The great Thomists: On the Church as a necessary condition for faith (Marín-Sola Part III)
According to Cajetan, John of St Thomas, and other Thomists, anyone who has not received a direct revelation from God must depend on the Church's proposition in order to make an act of faith.
According to Cajetan, John of St Thomas, and other Thomists, anyone who has not received a direct revelation from God must depend on the Church's proposition in order to make an act of faith.
Editors’ Notes
In two previous parts, we presented extracts from Fr Marín-Sola’s The Homogenous Evolution of Catholic Dogma.
These extracts address the question of how one comes to have the virtue of divine faith – without which “it is impossible to please God.” (Hebrews 11.6).
In these texts, Fr Marín-Sola notes that much confusion has arisen from some theologians – possibly following Suarez – about the formal object of faith, and the conflation of faith in itself (“quoad se”) and faith in us (“our faith” – “quoad nos”). Further confusion arises regarding the assent given to mediate revelation (the public revelation taught by the apostles, to us all) and immediate revelation (private, personal revelation, to a few).
St Thomas’s teaching, Fr Marín-Sola says, for anyone who has not been personally enlightened with a direct and immediate revelation from God (or been taught directly by some other supernatural means), is that the assent of faith must refer to the proposition and explication of the Church. This is a necessary condition, without which the faith is not the divine virtue needed for justification and salvation. The “faith” that arises instead is, rather, a kind of human judgment.
The reasons for this are explained in detail in the extracts. Marín-Sola summarises St Thomas’ opinion thus:
“The Holy Doctor says that man has many scientific, human mediums that lead to acts of human science or of acquired faith in the revealed deposit; however, man cannot arrive at the assent of divine faith except through one, and only one, medium: the authority of the Church. Without this medium the act of our divine faith is totally impossible.”
These ideas may seem new or strange to some. As a result, we are publishing parts of the section which we had omitted for ease of reading. This extract is taken from the fourth edition, translated under the auspices of the University of Santo Tomas in Manila.
In this omitted section, Fr Marín-Sola demonstrates that the same ideas were held and taught by highly respected Thomist commentators:
Cajetan
John of St Thomas
Bañez
Gonet and Contenson
The Salmanticenses
Cardinal Gotti.
We have also included the relevant section from Fr Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange’s De Revelatione as an appendix.
The opinions of these commentators opens up new vistas in discussion of the dogma outside the Church there is no salvation.
For example, there can be a tendency to treat the question as to what must be believed explicitly as if it turns around two or four dogmas: by contrast, St Thomas’ teaching, followed by the theologians mentioned, requires us to consider also the role of the Church’s proposition and explication. This is potentially very serious for heretics and schismatics – even for those “in good faith,” as is clear from these commentators and the other extracts.
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From
The Homogenous Evolution of Catholic Dogma
Fr Francisco Marin-Sola OP
The Organic Place of the Authority of the Church in Our Divine Faith
Chapter III, Section III, pp 300-306
Headings and some line breaks added for reading online.
The Church’s authority is indispensable for every act of divine faith
The great Thomists: On the Church as a necessary condition for faith
150. Cardinal Cajetan
Although the thought of Saint Thomas appears quite clear to anyone who reads the two cited questions with care and without prejudice.1
Editors’ Notes: “The two aforecited questions” are from St Thomas' Summa Theologica. These questions are discussed in Part II, and they are as follows:
Whether the object of faith is the First Truth? (II.II Q1 A1: Article 1.)
Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles? (II.II. Q5 A3: Article 3.)
However, it will be good to cite the interpretations of his most authoritative commentators – beginning with their prince.
Whoever wishes to form a true idea of the analysis and economy of divine faith, and of the primacy occupied in our faith by the infallible authority of the Church, and of the Holy Ghost who assists her, should read Cajetan’s entire commentary on those two articles of Saint Thomas. We shall have to content ourselves with extracts from them.
Commenting on article 1 of the first question De Fide, in which Saint Thomas defines the formal object of faith in itself by the phrase “It is nothing other than the First Truth” [Nihil aliud est quam Veritas Prima], he says thus:
“A third doubt occurs: How is the First Truth alone posited as the formal object of faith, whilst it is also said that “[The formal object] is nothing other than the First Truth” [Nihil aliud est quam Veritas Prima]. And the doubt arises both simpliciter and ad hominem.
“Simpliciter, because faith rests, as on an infallible rule, on the Church’s sense and teaching: otherwise heretics, who rely on the First Truth alone, without receiving the Church’s sense, would be among the faithful. And as Augustine says:
“I would not believe the Gospel, unless the authority of the Church warned me.”
