passive endurance only.
I agree with you that deprivation does not create authorization.
But deprivation does not prove that the episcopate is forbidden to examine whether authorization exists, where it exists, and under what conditions it could be exercised.
If no visible hierarchical subject may even examine the crisis of the visible head, then the visible hierarchy of the Church is reduced, in practice, to passive preservation only, and is denied any hierarchical capacity even to inquire into the restoration of its own principle of unity.
That is not a conclusion I see required by Catholic doctrine. On the contrary, it seems difficult to reconcile with the Church as a visible, apostolic, hierarchical society.
So I would state the remaining disagreement this way:
You fear that public hierarchical inquiry already implies unauthorized jurisdictional competence.
I fear that denying even such inquiry leaves no visible hierarchical subject capable of discerning whether the Church has any remedy at all.
Between private study and unauthorized jurisdictional action, there remains hierarchical discernment.
That is the precise point I am defending.
May God keep us faithful.
Serge,
Thank you again for the care and precision of your reply. I think the disagreement is now sufficiently isolated to identify clearly.
You are correct that I should not reformulate your position into a crude claim that bishops without mission simply possess ordinary jurisdiction or may replace Peter. That was not my intention.
I understand your distinction.
But I think the real issue is now even narrower and more decisive than either of us first stated.
The question is not whether the episcopate ontologically belongs to the Church.
Of course it does. We would never deny that.
Nor is the question whether bishops may preserve doctrine, testify, resist error, correspond, theologize, or even materially agree with one another concerning the crisis.
They may.
The question in my mind, and we think the mind of the Church, is whether materially consecrated men lacking demonstrable mission may publicly constitute themselves as a visible hierarchical subject competent to examine the constitution of the Church in the name of the Church.
That is the point I still do not see demonstrated.
Because the category itself — “public hierarchical inquiry” — already presupposes precisely what must be proved.
It already assumes:
a recognizable hierarchical subject, acting publicly, in a manner distinguishable from private theological discussion, concerning ecclesial constitution, with a competence proper to episcopacy rather than merely to learned Catholics.
But those are the very points under dispute.
This is why I do not think the distinction between “inquiry” and “government” finally resolves the problem.
The moment the act becomes public, ecclesial, and episcopal concerning the restoration, identification, or constitutional examination of the visible head, the question immediately arises:
what publicly demonstrates the authority of this body to act as episcopate in this matter?
That is the question I do not think your position answers.
Because I agree entirely that mission does not create the ontological reality of episcopacy.
But public ecclesial competence is not derived merely from ontology.
Otherwise every materially consecrated bishop would retain a standing public hierarchical competence simply by virtue of sacramental character.
And that would quietly relocate visible authority from demonstrable mission to sacramental ontology itself, even while verbally denying that conclusion.
You repeatedly and correctly deny that you are claiming jurisdiction.
But the difficulty is that the very category of “public hierarchical inquiry” already presupposes a publicly recognizable hierarchical competence requiring demonstration.
That is why I said your argument crosses from ontology into competence while verbally denying that it has done so.
Not because you explicitly claim jurisdiction — but because the act you are defending already assumes a visible ecclesial capacity proper to hierarchy.
And this becomes even clearer in your final question:
“what visible hierarchical subject is competent even to examine the crisis of the visible head?”
I think the answer may simply be:
no presently demonstrable subject possesses such public competence.
That is severe, yes.
But deprivation is severe.
And I do not think Catholic doctrine guarantees that the Church must always possess a publicly demonstrable internal mechanism capable of juridically examining or resolving every crisis from within the visible order itself.
The visibility of the Church consists primarily in the permanence of her divine constitution, doctrine, sacraments, and juridical principles — not necessarily in the uninterrupted demonstrability of competent officeholders in act.
So I do not deny that the episcopate belongs to the constitution of the Church.
I deny that this ontological belonging alone demonstrates a recognizable public hierarchical competence to act corporately concerning the restoration of the head apart from demonstrable mission ordered through that very head.
I'll put simply:
if they can act publicly as episcopate concerning restoration of the papacy, what publicly demonstrates their authority to do so?
That is the point I still do not think has been answered.
May God keep us both faithful under the weight of this crisis.
Louis,
It seems to me that we have now reached the point where the disagreement is no longer really advancing.
You say that “public hierarchical inquiry” already presupposes what must be proved. But that statement itself presupposes that every public hierarchical inquiry is already an act of jurisdictional competence derived from demonstrable mission.
That is precisely what you have not demonstrated.
Before attributing to my position a lack of demonstration, I think each step of the argument I have proposed must first be taken into account.
I have recalled the following principles:
the Church is a visible, apostolic, and hierarchical society;
the episcopate belongs by divine institution to that visible hierarchy;
it is not a mere private aggregate of validly consecrated men;
it is ordered to Peter;
and the present crisis concerns precisely the restoration of that visible head.
From these principles, it is at least coherent to conclude that the episcopate is the proper visible subject to examine, as episcopate, what the divine constitution of the Church permits or forbids in such a crisis.
You may contest that conclusion. But then it is not enough simply to repeat that it has not been demonstrated. It must be shown why it is excluded by Catholic doctrine.
In other words, the burden of proof cannot always remain on the same side.
If the episcopate belongs by divine institution to the visible hierarchy of the Church, and if the crisis concerns the very head of that hierarchy, then the one who refuses to the episcopate even the right to discern publicly as episcopate must demonstrate that prohibition.
He must show, from the divine constitution of the Church, that in such a crisis the episcopate is reduced to private study, individual testimony, and passive endurance, without being able to constitute any visible hierarchical subject of discernment.
That is precisely what you have not demonstrated.
You have demonstrated points which I already grant:
that bishops without mission do not possess ordinary jurisdiction;
that necessity does not create authority;
that the episcopate does not replace Peter;
that deprivation may be real.
But none of these points demonstrates that the episcopate is forbidden to gather publicly and hierarchically in order to examine whether the Church possesses a remedy, where the authorization would lie, and under what conditions it could be exercised.
The logical difficulty, therefore, is this: you contest the conclusion without refuting the principles from which it follows at the level of discernment, and then ask me to prove again what those principles already establish, not in the order of jurisdictional government, but in the order of hierarchical discernment.
So the question remains simple:
Where does Catholic doctrine teach that the episcopate, precisely as the visible apostolic body instituted by Christ and ordered to Peter, is forbidden to examine publicly and hierarchically a crisis concerning the restoration of Peter?
Until that is shown, your position does not merely warn against false jurisdiction. It makes the episcopate a visible body, but one incapable of public hierarchical discernment in the very crisis that touches its visible head.
I do not find that conclusion in Catholic doctrine.
For this reason, it seems to me that this exchange has reached its natural limit. I do not see the value of continuing unless this precise point is addressed directly.
May God keep us faithful.
Serge,
I think this may finally isolate the real point between us.
The issue is not whether bishops retain sacramental character or ontological belonging to the Church’s hierarchy. Of course they do.
Nor is the issue whether bishops may study, correspond, testify, preserve doctrine, resist error, or even materially agree with one another concerning the crisis.
They may.
The issue is whether materially consecrated men lacking demonstrable mission may publicly constitute themselves as a visible hierarchical subject competent to act as episcopate concerning the constitution and restoration of the papacy.
That is the point I still do not see demonstrated.
Because the category itself — “public hierarchical inquiry” — is not neutral.
It already assumes:
* a recognizable hierarchical subject,
* acting publicly,
* in a manner distinguishable from private theological discussion,
* concerning the constitution of the Church,
* with some competence proper to episcopacy itself.
But those are precisely the points requiring proof.
This is why I do not think the distinction between “inquiry” and “government” finally resolves the problem.
The moment men act publicly as episcopate concerning the restoration or constitutional examination of the visible head, the question immediately arises:
what publicly demonstrates their authority to do so?
That question cannot be answered merely by appealing to sacramental ontology.
Because Catholic theology consistently distinguished:
* sacramental power,
* lawful mission,
* jurisdiction,
* and public ecclesial authority.
Otherwise every materially consecrated bishop would retain a standing public hierarchical competence simply by virtue of consecration alone.
And historically the Church treated that idea with extreme caution precisely because valid sacramental power exercised apart from lawful mission could create the illusion of continuity while severing the juridical principle constituting the visible hierarchy.
So I do not deny that the episcopate belongs to the divine constitution of the Church.
I deny that ontological episcopacy alone demonstrates a publicly recognizable corporate competence to act as hierarchy concerning restoration of the papacy apart from demonstrable mission.
That, I think, remains the unresolved point.
Serge, does the power of jurisdiction come from the consacration or directly from the pope?
