A question (not a challenge) about this statement:
"These Bishops have in fact been consecrated validly and even, in our opinion (at least in certain cases) licitly; but nevertheless they are – in the most absolute way – deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that the Bishop receives jurisdiction from God only through the intermediary of the Pope, an intermediary excluded in our case.14 Being deprived of jurisdiction, they do not belong to the Church’s hierarchy of jurisdiction, which is why they are not members of the Council by right, and are therefore not qualified to validly elect the Pope – not even in extraordinary cases."
Questions:
1. Is it a matter of divine law that only members of the Council by right may validly elect a pope?
2. Even if so, why does necessity not dispense with this requirement, noting that in necessity, only divine negative law remains in effect:
“Not even God, the Supreme Legislator, is bound in the state of necessity ."That is why Christ Himself excuses David, who in grave danger ate the breads of proposition which the laity were forbidden to eat by Divine Law."5 According to this principle, not only do human laws cease to oblige in a state of necessity, but even divine-positive and affirmative divine-natural law cease (e.g., "Honor thy father and mother"; "Remember to keep holy the Sabbath Day"). The only law binding in the state of necessity is negative divine-natural law {e.g., "Thou shalt not kill," etc.) . This is because negative divine-natural law prohibits actions that are intrinsically evil and hence forbidden because they are evil, as opposed to actions which are evil only because they are forbidden, such as the consecration of bishops without pontifical mandate.”
"Cardinal Billot writes that Our Lord instituted the primacy, but left in some way the limits of episcopal power undefined, precisely because:
...it would not have been fitting that those things which are subject to change would be unchangeably fixed by divine law. Some things are indeed subject to change because of the variety of circumstances and of times and because of greater or lesser facility of recourse to the Apostolic See among other such-like things [De Ecclesia Christi, Q.XV, §2, p.713]
History confirms that the state of necessity extended not only the duties of bishops, but also their power of jurisdiction. Dom Grea whose attachment to the pope is above all suspicion testifies (De l’Eglise et de sa divine consitution, vol. I) that not only at the beginning of Christianity did the "necessity of the Church and the Gospel" demand that the power of the episcopal order be exercised in all its fullness without jurisdictional limitations, but that in successive ages extraordinary circumstances required" even more exceptional and more extraordinary manifestations" of episcopal power (ibid., p.218) in order "to apply a remedy to the current necessity of the Christian people" (ibid. and ƒƒ.), for whom there was no hope of aid on the part of the legitimate pastors nor from the Pope. In such circumstances, in which the common good of the Church is also at stake, the jurisdictional limitations vanish and "that which is universal" in episcopal power "comes directly to the aid of souls" (ibid., p.218):
Thus in the 4th century St. Eusebius of Samosata is seen passing through the Oriental Church devastated by the Arians and ordaining Catholic Bishops for them without having any special jurisdiction over them" (op. cit. p.218).
...today jurisdiction [over a diocese] is conferred [upon bishops] directly and expressly by the Pope…Formerly, however, it used to derive more indirectly from the Vicar of Christ as if from itself it flowed from the Pope onto those bishops, who were in union and peace with the Roman Church, mother and head of all churches [emphasis added].40"
Since we know that the Church is a perfect society, containing within itself all the means necessary to accomplish its mission at all times (even in a state of necessity or during an extended papal vacancy, which amounts to the same thing), I would like to learn more about why the rationale contained in the quotes above from the SSPX article regarding extraordinary manifestations of episcopal power such as were necessary in the early Church could not be reengaged by the situation in the Church today (eg., to legitimize the bishops of tradition in electing a legitimate pope).
I’m not saying it does. I’m just trying to understand why it doesn’t.
Perhaps the answer is as simple as noting that necessity may have EXTENDED the powers of bishops already possessing jurisdiction, but did not CONFER jurisdiction upon bishops who did not already possess it? But in that case, it would be necessary to also address why supplied jurisdiction would not engage (ie., +de Mallerais and Fr. Peter Scott have formerly argued that ecclesia supplet extends to all aspects necessary for the apostolate, from annulment tribunals, though in the same article, +de Mallerais explicitly rejects the possibility of electing a pope, for lack of authority).