Now it is established that the Church’s sense and authority are other than the First Truth, since they are something created: therefore the First Truth alone is not the object of faith.
“To this third doubt it is answered that, to the extent that faith can depend on a created cause, to that extent it can have some created rule. Now, since two things concur in faith, as appears below – namely the assent to, and the proposition and explanation of what is to be believed – faith, on the part of assent depends on God alone, as agent, object, end and rule. But on the part of the proposition of things to be believed, it can depend on angels and men, through whom God proposes these or those things to be believed. For on this part, faith “is from hearing the word of God [ex auditu est verbi Dei], as is said in Rom. 10.
“And therefore, so that error cannot occur in proposing and explaining things to be believed, the Holy Ghost has provided an infallible created rule, namely the sense and teaching of the Church; so that the authority of the Church is the infallible rule for proposing and explaining those things which are to be held by faith.
“Hence, with two infallible rules concurring in faith – namely divine revelation and the authority of the Church – there is such a difference between them that divine revelation is the formal reason of the object of faith [ratio formalis obiecti fidei]; but the authority of the Church is the minister of the object of faith [ministra obiecti fidei]; this is because the act of faith is joined to the material object (that is, to things believed) through the medium that God has spoken or revealed it.
“And the habit of faith itself inclines the mind to assent to things proposed, because God has revealed it. But the reason we believe that these or those things, in this or that sense, are revealed, is because the Church thus teaches.
“And again divine revelation is an infallible rule per se befitting faith; but the sense of the Church befits faith per accidens, that is, with respect to us, to whom these things are proposed. For there was no need for this rule in the angels, to whom God revealed and explained the mystery of the Trinity through himself. And similarly, there was no need for this rule for the first Fathers to whom the mysteries of faith were revealed, for the same reason – namely because God revealed these things through himself, and handed down understanding of them to them, illuminating the mind, as appears below in the treatise On Prophecy.”
Thus far Cardinal Cajetan commenting on article 1 of the first question, in which Saint Thomas, speaking of the formal object of faith in itself, defines it as “Nothing other than the First Truth.”
When commenting then on article 2 of the fifth question, in which Saint Thomas defines the formal object of our faith and seems to be correcting the phrase “Nothing other than the First Truth”, is doing nothing of the sort; instead, he introduces an addition or condition which belongs not to the formal object of faith in itself, but to the formal object of our faith, Cajetan says thus:
“In article 3 of the same fifth question two great doubts occur. One is how we should understand that the teaching of the Church is an infallible rule – such that in departing from it, one departs from the formal reason of the object of faith. But because this has been declared in the first question, article 1, there is no need for repetition, but for addition.
“The Church is indeed a rule in proposing and explaining things to be believed, and thus modifying the divine revealing Truth with respect to us.
“Thus, he who withdraws from the rule of the Church, withdraws from the formal reason of the object of faith (namely, the divine revealing truth), not only because he withdraws from one revealed article as we said before, but also because he withdraws from the condition or mode of the formal reason of the object of faith with respect to us.
“And this corresponds to the plain sense of the text. For it posits the First Truth in the Scriptures and teaching of the Church as the formal reason of faith; the First Truth indeed as the very reason for believing; but the manifestation of Scripture and of the Church as the condition by which the First Truth proposes and explains itself and other things to be believed.
“Now, although these kinds of conditions are not of the integrity of the formal object of faith, when considered simpliciter – as is obvious in the faith of the first man (if he had remained alone for eternity), and in the faith of the angels in their way, they are nevertheless part of the integrity of the formal object of our faith”.2
151. Let us hear Báñez
With regards to our faith, the distinction and explanation of things to be believed is finally resolved into the testimony of the Church, insofar as she is ruled by the Holy Ghost, and insofar as believing the Holy Catholic Church is one of the articles of faith.
To understand this, note that this conclusion is understood of our faith, [for those of us] who have not received revelation immediately from God, with the distinction of things to be believed.”3
“For we freely confess that the testimony of the Church determines the potentiality of the light of faith as regards the proposition and distinction of those things which pertain to faith.”4
“Secondly, it is answered that in acquired sciences there are many material mediums for inferring distinct conclusions, which are varied according to the variety of quiddity and essence of things. But nevertheless, in faith there are not many mediums – neither formal nor material – for assenting to things revealed by God: all things are immediately believed because of divine revelation manifested through the ministry of the Church.”5
152. Let us hear John of St Thomas
“The heretic does not accept divine testimony as it proceeds from God, but as it seems to him, and therefore does not rely on divine testimony, but is carried towards the thing testified by his own judgement. He persuades himself that that thing was said by God, not through the medium by which God speaks – namely, the Church – but by his own judgment.