Giuseppe, I have already answered this, but I shall do so again with the necessary theological distinctions. You are confusing the ordinary exercise of law with the extraordinary requirements of the Church’s survival.
In the ordinary order, jurisdiction is indeed granted by the Pope. No one denies this. But in the extraordinary order of a prolonged vacancy, the Church, as a Perfect Society, does not lose her radical power to act for her own preservation.
As Suárez and Cajetan teach, when the ordinary channel is obstructed, the Church possesses a supplied jurisdiction (jurisdictio vicaria) for the sake of the common good. If the power to restore the Head did not reside radically in the Episcopate (as a secondary cause), the Church would be a divisible and destructible society, which contradicts the Faith.
To ask "Consecration or Pope?" is to ignore a third term: the Divine Right of the Church to exist. The law is for the Church, not the Church for the law. By refusing this distinction, you make the legal means an obstacle to the divine end.
Serge, you have said that, in normal times, the exercise of the aptitude received by a bishop through his consecration "is "bound" or restricted by human law (papal designation) for the sake of order" and that, in an extraordinary vacancy, "this restriction is lifted by the law of necessity".
You add that "The principle of "Ecclesia Supplet" does not create a new or "rebel" authority; rather, it unlocks this power already ontologically present in the episcopal character. [...] If ordinary jurisdiction is absent, supplied jurisdiction flows directly from Christ".
Suppleance of jurisdiction means that one subject gives to another subject the jurisdiction that the latter lacks.
Now, what jurisdiction can be supplied to a "traditional bishop" who, according to you, already has (by consecration) the power needed for the survival of the Church (a power which moreover is already free, if it's true that what restricts the exercise of this power is a [never received] papal designation) ?
If you want to say that it is what you call "supplied jurisdiction" to "unlock" the exercise of the 'aptitude' of bishop (thus recognizing that this aptitude has a different nature from jurisdiction, given that it does nothing but allow the exercise of a power already present), where is the power of jurisdiction -that is to say the authority- in all this?
If, instead, according to you, aptitude IS jurisdiction, how can you say that for you jurisdiction does not come from consecration?
Excellent questions.
To which I would add: if bishops have a universal jurisdiction to govern the Church that is normally locked, as I have seem some argue, what distinguishes this universal jurisdiction from that of the Pope?
And what need is there to elect a pope if we already have bishops with universal jurisdiction?
S.D. Wright,
You’ve put your finger on the exact contradiction—and it exposes the entire position.
If bishops truly possessed a “universal jurisdiction” by virtue of consecration, even if “normally locked,” then nothing would distinguish their authority in kind from that of the Pope. At most, you would have a diffused papacy spread across many men. But this is foreign to Catholic doctrine.
The Church teaches the opposite: bishops receive jurisdiction only through the Roman Pontiff, not alongside him or in reserve. Pius XII states clearly that bishops “receive their jurisdictional power through the Roman Pontiff” (Mystici Corporis). That means no mandate, no jurisdiction—actual or “latent.”
So your second question answers the first: if bishops already had universal jurisdiction, a pope would be unnecessary. But the Church teaches that the Pope is necessary as the source and principle of jurisdiction.
Therefore, the “locked universal jurisdiction” theory collapses. It attempts to preserve function while severing the very source that gives that function reality.
Louis, you have made 9 comments in the last little while. I asked before whether you are using AI for your comments and you didn't reply. I am asking you again.
I am also pointing you in the direction of the comments policy. Thanks.
https://www.wmreview.org/about
Understood.
To answer your earlier question, I’m writing my own comments.
Can you clarify what specifically you’d like me to adjust—frequency, length, or something else? I’m happy to stay within your guidelines.
Dear Giuseppe, dear S.D. Wright,
The dilemma you propose—"Does jurisdiction come from consecration or from the Pope?"—seeks to lock the Church’s life into a binary administrative choice that does not reflect her nature as a societas perfecta. To resolve this, we must return to the classical distinctions of Scholastic theology and the Angelic Doctor.
1. On the Distinction between Power of Order and Radical Aptitude
According to Dom Gréa (The Church and Her Divine Constitution) and Cardinal Billot (De Ecclesia Christi), episcopal consecration confers the fullness of the priesthood, which includes a radical aptitude for government.
In the ordinary order, this aptitude is "bound" by ecclesiastical laws for the sake of unity: the Pope "unlocks" its exercise by appointing a bishop to a see. It is crucial to understand that the Pope does not create the episcopal character ex nihilo; he authorizes the exercise of a power already ontologically present in the successor of the Apostles.
2. The Law of Necessity as the "Summit of Law" (St. Thomas, ST I-II, q. 96, a. 6)
Saint Thomas Aquinas provides the definitive answer. He teaches that "every law is ordained to the common welfare, and from this it derives its force and nature of law" (ST I-II, q. 96, a. 6). Human law can never foresee every particular circumstance. Therefore, if a situation arises where the observance of the letter of the law becomes "hurtful to the general welfare" (damnosa communi saluti), the law ceases to bind.
In the case of a prolonged vacancy, the law regarding the papal mandate, which is a means, cannot be used to deny the Church the right to restore her Head, which is the end.
To claim that the absence of the ordinary channel renders the Episcopate (the secondary cause) powerless is to transform a law of protection into an instrument of destruction.
This reveals the error of legal positivism (the text alone) versus Catholic realism (the finality).
For a theologian, the Law of Necessity is the summit of the law.
3. How Supplied Jurisdiction Acts on the Existing Aptitude
You ask how "supplied jurisdiction" acts upon an aptitude already present. It acts as a divine manifestation of a power that necessity makes active.
When ordinary electors fail, the right to ensure the survival of the Church is not lost. This "supply" is not a new creation of power, but the removal of the legal obstacle that prevented its exercise.
In times of crisis, it is the needs of the Church, and the will of her Divine Head, that "unlock" the mission inherent in the episcopal character.
4. To S.D. Wright: Distinction from Papal Jurisdiction
The difference is one of nature and finality. The Pope possesses a Universal and Ordinary jurisdiction. The Bishop in a state of necessity receives only a Supplied and Extraordinary jurisdiction, strictly limited to the necessity that justifies it. He cannot change laws or dogmas; he acts for necessary acts and, crucially, for the acts ordained to the election of a new Head.
5. Why elect a Pope? (Cajetan and Suarez)
We must elect a Pope because the bishops' power in this state is abnormal and precarious. The Church is a monarchy, not a "collegial" republic. As Cajetan teaches (De Comparatione, cap. XIII), when ordinary electors fail, the power of election devolves to the Church.
As Suarez notes (De Legibus), if the Church lacked this power to act as a secondary cause in the absence of the first human cause, Christ would have left His Bride a "defective" and "destructible" society, which is impossible.
Conclusion: Superior Obedience
The faithful Episcopate, in organizing an Imperfect General Council or exercising jurisdiction in a state of necessity, does not act out of rebellion. It acts through a superior obedience to the will of Christ for His Church.
The "just path" consists in recognizing that jurisdiction, in such times, is provided directly by Christ to the subject (the Bishop) because of the objective need of the Church. To reject this is to claim that legal "forms" are more important than the "life" of the Body. As Saint Thomas reminds us, the letter kills, but the Spirit, and the intention of the Divine Legislator, gives life.
Dear Serge,
the question "Does jurisdiction come from consecration or from the Pope?", addressed to you, has nothing to do with administrative choices that do not reflect the nature of the Church. It has nothing to do with human law, with positive law. And even less with the letter of the law. It is not a legal question, but a purely DOCTRINAL question. A question that concerns the divine will and our FAITH, and that it is made precisely to understand whether or not the path you propose is consistent with the nature of the Church.
The issue about the origin of episcopal jurisdiction was once debated, but it is no longer, as you can see from the magisterium I mentioned above for which the power of jurisdiction DIRECTLY and ENTIRELY comes from the pope.
Aptitude for government (radical or not) IS NOT power.
I note a contradiction, or at least a lack of clarity, in your words (which still refuse to answer the questions you were asked simply with "yes" or "no", BEFORE presenting any distinction or explication deemed useful), because on the one hand, you say that in normal times "[the Pope] authorizes the exercise of a POWER ALREADY ontologically PRESENT in the successor of the Apostles" (or that necessity "makes active" the power or that "This "supply" is not a new creation of power, but the removal of the legal obstacle that prevented its exercise") and, on the other, you say that "The Bishop in a state of necessity RECEIVES only a Supplied and Extraordinary JURISDICTION" and that "The "just path" consists in recognizing that jurisdiction, IN SUCH TIMES, IS PROVIDED directly by Christ to the subject (the Bishop)".