The mechanism by which the pope is "elected" for lack of a better term, which by the way is the same phrase used to describe the selection of he who would become a bishop, particularly in the Greek churches, is a matter of human law. The Church being not just a supernatural society, but temporal one, as well, has the right to establish laws to specify how all manner of things are done within that temporal sphere. The basis for those laws may be divine law, but in other cases it is either prudence, charity, custom, or whatever.
This is no different to how secular societies operate. The people maintain the right to choose the form of governance; however, once that decision is made, authority is held by that form of government established. Because all power to rule, i.e., jurisdiction, comes from God and flows downward vertically, the people do not retain the right to change the means by which they are able to determine how they are governed. That is the sovereign's job by definition.
So similarly it is in the Church. The sovereign, i.e., the Pope, established how future sovereigns shall be determined, i.e., via election by the Cardinals. It is only the sovereign who can modify or reform that mechanism. As we do not have a sovereign, that cannot be done by the whims of a very small fraction of the ostensibly Catholic faithful.
Is it your opinion, therefore, that the Church is no longer a perfect society, possessing all the means necessary to accomplish her mission (eg., no mechanism by which to elect another pope)?
Recognizing this was impossible, St. Bellarmine and others wrote that in the absences of cardinals, the right to elect a pontiff would devolve either to an imperfect council, or the Roman clergy, or to the bishops, etc.
Unless I’m misunderstanding, this seems to contradict what you are saying?
Or are you suggesting there are still some cardinals left somewhere who could elect a pope?
The Church is a Perfect Society. If anyone says there is some instance or circumstance that would prevent the Church from electing Her next Vicar, or even the possibility of such a circumstance, then the logical conclusion is that person does not believe the Church is a Perfect society. You can't say the Church has within Herself the ability to always maintain Her existence and then say that some circumstance will prevent Her from existing.
A question (not a challenge) about this statement:
"These Bishops have in fact been consecrated validly and even, in our opinion (at least in certain cases) licitly; but nevertheless they are – in the most absolute way – deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that the Bishop receives jurisdiction from God only through the intermediary of the Pope, an intermediary excluded in our case.14 Being deprived of jurisdiction, they do not belong to the Church’s hierarchy of jurisdiction, which is why they are not members of the Council by right, and are therefore not qualified to validly elect the Pope – not even in extraordinary cases."
Questions:
1. Is it a matter of divine law that only members of the Council by right may validly elect a pope?
2. Even if so, why does necessity not dispense with this requirement, noting that in necessity, only divine negative law remains in effect:
“Not even God, the Supreme Legislator, is bound in the state of necessity ."That is why Christ Himself excuses David, who in grave danger ate the breads of proposition which the laity were forbidden to eat by Divine Law."5 According to this principle, not only do human laws cease to oblige in a state of necessity, but even divine-positive and affirmative divine-natural law cease (e.g., "Honor thy father and mother"; "Remember to keep holy the Sabbath Day"). The only law binding in the state of necessity is negative divine-natural law {e.g., "Thou shalt not kill," etc.) . This is because negative divine-natural law prohibits actions that are intrinsically evil and hence forbidden because they are evil, as opposed to actions which are evil only because they are forbidden, such as the consecration of bishops without pontifical mandate.”
-See paragraph here containing footnote #5: https://www.sspxasia.com/Documents/SiSiNoNo/1999_September/The_1988_Consecrations.htm)?
