Discussion about this post

User's avatar
Sean Johnson's avatar

A question (not a challenge) about this statement:

"These Bishops have in fact been consecrated validly and even, in our opinion (at least in certain cases) licitly; but nevertheless they are – in the most absolute way – deprived of jurisdiction by the fact that the Bishop receives jurisdiction from God only through the intermediary of the Pope, an intermediary excluded in our case.14 Being deprived of jurisdiction, they do not belong to the Church’s hierarchy of jurisdiction, which is why they are not members of the Council by right, and are therefore not qualified to validly elect the Pope – not even in extraordinary cases."

Questions:

1. Is it a matter of divine law that only members of the Council by right may validly elect a pope?

2. Even if so, why does necessity not dispense with this requirement, noting that in necessity, only divine negative law remains in effect:

“Not even God, the Supreme Legislator, is bound in the state of necessity ."That is why Christ Himself excuses David, who in grave danger ate the breads of proposition which the laity were forbidden to eat by Divine Law."5 According to this principle, not only do human laws cease to oblige in a state of necessity, but even divine-positive and affirmative divine-natural law cease (e.g., "Honor thy father and mother"; "Remember to keep holy the Sabbath Day"). The only law binding in the state of necessity is negative divine-natural law {e.g., "Thou shalt not kill," etc.) . This is because negative divine-natural law prohibits actions that are intrinsically evil and hence forbidden because they are evil, as opposed to actions which are evil only because they are forbidden, such as the consecration of bishops without pontifical mandate.”

-See paragraph here containing footnote #5: https://www.sspxasia.com/Documents/SiSiNoNo/1999_September/The_1988_Consecrations.htm)?

And in Part I of the article just cited, we read:

"Cardinal Billot writes that Our Lord instituted the primacy, but left in some way the limits of episcopal power undefined, precisely because:

...it would not have been fitting that those things which are subject to change would be unchangeably fixed by divine law. Some things are indeed subject to change because of the variety of circumstances and of times and because of greater or lesser facility of recourse to the Apostolic See among other such-like things [De Ecclesia Christi, Q.XV, §2, p.713]

History confirms that the state of necessity extended not only the duties of bishops, but also their power of jurisdiction. Dom Grea whose attachment to the pope is above all suspicion testifies (De l’Eglise et de sa divine consitution, vol. I) that not only at the beginning of Christianity did the "necessity of the Church and the Gospel" demand that the power of the episcopal order be exercised in all its fullness without jurisdictional limitations, but that in successive ages extraordinary circumstances required" even more exceptional and more extraordinary manifestations" of episcopal power (ibid., p.218) in order "to apply a remedy to the current necessity of the Christian people" (ibid. and ƒƒ.), for whom there was no hope of aid on the part of the legitimate pastors nor from the Pope. In such circumstances, in which the common good of the Church is also at stake, the jurisdictional limitations vanish and "that which is universal" in episcopal power "comes directly to the aid of souls" (ibid., p.218):

Thus in the 4th century St. Eusebius of Samosata is seen passing through the Oriental Church devastated by the Arians and ordaining Catholic Bishops for them without having any special jurisdiction over them" (op. cit. p.218).

...today jurisdiction [over a diocese] is conferred [upon bishops] directly and expressly by the Pope…Formerly, however, it used to derive more indirectly from the Vicar of Christ as if from itself it flowed from the Pope onto those bishops, who were in union and peace with the Roman Church, mother and head of all churches [emphasis added].40"

https://www.sspxasia.com/Documents/SiSiNoNo/1999_July/The_1988_Consecrations.htm

Since we know that the Church is a perfect society, containing within itself all the means necessary to accomplish its mission at all times (even in a state of necessity or during an extended papal vacancy, which amounts to the same thing), I would like to learn more about why the rationale contained in the quotes above from the SSPX article regarding extraordinary manifestations of episcopal power such as were necessary in the early Church could not be reengaged by the situation in the Church today (eg., to legitimize the bishops of tradition in electing a legitimate pope).

I’m not saying it does. I’m just trying to understand why it doesn’t.

Perhaps the answer is as simple as noting that necessity may have EXTENDED the powers of bishops already possessing jurisdiction, but did not CONFER jurisdiction upon bishops who did not already possess it? But in that case, it would be necessary to also address why supplied jurisdiction would not engage (ie., +de Mallerais and Fr. Peter Scott have formerly argued that ecclesia supplet extends to all aspects necessary for the apostolate, from annulment tribunals, though in the same article, +de Mallerais explicitly rejects the possibility of electing a pope, for lack of authority).

https://sspx.org/en/supplied-jurisdiction-traditional-priests-30452

Serge Bardoux's avatar

On the Primacy of the Supernatural Common Good over Purely Material Continuity

Fr. Ricossa’s analysis, alongside the debate between Sean Johnson, Michael Pigg, and Kastrioti, highlights the need to clarify the distinction between ecclesiastical law and the Divine Constitution of the Church.

1. Refuting Static Legalism:

The argument that only a Pope can modify the electoral mechanism (Kastrioti) overlooks the nature of the Church as a "Perfect Society." As Michael Pigg observes, if any circumstance could prevent the Church from electing its Head, the Church would cease to be the perfect society instituted by Christ. Human law (cardinalitial election) can never supersede the Divine Right of the Church to its own preservation.

2. Devolution according to Cajetan:

Fr. Ricossa argues that "material" cardinals block any recourse. However, Cajetan (De Comparatione, cap. XIII, n. 204) teaches that if the ordinary electors "fail" (deficientibus electoribus), the right to elect devolves to the Church. This failure is moral and juridical when electors no longer profess the Catholic faith. In the light of Divine Law, a structure that can no longer fulfill its final cause is considered non-existent for that function.

3. On the Primacy of the Final Cause:

According to Suárez (De Legibus, Lib. IV, c. 7), every human law is subordinate to the Divine Right of the Church to preserve itself. If strict adherence to the electoral "letter" leads to a perpetual vacancy, it becomes a lex injusta. As a "perfect society," the Church must possess within itself the means for its own restoration.

4. The Nature of the Imperfect Council and the Law of Necessity:

An Imperfect Council does not claim ordinary authority over a Pope, but a ministerial authority over the election. As taught by Vitoria (Relectio de potestate Ecclesiae), in extreme necessity, the Church possesses the intrinsic power to provide for its own Head. As Johnson correctly notes, only negative divine law remains absolute; electing a Pope through the episcopate is not an intrinsically evil act, but an exercise of supplied jurisdiction (Ecclesia supplet).

5. Episcopal Legitimacy:

According to St. Thomas Aquinas (ST, IIa-IIae, q. 39, a. 3), the episcopal character confers a radical aptitude for government, which is activated by the necessity of the Universal Church to restore its visible Head.

Conclusion:

An Imperfect Council does not claim authority over a Pope but exercises an indispensable ministerial authority. Indefectibility cannot be reduced to a mere material lineage of occupied sees; it requires the Church's real capacity to provide itself with an effective Head.

Bibliographical References:

Cajetan: De Comparatione Auctoritatis Papae et Concilii, cap. XIII.

Suárez: De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, Lib. IV, cap. VII.

Vitoria: Relectio de Potestate Ecclesiae, q. 2, art. 1.

St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica, IIa-IIae, q. 39, a. 3.

130 more comments...

No posts

Ready for more?