The power is either already present or it is provided and received, it cannot be both at the same time.
Dear Giuseppe,
I thank you for your call for doctrinal clarity. However, I note that you have not yet answered the central question I previously asked: If the ordinary legal means are definitively lost, does the Church, as a perfect society, possess the internal resources to restore its Head, or is it condemned to a formal disappearance? To claim the latter would be to deny the indefectibility of the Church. To admit the former is to accept the necessity of the extraordinary path I am describing.
Allow me now to respond to your specific points and to your request for a "yes or no" answer.
Does the power of jurisdiction come entirely from the Pope in the ordinary order of the Church? Yes.
The teaching of the Magisterium is in no way contested, notably that of Pius XII (Mystici Corporis, Ad Sinarum Gentes), according to which jurisdiction in the Church is conferred according to the hierarchical order established by Christ and depends, in its ordinary exercise, on the canonical mission given by the Roman Pontiff.
The difficulty you raise, namely, that a power cannot be both "present" and "received", stems, however, from a confusion between two distinct levels that Aristetolian-Thomistic philosophy clearly distinguishes: potency and act.
Potency and Act
A power can be present in a subject as a radical aptitude (potency), while being received as to its legitimate exercise (act). Thus, the power of sight is present in a man who has his eyes closed: the faculty truly exists, even if its exercise is not currently in act.
In an analogous manner:
- Episcopal Consecration (Sacre) constitutes the bishop as a member of the apostolic hierarchy and a subject capable of receiving jurisdiction in the Church (Potency).
- Jurisdiction is the legitimate right to exercise ecclesiastical government (Act).
In normal times, the Pope provides the canonical mission that moves the bishop from potency to act. In a state of prolonged vacancy, it is Christ Himself, acting through the Law of Necessity, who moves the bishop from potency to act. There is therefore no contradiction: the episcopal character constitutes the subjective foundation, while jurisdiction constitutes the legal authorization to exercise that power.
Aptitude is not Power, but it is its Necessary Subject
You are correct to say that aptitude is not power itself. However, an aptitude is the necessary condition for receiving a specific power. A layman possesses no aptitude for episcopal jurisdiction; consequently, he cannot be the subject of an act of jurisdiction ordained to the government of the Church. Only a bishop, who possesses the episcopal character and belongs to the apostolic succession, can be the subject of an ecclesiastical jurisdiction of necessity.
Ecclesiastical Law and the Indefectibility of the Church
The Magisterium you cite defines the ordinary law. But this doctrine cannot be interpreted in a way that contradicts the divine constitution of the Church itself, which is indefectible. Ecclesiastical law is ordained to the common good. When the literal application of a positive law would peril the conservation of the Church, the law ceases to bind. In such a situation, the necessary authority proceeds from the higher order established by Christ Himself, the Supreme Legislator.
The Potestas Electiva according to Cajetan
Cajetan expresses this clearly (De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii, chap. XIII): "Deficientibus electoribus, potestas eligendi devolvitur ad Ecclesiam" (If the electors fail, the right to elect is devolved to the Church). The electors determined by ecclesiastical law are only the ordinary holders of this power; the elective power itself belongs radically to the Church to ensure its survival.
The Church as a Societas Perfecta
According to Suarez (De Legibus, IV, 7), the Church possesses in itself the means necessary for its own conservation. Since the Papacy belongs to its divine constitution, the Church can never lose the real capacity to restore the pontifical succession.
Indefectibility and the Visibility of the Real Subject
In Thomistic metaphysics, a real potency must be able to pass into act. If the Church retained a capacity to elect without any visible subject being able to exercise it, that power would be a fiction. This capacity must subsist in a real and identifiable subject. Now, if the Papacy is vacant and the ordinary electors are lacking, the only visible hierarchical body remaining in the Church is the episcopate, the depository of the uninterrupted apostolic succession, which constitutes the visible sign par excellence of the continuity of the Church. This is why several theologians have envisioned that, in extreme circumstances, the Church could act through an extraordinary episcopal organ, such as an Imperfect General Council, in order to restore the Papacy.
Nature of the Elective Act
Finally, it should be recalled that the election of the Pope is not an act of universal jurisdiction, but an act of designation of person (designatio personae). The electors do not confer pontifical jurisdiction: they designate the subject who will receive it directly from Christ upon his acceptance. This is why, historically, the clergy and the people were able to participate in the election without possessing universal jurisdiction. The elective act has never been understood as an act of government, but as the act by which the Church designates the one who will receive the Primacy.
Conclusion
The fundamental question remains: if the ordinary electors were truly to fail, must we conclude that the Church would be definitively incapable of electing a successor of Peter? If that were the case, the potestas electiva would be a dead abstraction and the Church would lose the means to restore its own visible constitution. Traditional theology teaches the opposite: the Church can never lose the means necessary for its conservation. It is in this perspective that the extraordinary intervention of the Church to restore the Papacy must be understood.
Regarding the jurisdiction of Bishops in our time, it seems to me that the best possible explanation is not that of «universal jurisdiction» (radical aptitude), although it should not be excluded completely, but rather the «implicit delegation of jurisdiction», according to which the pope (or the Church, the Holy See in time of vacancy) wills necessarily in time of great necessity to delegate jurisdiction to Bishops (principle of devolution) in order to govern the flock. Why? Because the power of jurisdiction being an element that constitutes the very nature of the Church, it cannot cease to exist and to be exerced in actum in the Church : there will always be Pastors in the Church who can be identified and followed.
A question that arises is the following : did Pius XII change the nature of the episcopacy and the nature of jurisdiction? To which question, I think we should all answer that he did not. Whatever Pius XII has said about Bishops applied to Bishops from the time of the Apostles until the time of Pius XII. If, therefore Pius XII said that the jurisdiction of Bishops comes only through the Sovereign Pontiff, this did not create a new situation in the Church. It means that the jurisdiction of St Gregory Thaumaturgus, the jurisdiction of St Eusebius of Samosate, the jurisdiction of St Basile the Great came only through the Sovereign Pontiff. Therefore, whatever has been possible in the early Church will always be possible if the circumstances that existed in the early Church arise again in the Church, namely the impossibility to have recourse to the Sovereign Pontiff.
Now, one would have to show that every single delegation of jurisdiction in the Church has always been made explicitly by the Sovereign Pontiff in order to show that explicit delegation from the Sovereign Pontiff is always necessary. I wish good luck to anyone to demonstrate that in the light of the history of the Church.
Thank you for your comment, Monseigneur. One thing I have wondered about this idea is how we know who among those consecrated to the episcopate at present have this implicit delegation?
This is a good question indeed, M. Wright. I can only give you my humble opinion.
The jurisdiction of Pastors is not well assured in a time like the one we are in. The fact to affirm jurisdiction in the remaining Shepherds does not mean that there is no crisis of authority. We need Peter to confirm his Brothers in the Faith, but also in their authority. We need him to clearly say who will from now on be a Shepherd and who will not. As long as this is not done, this authority will not be well assured, not in itself (quoad se), but in the perception men have of it (quoad nos). There will be disputes over this authority (as has happen locally to a lesser degree in the history of the Church) and the members of the flock will be free to go from one Shepherd to another they trust better.
But, as a matter of fact, there are on earth today Shepherds and flocks gathered around these Shepherds. These Shepherds have to feed these flocks. This is a fact. If these Shepherds stop feeding these flock for no good reason, I believe they will have to answer to God. Yet, God does not ask something from these Shepherds without giving them the necessary powers to accomplish it.
Everything is quite disorderly because the territoriality of this jurisdiction is not well established. We need territoriality to be clearly reinstated. I don’t think we can say that we need jurisdiction to be reinstated, because jurisdiction cannot disappear in the Church. We need territoriality to be reinstated clearly. This will be done by the Sovereign Pontiff in due time. All of our problems are linked to the absence of Peter. This is why this has to be the most important question to all and especially to the Shepherds: how can the Church today find back its visible head in a manner that will be recognized by all (moral unanimity) who still profess the Faith. But in the meantime, whenever a Shepherd exists who has kept the Faith and is there to feed the flock, the said flock can be assured that the implicit will of the pope (the Holy See, the Church in a time of prolonged vacancy) provides to this Shepherd the necessary means to accomplish his mission. Such a Shepherd could very well turn into a wolf, and the flock would have to separate from one who has proven to be a wolf, but in this scenario, the divine constitution of the Church is at least respected although there is much fog and mist.
To pretend that we are feeding the flock without being the legitimate Shepherds is to proclaim everywhere our illegitimacy, our status of impostors, which I cannot accept obviously. The consequence of this would necessarily be to cease all of our activities. Which I would do readily, but I have the evidence of the immediate damage it would do to souls.