And in Part I of the article just cited, we read:
"Cardinal Billot writes that Our Lord instituted the primacy, but left in some way the limits of episcopal power undefined, precisely because:
...it would not have been fitting that those things which are subject to change would be unchangeably fixed by divine law. Some things are indeed subject to change because of the variety of circumstances and of times and because of greater or lesser facility of recourse to the Apostolic See among other such-like things [De Ecclesia Christi, Q.XV, §2, p.713]
History confirms that the state of necessity extended not only the duties of bishops, but also their power of jurisdiction. Dom Grea whose attachment to the pope is above all suspicion testifies (De l’Eglise et de sa divine consitution, vol. I) that not only at the beginning of Christianity did the "necessity of the Church and the Gospel" demand that the power of the episcopal order be exercised in all its fullness without jurisdictional limitations, but that in successive ages extraordinary circumstances required" even more exceptional and more extraordinary manifestations" of episcopal power (ibid., p.218) in order "to apply a remedy to the current necessity of the Christian people" (ibid. and ƒƒ.), for whom there was no hope of aid on the part of the legitimate pastors nor from the Pope. In such circumstances, in which the common good of the Church is also at stake, the jurisdictional limitations vanish and "that which is universal" in episcopal power "comes directly to the aid of souls" (ibid., p.218):
Thus in the 4th century St. Eusebius of Samosata is seen passing through the Oriental Church devastated by the Arians and ordaining Catholic Bishops for them without having any special jurisdiction over them" (op. cit. p.218).
...today jurisdiction [over a diocese] is conferred [upon bishops] directly and expressly by the Pope…Formerly, however, it used to derive more indirectly from the Vicar of Christ as if from itself it flowed from the Pope onto those bishops, who were in union and peace with the Roman Church, mother and head of all churches [emphasis added].40"
https://www.sspxasia.com/Documents/SiSiNoNo/1999_July/The_1988_Consecrations.htm
Since we know that the Church is a perfect society, containing within itself all the means necessary to accomplish its mission at all times (even in a state of necessity or during an extended papal vacancy, which amounts to the same thing), I would like to learn more about why the rationale contained in the quotes above from the SSPX article regarding extraordinary manifestations of episcopal power such as were necessary in the early Church could not be reengaged by the situation in the Church today (eg., to legitimize the bishops of tradition in electing a legitimate pope).
I’m not saying it does. I’m just trying to understand why it doesn’t.
Perhaps the answer is as simple as noting that necessity may have EXTENDED the powers of bishops already possessing jurisdiction, but did not CONFER jurisdiction upon bishops who did not already possess it? But in that case, it would be necessary to also address why supplied jurisdiction would not engage (ie., +de Mallerais and Fr. Peter Scott have formerly argued that ecclesia supplet extends to all aspects necessary for the apostolate, from annulment tribunals, though in the same article, +de Mallerais explicitly rejects the possibility of electing a pope, for lack of authority).
https://sspx.org/en/supplied-jurisdiction-traditional-priests-30452
The mechanism by which the pope is "elected" for lack of a better term, which by the way is the same phrase used to describe the selection of he who would become a bishop, particularly in the Greek churches, is a matter of human law. The Church being not just a supernatural society, but temporal one, as well, has the right to establish laws to specify how all manner of things are done within that temporal sphere. The basis for those laws may be divine law, but in other cases it is either prudence, charity, custom, or whatever.
This is no different to how secular societies operate. The people maintain the right to choose the form of governance; however, once that decision is made, authority is held by that form of government established. Because all power to rule, i.e., jurisdiction, comes from God and flows downward vertically, the people do not retain the right to change the means by which they are able to determine how they are governed. That is the sovereign's job by definition.
So similarly it is in the Church. The sovereign, i.e., the Pope, established how future sovereigns shall be determined, i.e., via election by the Cardinals. It is only the sovereign who can modify or reform that mechanism. As we do not have a sovereign, that cannot be done by the whims of a very small fraction of the ostensibly Catholic faithful.
Is it your opinion, therefore, that the Church is no longer a perfect society, possessing all the means necessary to accomplish her mission (eg., no mechanism by which to elect another pope)?
Recognizing this was impossible, St. Bellarmine and others wrote that in the absences of cardinals, the right to elect a pontiff would devolve either to an imperfect council, or the Roman clergy, or to the bishops, etc.
Unless I’m misunderstanding, this seems to contradict what you are saying?
Or are you suggesting there are still some cardinals left somewhere who could elect a pope?
The Church is a Perfect Society. If anyone says there is some instance or circumstance that would prevent the Church from electing Her next Vicar, or even the possibility of such a circumstance, then the logical conclusion is that person does not believe the Church is a Perfect society. You can't say the Church has within Herself the ability to always maintain Her existence and then say that some circumstance will prevent Her from existing.