So, in my position,
- either I believe I am a legitimate Shepherd of the Church and I accomplish my work of feeding the flock (whoever gathered around me) with the power (jurisdiction) granted by God to his Apostles and their successors through the pope (at least implicitly);
- or I come to the conclusion that I am not a legitimate Shepherd and then I have to leave the flock alone and look for the legitimate Shepherds of the Church to whom I myself have to be submitted.
Thank you for your reply, Monseigneur. I shall continue to reflect on it all.
Mgr Roy, you begin correctly: Pius XII did not change the nature of jurisdiction, and it comes only through the Roman Pontiff. But that principle is exactly what your conclusion contradicts.
You introduce “implicit delegation” or “devolution” in time of necessity—but where is this taught? Not assumed, not inferred—taught. Because jurisdiction is not a function that must always be exercised; it is a juridical mission that must be conferred.
Your appeal to the early Church does not establish your claim. Difficulty of access to Rome is not the same as the absence of a Roman Pontiff, nor does it prove jurisdiction arises without him.
You are also assuming what must be demonstrated: that the Church must always have identifiable pastors with jurisdiction in act. But indefectibility guarantees the structure, not uninterrupted operation.
Without Peter, there is no mission.
And without mission, there is no jurisdiction—implicit or otherwise.
Dear Serge,
- I have not answered your question for several reasons. One of these is that answering the question means changing the subject of the discussion (transferring it to the solutions that I would propose) without first reaching a conclusion about the current one. Here we are discussing a limited aspect of something you stated, indicating a "path" to get out to the current crisis. I have not proposed any solution to the current situation here. Even less have I stated, or in any way implied, that the Church does not possess the internal resources to restore its Head or that the Church is ended. To the question: "If the ordinary legal means are definitively lost, does the Church, as a perfect society, possess the internal resources to restore its Head, or is it condemned to a formal disappearance?" I can incidentally answer "yes, the Church possesses the internal resources to restore its visible Head. To think this does not mean to accept the necessity of the path you are describing". Whatever "my" solution to this crisis, right or wrong, remains completely irrelevant to what we are discussing now, namely, the exact terms of the "path" you affirm as good and their compatibility with the doctrine of the faith: even if "my" solution was completely wrong and we recognized it together, that would in no way help the goodness of the one you proposed;
- after hearing you say (against my assertion "A[p]titude, that is predisposition, is not jurisdiction. [...] "traditionalist bishops" have no power that can be "unlocked") that "[the Pope] authorizes the exercise of a POWER ALREADY ontologically PRESENT in the successor of the Apostles" and again that "The principle of "Ecclesia Supplet" [...] unlocks this power already ontologically present in the episcopal character", after all this, I am happy to hear you finally acknowledge that "Aptitude is not Power"/"aptitude is not power itself".
I think we can now more easily acknowledge together that "traditional bishops" (a generic notion that needs to be "defined" [but with what authority?], but this was not the subject of our discussion) have no power, no jurisdiction, no authority at all simply because of their consecration;
- it seems to me, however, that there are still some things that need to be clarified.
I invite you to note that the recourse to the distinction "potency" / "act" CONFIRMS that "traditional bishops" DO NOT HAVE any power of jurisdiction.
Indeed, having power "in potency" means having no power at all.
On the other hand, if one does not want or can not (for whatever reason) to exercise a power that he has, it does not mean that he has a power "in potency". It means that he has a power "in act", that he does not want or cannot EXERCISE (like the sighted person who keeps his eyes closed).
So when you say: "A power can be present in a subject as a radical aptitude (potency), while being received as to its legitimate exercise (act)", I invite you to consider: a) that the subject you are talking about, who has a power "in potency", does not have the power at all (and it is for this reason that it is you yourself who now rightly recognizes that "aptitude is not Power") and b) that having power "in act" is something independent from its legitimate exercise: exercise presupposes power, but power does not necessarily entail exercise. One may not exercise the power that he has and that power remains actual, but no one can exercise a power that he has not.
You say: "- Episcopal Consecration (Sacre) constitutes the bishop as a member of the apostolic hierarchy and a subject capable of receiving jurisdiction in the Church (Potency)".
I invite you to consider that consecration constitutes the bishop as a member of the apostolic hierarchy OF ORDERS, not as a member of the hierarchy OF JURISDICTION, because (it is you to confirm it with the following words) he is (only) "CAPABLE OF RECEIVING JURISDICTION", but not in possession of it.
You say again: "- Jurisdiction is the legitimate right to exercise ecclesiastical government (Act)", but then you also say that "In normal times, the Pope provides the canonical mission that moves the bishop from potency to act. In a state of prolonged vacancy, it is Christ Himself, acting through the Law of Necessity, who moves the bishop from potency to act. There is therefore no contradiction: the episcopal character constitutes the subjective foundation, WHILE JURISDICTION CONSTITUTES THE LEGAL AUTHORIZATION TO EXERCISE THAT POWER".
Here, it seems, the idea still persists that consecration prints jurisdictional power, instead of a simple aptitude, because papal intervention is described as a mere "authorization to exercise" a power already present.
If this is the case, the contradiction lies in this: if the power is already present (by consecration), it cannot be simultaneously stated that the pope authorizes the bishop to exercise this power already present and that, prior to the authorization to exercise it, the bishop does not have that very power (to avoid saying that it is not received by consecration). It cannot be simultaneously stated that power (I emphasize "power", not "exercise") is received both through consecration and through the pope.
When the pope confers the power of jurisdiction, the bishop, by definition, has not any power of jurisdiction before this attribution.
[Note that the pope can also confer the power of jurisdiction to one who is not yet consecrated bishop; he can suspend the exercise of power already conferred to a bishop (in this case, not in our, the power is present without the legitimate exercise existing), etc.].
I. Response to Mgr Roy - On the continuity of the apostolic mission
Your Excellency,
I thank you sincerely for your intervention, which rightly situates the present question within its proper ecclesiological framework: the indefectibility of the Church and the continuity of her mission throughout history.
You correctly recall that the Magisterium of Pius XII did not alter the nature of the episcopate, but clarified its mode of operation within the ordinary order of the Church. It follows that what was possible in earlier periods, when recourse to the Apostolic See was morally or physically impossible, cannot be declared impossible in principle under analogous circumstances.
It must, however, be specified, in order to avoid any ambiguity, that jurisdiction cannot be understood as contained in episcopal consecration nor as proceeding from it.
The constant teaching of the Church holds that consecration constitutes the subject within the apostolic order, but does not confer jurisdiction.
More precisely, consecration is not the cause of jurisdiction, but constitutes the subject as properly disposed to receive mission within the hierarchical structure of the Church Accordingly, the difficulty does not consist in positing a jurisdiction already present in an implicit or latent manner, but in determining how the Church, as a visible and hierarchical society, retains the real and effective capacity to restore the order of jurisdiction when the ordinary means fail.
On this point, your intuition remains fundamentally sound: the Church cannot be reduced to a merely juridical framework rendered inoperative. She remains a living body, ordered to the salvation of souls, and cannot be deprived of the means necessary for her own constitution.
II. Response to S.D. Wright - On the discernment of the ecclesial subject
Dear S.D. Wright,
Your question touches upon the most delicate and decisive point: the identification of the subject of authority in a time of crisis. Indeed, a jurisdiction that could not be attributed to any identifiable subject within the visible Church would, in practice, be nonexistent.
However, the criterion cannot be purely individual, such as the validity of consecration or personal orthodoxy, since jurisdiction in the Church is not a private or merely individual quality, but a principle of public and hierarchical order.
It is therefore necessary to seek not isolated individuals, but an ecclesial subject belonging to the visible and hierarchical constitution of the Church.
Now, in a Church deprived of her Head and of the ordinary electors, the only remaining visible hierarchical body is the episcopate, which is the depositary of apostolic succession and thus constitutes the visible sign of the Church’s continuity.
This does not mean that each bishop, taken individually, possesses a determinate jurisdiction, nor that jurisdiction is diffused among them.
Rather, it means that the continuity of the hierarchical principle subsists in this body. It is therefore within this ecclesial subject, and not in private initiatives, that the capacity of the Church to act for the restoration of order must be located.
Response to Giuseppe - On the nature of jurisdiction and the subject of the potestas electiva
Dear Giuseppe,
I thank you for your insistence on doctrinal clarity. I also take note of the decisive point you acknowledge: the Church possesses within herself the resources necessary to restore her visible Head.
On aptitude and jurisdiction
You are correct to affirm that aptitude is not jurisdiction. However, a necessary distinction must be made between:
- the absence of jurisdiction
- and the absence of disposition for ecclesiastical government
A layman possesses no disposition for ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
A bishop, by episcopal consecration, is constituted within the apostolic order as a subject properly disposed to receive jurisdiction.
This disposition is not a power of jurisdiction, nor any form of latent jurisdiction, but a real and intrinsic disposition of the subject to receive mission within the hierarchical structure of the Church.
On potency and act
In classical metaphysics, potency is not a pure negation, but a real and intrinsic capacity ordered to the reception of act.
To say that the bishop is in potency with respect to jurisdiction does not mean that he possesses jurisdiction, but that he is the proper subject in which it can be received through mission within the hierarchical structure of the Church.
There is therefore no contradiction:
- jurisdiction is not present prior to mission
- but the subject properly disposed to receive it is already constituted
On the origin of jurisdiction
It must be firmly maintained that jurisdiction does not proceed from consecration, but from mission. There is therefore no dual origin of jurisdiction. The present question concerns not the ordinary mode of transmission, on which we agree, but the situation in which the ordinary channels of mission are no longer accessible.
On the consequence of your position
You affirm that the Church retains the capacity to restore her Head.
However, a capacity that cannot be exercised by any determinate subject within the visible structure of the Church would remain purely abstract.
Now, in a society that is essentially visible and hierarchical, any real power must be reducible to act within the subject in which it subsists.
On the potestas electiva
Cajetan teaches:
“deficientibus electoribus, potestas eligendi devolvitur ad Ecclesiam”
Thus, the right to elect does not belong exclusively to the electors designated by positive law, but to the Church herself, in order to ensure her preservation.
On the subject of this power
The Church is not an abstraction, but a concrete, visible, hierarchical, and apostolic society.
This power must therefore subsist in a subject belonging to that structure. If the papacy is vacant and the ordinary electors are lacking, the only remaining visible hierarchical subject is the episcopate, the depositary of apostolic succession.
If this power is not found in the episcopate, which is the only remaining visible hierarchical subject, then it is not found anywhere within the visible structure of the Church.
This does not mean that bishops possess universal jurisdiction, nor that they may act individually. It means that the effective and operative capacity of the Church to act within her visible structure must subsist in this ecclesial subject.
On the nature of the electoral act
The election of the Roman Pontiff is not an act of universal jurisdiction, but an act of designation (designatio personae).
The electors do not confer papal jurisdiction; they designate the one who will receive it directly from Christ upon acceptance.
Conclusion
The fundamental question therefore remains:
if the ordinary electors were truly to fail, must we conclude that the Church would become incapable of electing a successor of Peter?
In that case, the potestas electiva would remain a purely abstract capacity, incapable of realization in history.
But the Church, as a societas perfecta and indefectible, cannot lose the means necessary for her own constitution.
Therefore, this capacity must subsist in a real, determinate, and visible subject belonging to her hierarchical structure.
Thank you Serge.
If we say rightly that jurisdiction does not come from episcopal consecration, I think nevertheless that there is room to say that a form or another of jurisdiction (not the territorial one), or at least a disposition to jurisdiction, could be granted through the Sovereign Pontiff «at the occasion of» episcopal consecration when it is received within the frame of hierarchical communion, that is within the frame of communion with the Sovereign Pontiff. This form of jurisdiction would be an ability to come to the help of souls and individual Churches in situations of extreme necessity, would be dependant on communion with the Sovereign Pontiff and would cease to exist as soon as this communion is broken. By this we see that it comes ultimately from the Sovereign Pontiff.
It would be otherwise very difficult to explain the words of the Pontifical speaking of ruling the flock, teaching the flock, etc.. which would become a purely meanless liturgy, empty words, if they did not create something in the Bishop when his consecration is received in the frame of communion with the Sovereign Pontiff.
That being said, and no matter what we think of the above, I agree fully that jurisdiction comes from the Sovereign Pontiff at least implicitly in times of prolonged Sede Vacante.
Your Excellency,
I thank you for this important clarification, which rightly recalls the theological weight of the Roman Pontifical and helps to deepen the present discussion.
It must indeed be maintained that the Church does not speak in vain in her rites. However, it would seem necessary, in order to remain consistent with the common teaching of the Church, to clarify the precise theological meaning of the expressions used in the liturgy.
In the classical doctrine, jurisdiction proceeds solely from mission (cf. Pius XII, Mystici Corporis), and cannot be understood as contained in episcopal consecration, nor as proceeding from it, even in an indirect or occasional manner.
What is signified in episcopal consecration is therefore not the possession of jurisdiction, but the ordination of the bishop to acts of teaching and governing, and the constitution of the subject as properly disposed to receive mission within the hierarchical structure of the Church.
For this reason, it would seem preferable to avoid speaking of a “form of jurisdiction” granted at the occasion of consecration. Such a formulation risks introducing an ambiguity concerning the origin of jurisdiction, which, according to the common doctrine, does not arise, even indirectly, from the sacrament.
Rather, what consecration confers is a real and intrinsic disposition, proportioned to the reception of jurisdiction, which itself proceeds from mission, whether in the ordinary manner through the Sovereign Pontiff, or, in extraordinary circumstances, according to the principles traditionally admitted by theologians concerning the indefectibility of the Church (cf. Thomas Cajetan; Francisco Suárez).
Understood in this way, the liturgical expressions referring to governing and teaching the flock retain their full meaning: they signify not a jurisdiction already possessed, but the ordering of the bishop to such acts within the divine constitution of the Church.
In this perspective, I fully concur with your conclusion: in a prolonged state of necessity, the Church does not lose her capacity to act, but continues to act through the hierarchical subject which subsists within her, according to the implicit will of the Holy See and the higher law of the salus animarum.
I would have to agree with what you said here. Thank you!
You’re forcing a false dilemma that classical theology explicitly rejects.
No one is claiming that jurisdiction is received by consecration. The distinction is precise: consecration gives the subject capable of receiving jurisdiction; jurisdiction itself comes only from the Roman Pontiff.
But your error is this: you redefine “potency” as “nothing.”
That is not Catholic theology. A subject in potency is not non-existent—it is a real subject lacking actualization. Otherwise, your own framework collapses: a bishop before receiving jurisdiction would not merely lack authority—he would not even be capable of receiving it.
That is absurd.
More importantly, you smuggle in a second premise: that necessity can actualize jurisdiction without a pope. That is exactly what must be proven—and cannot be.
Because jurisdiction is not a latent power waiting to be “activated.” It is a juridical reality conferred by mission.
No pope → no mission → no jurisdiction.
So your conclusion is right for the wrong reason: traditional bishops have no jurisdiction—but not because potency is nothing, rather because no authority exists to actualize it.
And that is precisely the point.
Louis,
You say: "A subject in potency is not non-existent—it is a real subject lacking actualization. Otherwise, your own framework collapses: a bishop before receiving jurisdiction would not merely lack authority—he would not even be capable of receiving it".
I said that if a subject has JURISDICTION IN POTENCY this subject exists, but he has not jurisdiction.
You say to me: "No pope → no mission → no jurisdiction.
So your conclusion is right for the wrong reason: traditional bishops have no jurisdiction—but not because potency is nothing, rather because no authority exists to actualize it".
That "traditional bishops" have no jurisdiction at all because there is not the pope, it is precisely what I think.
I think we’re actually very close here, and your distinction helps clarify the point rather than contradict it.
A subject in potency does exist—but only as a subject capable of receiving authority, not as one who possesses or exercises it.
And that’s exactly where the practical question comes in.
A bishop may exist:
– as a validly consecrated subject
– capable of receiving jurisdiction
But until that jurisdiction is actually conferred through mission, he does not have authority.
So the distinction holds:
Potency preserves the structure.
Act establishes the authority.
And this is where the consequence has to be faced directly:
If there is no pope to confer mission, then jurisdiction remains unactualized.
Which means:
– bishops exist in potency with respect to jurisdiction
– but do not possess it in act
And that leads to the point most people avoid:
The Mass is not offered by a subject in potency.
It is offered by a priest acting in act, with real jurisdiction and mission in the Church.
So while your formulation is correct metaphysically, the practical conclusion is the same:
Without mission:
– there is no jurisdiction in act
– and without jurisdiction in act, there is no priest who can be publicly known to offer the Mass in the name of the Church
So the issue is not whether the subject exists.
It’s whether the authority has been actualized.
And that brings us back to the same unresolved question:
Where is the act of apostolic mission?
Because without that, everything remains in potency—but the Church operates through act.
Louis,
You say: "The Mass is not offered by a subject in potency.
It is offered by a priest acting in act, with real jurisdiction and mission in the Church.
[...]
without jurisdiction in act, there is no priest who can be publicly known to offer the Mass in the name of the Church
[...]
And that brings us back to the same unresolved question:
Where is the act of apostolic mission?
Because without that, everything remains in potency—but the Church operates through act".
In the Church "in order" jurisdiction (source of the missio canonica) is FOR the Mass (for the glory of God and the salvation of souls, that is the MISSIO of the Church: "Go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them ..."; "do this in memory of me"). Jurisdiction is FOR the Missio (including Mass). And Missio IS NOT FOR jurisdiction.
The Holy Sacrifice is celebrated today. It is not in potency. It is celebrated by the hierarchy of orders of the Church (hierarchy - note well - which is not rebellious to authority). The Missio continues (so not everything is in potency, jurisdiction is it). To claim that, now that there is no jurisdiction in act, the absence of jurisdiction means absence of Missio (including Mass) it is to claim that Missio is FOR jurisdiction. Which is not true.
I understand what you’re saying about being prolific. That part is fair. I do write a lot, and I’ve had some extra time lately, so the comments came closer together than they normally would.
But the similarity you’re noticing is intentional. In my view, everything in this discussion ultimately leads back to the same center, which is the papacy and the question of jurisdiction and mission. So when I respond to different points, I’m often bringing them back to that same foundation. That’s not repetition for its own sake, it’s because I think that’s where the issue actually resolves.
For context, I’m not just commenting casually. I’m an older guy, a boomer, I was born before the Council, went through the seminary system, and lived through what followed. That’s why I’m where I am on this. I’m currently working through a multi-volume project on this same subject, so I’m thinking about these things constantly. And I’m not alone in it. There’s a small group of us who hold to what we understand to be the Catholic faith in continuity, and we’re trying to work through these questions seriously.
I do make an effort to respond to what people are actually saying, but I also try to bring it back to what I see as the central issue, because otherwise it turns into arguments about things that don’t really resolve anything.
So with that in mind, what specifically would you want me to be most careful about when commenting here so that I stay within your expectations?
I think in general you’re going to get more substantive engagement if you have one focused comment rather than a scattergun range of them.
S.D. Wright,
That’s fair, and I understand what you’re aiming at. If a more focused exchange leads to better engagement, I’m happy to work within that.
I also want to say I appreciate the level you’re operating at—these aren’t superficial questions, and that’s why I’ve taken the time to engage.
From my side, what may look scattered is actually intentional. I’ve worked through the Novus Ordo, the traditional Latin Mass circuit, and the various groups claiming continuity. So when I respond across threads, I’m not shifting topics—I’m testing whether any of those claims can actually demonstrate mission and jurisdiction.
That’s the point everything keeps returning to for me: not preference, not liturgy, but whether a real line of jurisdiction can be shown. If it cannot, then all these structures—however serious or well-intentioned—remain assertions without a source.
So I’m not trying to multiply points, but to bring each one back to that single question where, in my view, it either stands or falls.
If you’d prefer to focus that discussion in one place, I’m glad to do so.
You’re trying to preserve effects without cause.
You admit authority must be transmitted as Christ instituted—good.
Then you immediately suspend that requirement and act as if things still function juridically “as if” authority were present.
That’s the contradiction.
The Church does not treat acts as valid before authority exists—authority is THE principle that gives them meaning in the first place.
No mandate → no mission → no jurisdiction.
So again, clean and simple:
Where is the juridical act from a Roman Pontiff that transmits that authority?
If it’s absent, nothing downstream stands—no matter how you frame it.
You’re describing continuity.
But you can’t produce the source. If I’m wrong, show it.
Giuseppe, now let’s anchor this cleanly in what the Church actually teaches—no abstractions.
Vatican I (Pastor Aeternus):
“If anyone says… that Blessed Peter does not have perpetual successors in the primacy… let him be anathema.”
Perpetual successors = the office remains, not that occupants are uninterrupted or always visible.
Pius XII (Mystici Corporis):
“Bishops… receive their jurisdiction only through the Roman Pontiff.”
That’s transmission—no source, no jurisdiction.
And Vacantis Apostolicae Sedis:
“During the vacancy… the Cardinals have no power or jurisdiction… all is reserved to the future Pope.”
So vacancy does not supply authority—it suspends it.
You’re trying to preserve effects without cause.
Show the transmission—or admit it’s not there.
Louis,
Who transmits authority to the one elected to the papacy?
Christ does—through the constitution He established.
But not immediately or privately, and not apart from the juridical order.
The Church teaches that the one elected receives authority when he is legitimately designated according to the Church’s law and accepts the office—that is the instrument Christ uses.
The electors do not “give” the papacy, but they designate the subject. Christ confers authority through that visible, juridical act.
That’s why the process matters.
No lawful designation → no reception of office.
So the question turns back again:
If there is no demonstrable, lawful election according to the Church’s constitution,
where is the instrument through which Christ confers that authority?
Louis,
You say: "The electors do not “give” the papacy, but they designate the subject. Christ confers authority through that visible, juridical act".
I fully agree with this, but with one clarification (which perhaps is what you want to say): namely, that Christ does not confer authority THROUGH, i.e. WITH, that act, but ON THE BASIS of that act. If there is not a real acceptation from the one who is designated, there is designation, but not transmission of authority by Christ.
Now, a man elected to the papacy but who does not really accept the papacy (doing it however apparently) is still in a juridically different position from that of any other man with respect to the papacy.
If this man appoints electors (who must not exercise any act of jurisdiction, but only, one day, elect), what is it that prevents us from thinking that, having this man a colored title to do these appointments (and therefore not something that juridically is nonexistent), Christ's authority "cures" those acts, making them capables to fully achieve their goal?
Holy and happy Easter to you!
Giuseppe,
Thank you, and I hope you had a blessed Easter.
Your distinction still creates a problem.
If Christ confers authority on the basis of a juridical act, then that act must itself be valid and lawful. Otherwise, you are proposing that something lacking jurisdiction can later be “cured” into possessing it—which reverses the Church’s causal order.
Authority does not arise from defective acts.
“Bishops… receive their jurisdiction from the Roman Pontiff.” (Mystici Corporis)
So the question is:
where does the Church teach that acts without jurisdiction can become capable of conferring authority by a subsequent effect?
Or must the cause already possess what it transmits?
Louis,
You say: "If Christ confers authority on the basis of a juridical act, then that act must itself be valid and lawful. Otherwise, you are proposing that something lacking jurisdiction can later be “cured” into possessing it—which reverses the Church’s causal order".
But we have said that THERE IS [real and lawful] DESIGNATION (which is the juridical act that does not give authority, but on the basis of which Christ confers authority).
You remember: "“Bishops… receive their jurisdiction from the Roman Pontiff.” (Mystici Corporis)".
But Roman Pontiff receive it directly from Christ and from any other ("The electors do not “give” the papacy").
Giuseppe,
This is a thoughtful clarification, but it introduces a problem.
If Christ confers authority only on the basis of a valid juridical act, then that act must itself be real and lawful. It cannot be “cured” afterward by the effect you’re trying to produce.
The Church teaches that authority is conferred, not presumed, and flows through legitimate mission—not through defective acts later justified by outcome (Pius XII, Mystici Corporis).
So the question is simple:
Where does the Church teach that acts lacking jurisdiction can be retroactively supplied to establish the very authority they require?
Otherwise, the order is reversed—effect preceding cause.
I hope you both had a blessed and holy Easter.
Louis, my answer here: https://wmreview.substack.com/p/who-can-elect-a-pope-fr-ricossa?utm_source=direct&r=49pf80&utm_campaign=comment-list-share-cta&utm_medium=web&comments=true&commentId=239630595
Giuseppe,
We’ve previously read your article and commented on it: your article proves too much and then tries to solve the problem by material occupation.
You correctly argue that only those in the hierarchy of jurisdiction can elect a pope, and that bishops without jurisdiction cannot do so. But then you preserve “electors” by appealing to men who hold offices only materially, not formally.
That is the contradiction.
If jurisdiction is required for the act, material occupation without formal authority cannot supply it. A merely material cardinal is not an elector in the Church’s juridical order simply by being there.
So the question remains:
where does the Church teach that a man lacking formal authority nonetheless retains the power to designate or elect by mere material occupation?
If nowhere, your solution does not solve the defect—it renames it.
Perhaps he will not be elected. As I believe the status of the papacy is not only 'sede vacante' but 'sede remota' (seat removed - 2 Thess. 2:7) then it follows that the papacy can only be returned by Heaven by appointment when such time arrives that the right appointee is found. How is this to be done ? Don't know. Doesn't matter; there are many things we don't know. But the thing is the devil does not know either so he can't forestall this.
You’ve correctly established a key principle: jurisdiction is required for participation in the Church’s governing acts, and bishops without papal mandate do not possess it .
But your conclusion breaks that same principle.
You argue that the Church must always retain the power to elect a pope and resolve this by positing “material” cardinals and bishops who retain elective capacity in potency . That is the rupture.
Jurisdiction is not a dormant quality that persists in heresy or outside mission. It flows from the Roman Pontiff as a living source, not from a material designation. If the source is absent, the effect is absent—not “latent.”
You also reject necessity as conferring jurisdiction (correct), yet your solution implicitly reintroduces it by allowing a future activation of authority without a demonstrated mandate.
The actual conclusion is simpler and more consistent:
If no one can be shown to possess jurisdiction, then no one currently possesses the power to elect.
That is not a defect in the Church—it is a condition of deprivation.
Indefectibility guarantees the permanence of the constitution, not the uninterrupted exercise of its powers.
Dear Louis,
Thank you for your reply. Several of the points you raise have already been addressed in my previous comment, particularly the distinction between designation and jurisdiction, as well as the precise scope of necessit, and I would refer back to them to avoid unnecessary repetition.
Here, I would like to focus on what seems to be the central point of our disagreement.
You argue, in substance, that the absence of jurisdiction implies the impossibility of any ecclesial act regarding election: no mission, therefore no right to act, therefore no possibility of electing. From this, you conclude that the only coherent position is one of waiting without intervention.
It is precisely this point that seems to me problematic.
Your reasoning assumes that any act ordered to the constitution of authority in the Church would already be an act of jurisdiction. But this is where the confusion lies.
Papal election is not, formally speaking, an act of jurisdiction. It is an act of designation (designatio personae), which does not confer jurisdiction, but designates the subject who will receive it from Christ.
To deny the possibility of such an act on the grounds that no prior jurisdiction exists is to require that jurisdiction already be in act in order to designate the one who is to receive it, thus introducing a circular difficulty.
On this point, the theological tradition makes a precise distinction between:
– what pertains to the collation of jurisdiction (which belongs to God),
– and what pertains to the designation of the subject (which may belong to the Church according to various modalities).
It is within this framework that Cajetan’s notion of “devolution” must be understood: not as a production of jurisdiction, but as the possibility, in the case of failure of the ordinary electors, for the Church to perform an act of designation ordered toward the reception of that jurisdiction.
You object that this would amount to “reconstructing” authority or introducing a new source of it. But this objection rests precisely on the conflation of designation and jurisdiction. Once this distinction is maintained, the difficulty disappears: the Church does not create anything, she designates.
Likewise, historical examples of irregular elections do not demonstrate a creation of jurisdiction by necessity, but rather that, in certain exceptional circumstances, the designation of the subject could occur outside ordinary forms, without altering the principle of authority.
Finally, your position, which you describe as one of “custody”, raises a real theological difficulty.
You state that indefectibility preserves the structure but not its exercise. This distinction requires clarification. While it may be admitted that a factual impossibility can temporarily affect the exercise of functions, it is much more difficult to maintain that a principled impossibility could indefinitely prevent any designation of the subject of the papacy.
A perfect society cannot be conceived as such if its own constitution renders impossible, in principle, the exercise of the functions necessary for its preservation.
Accordingly, if the Church did not possess within herself, at least radically (in radice), the capacity to provide for her head in an extreme situation, one would have to admit not merely a practical difficulty, but a structural impossibility affecting her visible principle of unity.
But the tradition does not admit such an impossibility. What is at stake here is not a “reconstruction” of authority, but the possibility, in exceptional circumstances, of an act of designation ordered toward the reception of jurisdiction, in order to preserve the visible form of the Church.
This, it seems to me, is the precise point on which our analyses diverge.
May God guide us all in the love of truth.
Surely will not ask Ricossa for canonic or papal questions… As for La Salette, as for Fatima, as for Rampolla and the judeo masonic infiltration, end of the list for now !
Louis,
Your intervention raises an important point, but it rests on a methodological premise that requires clarification.
You seem to assume that only an explicit dogmatic definition can ground a binding doctrinal certainty. However, this reduction does not correspond either to the Catholic doctrine on the Magisterium or to the constant practice of theology.
On Baptism of Desire
The Council of Trent teaches that justification cannot take place “without the laver of regeneration or the desire thereof” (aut eius voto) (Session VI, chapter 4).
This text explicitly introduces the notion of votum baptismi, and it has been consistently interpreted in the theological tradition as affirming the possibility of justification through the desire for baptism when the sacrament cannot be received in act.
This interpretation is not an isolated opinion, but a common doctrine. Thomas Aquinas explicitly teaches that baptism can be received in voto (ST III, q. 68, a. 2), and this doctrine is consistently upheld in scholastic theology.
Moreover, the Holy Office (Letter to Cardinal Cushing, August 8, 1949) rejected the restrictive interpretation that excludes any form of belonging to the Church apart from water baptism received in act, affirming that one can belong to the Church in voto, even implicitly.
This is therefore not a freely disputable theological opinion, but a point belonging to the constant teaching of the Church and confirmed by Roman authority.
On the Nature of Doctrinal Assent
The main difficulty lies in the methodological principle you seem to adopt.
Catholic doctrine does not reduce the obligation of assent to solemn definitions alone. The Magisterium teaches at different levels.
Thus, Pius IX (Tuas Libenter, 1863) teaches that the faithful are bound to adhere not only to defined truths, but also to those taught by the ordinary Magisterium.
Likewise, Pius XII (Humani Generis, 1950) explains that teachings proposed by the ordinary Magisterium cannot be treated as mere opinions, even when not defined in a solemn manner.
Finally, classical theology (notably Francisco Suárez) distinguishes various degrees of assent, including that owed to doctrines held as certain in the Church without solemn definition.
Consequently, requiring an explicit definition for every doctrinal certainty amounts to misunderstanding the actual structure of the Church’s teaching.
Application to Jurisdiction and Mission
The same methodological approach appears in your other interventions, where you require an explicitly demonstrable juridical act in order to recognize any ecclesial action.
It is true that jurisdiction comes from the Roman Pontiff (Pius XII, Mystici Corporis; Leo XIII, Satis Cognitum). But it does not follow that every ecclesial reality depends formally on jurisdiction.
Tradition consistently distinguishes:
– jurisdiction (order of governance),
– and the power of orders (sacramental order).
Thus, the Mass depends on the priesthood, not on jurisdiction. A validly ordained priest offers a true sacrifice, independently of the question of canonical mission.
Likewise, valid sacraments do not become merely private acts due to the absence of jurisdiction in act. The Church is not only a juridical society, but also a sacramental one.
On Indefectibility
Your position leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of demonstrable jurisdiction, the Church can no longer act publicly, but only subsist in a form of conservation.
Such a conclusion transforms a factual difficulty into a principled impossibility.
Yet indefectibility implies that the Church is never deprived, in principle, of the means ordered to her visible constitution. To admit a structural impossibility of action would compromise this point.
Conclusion
On Baptism of Desire as on the other issues raised, the difficulty does not lie in an excess of affirmation, but in a methodological restriction.
The Catholic faith certainly rests on dogmas, but it is not limited to them. It also includes adherence to the constant teaching of the ordinary Magisterium and to the received theological tradition.
Therefore, the decisive question is not only whether a formal definition exists, but whether a doctrine belongs to the constant teaching of the Church.
This is indeed the case with Baptism of Desire, attested by the Council of Trent (aut eius voto), consistently taught in classical theology, and confirmed by the intervention of the Holy Office in 1949, not as a mere opinion, but as a point held as certain in the common theological tradition and confirmed by Roman authority.
The admirable Fr Ricossa's error in his critique is that while he intelligently acknowledges that an Imperfect General Council would have the right to elect the next pope in the absence of cardinals and Roman clergy ...
... he, unfortunately, confuses these two completely distinct Councils:
1.
The Ecumenical Council that must be convoked by a pope and to which only Cardinals, and residential bishops have a right to be called, and whose primary function is definitive promulgation of doctrines and disciplines in exercise of the Church’s Teaching and Ruling Authority.
2.
The Imperfect General Council that cannot be convoked by a pope in this case given the circumstances, and in which only "bishops of the entire Christian Church" come together, not as the Teaching or Ruling Church to define doctrines or institute disciplines, but as the representatives of the Universal Church to designate its head, and to whom the Universal Church will submit.
Having confused these truly distinct Councils, Fr Ricossa goes on to make erroneous conclusions by applying provisions of Canon Law for the Ecumenical Council to the Imperfect General Council which has no provisions whatsoever in law, which in fact is not recognised in any ecclesiastical law, and which has merely been proposed as a solution to what theologians have only ever considered as hypothetical.
The theologians who treat of the election of the pope in the absence of cardinals practically only require it be done in a manner that ensures the Universal Church is fully represented, just like at Constance.
At Constance, despite the final union of the cardinals created by the three papal claimants, twenty-three in total, such that there was no longer doubt as to the identity of the electors, it was nevertheless decided by the Council to add thirty more electors, prelates selected from various nations.
Pope Martin V was elected by a combination of cardinals who were not residential bishops, and cardinals who were residential bishops, and residential bishops who were not cardinals, abbots and deans and canons who were not even bishops,
https://cardinals.fiu.edu/conclave-xv.htm
The reason is sinple: if the election is done by true and full representatives of the Universal Church following unanimously agreed rules, the elect will be universally and peacefully accepted, guaranteeing the legitimacy of his papacy.
AugustineMary,
The distinction you make between an Ecumenical Council and an Imperfect General Council is indeed important, and it helps clarify part of the discussion.
However, it seems to me that a key point still requires clarification, because it touches the very foundation of the problem.
Your argument appears ultimately to rest on the idea that a sufficiently representative body of the Universal Church, acting according to commonly agreed rules, and followed by peaceful and universal acceptance, would thereby guarantee the legitimacy of the elected pope.
This, however, raises a fundamental difficulty.
On the nature of legitimacy
In Catholic theology, legitimacy does not arise from acceptance, but from a prior juridical cause.
Peaceful acceptance (universalis et pacifica acceptatio) is classically regarded as a certain sign of legitimacy, but not as its formal principle.
As noted by Robert Bellarmine, it presupposes a prior foundation and cannot replace it (De Romano Pontifice, IV, 9).
On the role of representation
The appeal to the “representation of the Universal Church” is understandable, especially in reference to Constance.
However, this notion must be properly understood: the Church is not a representative body in the political sense, but a hierarchical society of divine institution.
As explained by Thomas de Vio Cajetan, in the extreme case of failure of the ordinary electors (deficientibus electoribus), the right to elect may revert to the Church, not as an undifferentiated multitude, but according to its proper hierarchical order (De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii, ch. XIII).
The decisive question therefore remains:
what principle gives such an assembly the authority to designate the subject of the papacy?
Without a clear answer, the process risks resting on an implicit form of self-legitimation.
On the risk of circular reasoning
If one argues that the election is legitimate because it is accepted, and it is accepted because it is legitimate, then one falls into circular reasoning.
Universal reception confirms legitimacy, but does not produce it.
On the deeper issue (link with the broader discussion)
This connects to a broader question: whether the absence of a pontifical juridical act entails a total impossibility, or whether extraordinary modes of resolution may be considered within the limits of Catholic ecclesiology.
On this point, the theological tradition at least admits the possibility of extraordinary cases, without determining in advance all their concrete modalities.
As Charles Journet points out, the Church always retains, by virtue of her divine constitution, the means necessary for her own preservation, even if their concrete application may become obscured in times of crisis (The Church of the Word Incarnate, vol. I).
Within this framework, one requirement remains:
legitimacy must be grounded in a real principle of authority, and not merely in its effects.
In the order of this constitution, the episcopate appears as the most qualified human subject to act in an exceptional situation, precisely because it constitutes the hierarchical body ordered to the head.
This does not make it an autonomous source of authority, but recognizes that, apart from it, no other body seems capable of representing the Church in her order of governance.
It seems to me that this is precisely where the discussion should be focused.
You brilliantly state that the decisive question therefore remains: what principle gives such an assembly the authority to designate the subject of the papacy?
Cardinal Billot answers: the principle of devolution of powers in case of necessity, founded on what you already highlight, the Church’s as a perfect society and consequent permanent possession of all that is required for her perpetual preservation.
Fr Dutertre makes a further brilliant argument on this point. The Imperfect General Council in designating the head of the Church does not act as the Teaching Church since it is without the head and unable to promulgate any doctrines or disciplines to the Universal Church. Rather, it adequately represents the Learning Church which has passive infallibility that prevents her following a false rule of faith, or permanently not knowing her head, such that where necessity demands, the Learning Church is able to determine her head. Just stellar.
Consequently, to clarify what you point out could be circular reasoning.
The argument is that the Imperfect General Council is a sufficiently representative body of the Universal Church, acting according to commonly agreed rules and is itself radically competent to designate the head of the Church legitimately. This radical competence due to devolution of the powers to elect resulting from a state of necessity is itself the formal principle of legitimacy. The composition of the Imperfect General Council as sufficiently representative of the Universal Church also allows for a post-election peaceful and universal acceptance, that further infallibly confirms the legitimacy of the elected pope.
You put it so well: In the order of the divine hierarchical constitution of the Church, the episcopate appears as the most qualified human subject to act in an exceptional situation, precisely because it constitutes the hierarchical body ordered to the head ... [and] apart from it, no other body [is] capable of representing the Church in her order of governance.
The principle as applicable to our day seems to me incontrovertible. All that remains is resolving the practical difficulties around attaining this sufficiently universal representation to constitute the Imperfect General Council.
We only need to read the detailed history of the Great Western Schism to see that the practical difficulties we face on the subject today were no less present BEFORE, DURING and AFTER the Council of Constance! The Holy Ghost proved in concrete terms His ever present guidance of the Church in that crisis that could have destroyed the papacy forever. The difficulties we talk about today are nothing to this Divine Spouse of the Church! When He wills, He will crown our efforts of working towards a resolution with His ever gentle movement of the wills os all those who are now unwilling!
Thank you for your brilliant commentary.
Thank you for your thoughtful and well-structured reply, it clearly helps bring the discussion to a deeper level.
However, it seems to me that an important clarification is still needed regarding the notion of a “devolution of power” in a state of necessity, and the conclusion drawn from it.
On the nature of the principle invoked
The appeal to authors such as Billot is certainly relevant.
However, it should be noted that the hypothesis of a devolution of the power to elect in cases of extreme necessity is presented in theological literature as a possibility, not as a fully determined juridical principle with clearly defined conditions and operative structure.
In other words, it remains within the domain of theologice disputata, not of established doctrine.
On “radical competence” and actual authority
The distinction you introduce is important, but it requires further precision.
To say that a body is “radically competent” does not yet establish that it possesses actual juridical authority.
Classical theology consistently distinguishes between:
– a subject capable of receiving or exercising authority
– and the actual possession of that authority through a juridical act
This distinction seems essential here; otherwise, one risks moving from potency to act without a clearly identified principle of actualization.
On the risk of implicit self-legitimation
If the assembly is said to be:
– sufficiently representative
– competent by necessity
– and thereby able to designate the head
then the question inevitably arises:
what determines, in a non-circular way, that this particular assembly truly possesses that competence?
Without a prior and identifiable principle, the risk is that the process itself becomes the source of its own legitimacy.
On the role of the “Learning Church”
The reference to the passive infallibility of the Church is significant.
However, classical theology attributes to the Church as a whole an indefectibility in adhering to the true faith, not an active juridical capacity to designate her head apart from the structures established by Christ.
This point seems to require further clarification before it can serve as a foundation for such a conclusion.
On the remaining difficulty
You conclude that “all that remains” is the practical realization of such a council.
It seems to me, rather, that the principal difficulty is not practical but theological:
namely, whether the principle invoked is sufficiently determined and grounded to support the conclusion drawn from it.
Until that point is clarified, the question cannot be considered resolved.
That said, I fully agree that the historical example of Constance deserves careful study, precisely because it illustrates both the possibility of extraordinary situations and the complexity of their resolution.
It seems to me that this is where the discussion should continue to be focused.
You’re appealing to a hypothetical that never solves the actual problem.
Yes—an “imperfect council” is discussed by theologians. But always under one condition: that the Church still possesses identifiable, lawful bishops who can act as representatives of the universal Church.
That’s exactly what you cannot demonstrate today.
At Constance, there were real claimants, real cardinals, real bishops—men with recognized standing in the Church. The crisis was which pope, not whether the structure itself still existed.
Your position assumes what must be proven:
that there are today “bishops of the universal Church” capable of assembling and acting for her.
But where is that body? Who recognizes them? By what mission do they act?
Without demonstrable jurisdiction and representation, the “imperfect council” remains a theoretical solution—not an executable one.
So the issue returns, unchanged:
Who today can publicly and juridically represent the Church to elect her head?
Obviously a bunch of corrupt so called cardinals locked in the most beautiful master piece on this earth. That’s a desacration .