“Thus, he believes fallibly, because dependently on his own judgment, through which he wishes to discern the divine testimony; and this judgment is fallible. Thus, if it seems good to him, he will change his judgment and not believe; thus, the heretic does not regard divine testimony as coming from God, and in the way in which it comes from God, but as subject to his own fallible judgement; and therefore the whole of the heretic’s “faith” is not infused by God, but acquired by himself, like any other human faith.”6
We recommend that the reader meditate well on the preceding paragraph, replacing the word “heretic” with the word “theologian,” if he wishes to understand well what kind of faith should be given to the virtual inclusive (or formal confused of Suárez), or to any other theological conclusion, before the definition of the Church.
But let us continue citing John of Saint Thomas:
“But if you argue: Faith does not have the testimony of God as its formal reason, but the proposition of the Church: the consequence is proved because a given man is not a heretic because he denies the testimony of God, but because he does not receive the proposition of the Church [...]
“It is answered: The heretic denies the true testimony of God and destroys it, precisely by denying the proposition of the Church, to which the true testimony of God is bound – bound not as to the formal reason, but as to the condition applying the divine testimony, and its organ. Nor is it required that one be directly opposed to a form, in order to destroy it: it suffices to destroy the required conditions without which such a thing will not subsist – just as whoever removed obscurity from faith would destroy faith (even though obscurity is a condition), and just as someone kills a man, by destroying the dispositions required for the soul to be in the body”7
“Faith is not carried towards the proposition of things as made by this or that inferior minister, who can deceive or be deceived, and does not have the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit; faith is carried directly towards the proposition of the Catholic Church, as it descends from the Pontiff, who cannot err. Thus, if what this [inferior] minister proposes is false, faith is not endangered, because it does not elicit an absolute assent about the thing proposed, or as it is proposed by this minister; rather, it elicits assent as it is proposed by the Church – which is virtually included in every act of faith. Thus, if such a thing is not defined, it is not believed by him.
“But if anyone is carried towards assenting to that thing absolutely, and without presupposing the condition that it is truly defined by the Catholic Church, then he does not believe with an infused faith, but rather one that is acquired.”8
“The material object of faith (the thing to be believed and attained through revelation) requires two conditions in order to be matter of faith, as Saint Thomas explains. The first condition is that such a thing be non-evident […] The other condition is that it be proposed by the Catholic Church, and by its Head, in whom is found the infallible rule of faith, or of those things which pertain to faith.
“To understand this, note that this condition and this visible rule are not required for faith in just any way whatever; they are required with respect to us, because God does not speak to us immediately, or propose revealed things through himself immediately – but rather, mediately, through men. […]
“But if God were to propose to us immediately things which are to be believed, we would undoubtedly need no visible rule proposing; we would be certified immediately by the Spirit of God himself, concerning the matter proposed for faith, just as the Apostles and Prophets were taught. They did not receive the things of faith from the Church, but rather themselves handed down the things of faith to the Church.”9
153. Gonet and Contenson
Let us also hear the commentary of two other Thomists, Gonet and Contenson:
“The faithful cannot assent to God revealing his mysteries unless the divine revelation be proposed and made known to them through the Church.”10
“The formal reason of faith is divine revelation insofar as it is made known through the absolutely infallible teaching of the Church – so that such teaching and persuasion of its infallibility are an absolutely necessary condition for us, in order for divine revelation to move our intellect to assent to truths revealed by God.”11
“For this reason, divine authority is the formal reason of believing; but ecclesiastical authority is the condition without which we would not believe; just as goodness proposed is the motive alluring and attracting the will to itself; but the proposition of goodness by the intellect is the condition without which this manifested goodness would not be able to entangle the will.”12
“The second condition of the object of faith is: the formal, or virtual revelation declared by the Church. The object of faith must be not only virtually, but formally revealed – or at least expressly declared by the Church [...] Then the statement begins to pertain to the object of our faith: not precisely because it is virtually revealed, but because, since it is virtually revealed, it is formally declared and drawn out from an article of faith by the Church.”13
154. The Salmanticenses
The Salmanticenses, who in this matter of the virtually revealed or theological conclusion, employed the nomenclature of Suárez, and even went so far as to admit the doctrine of two assents (although only for conclusions deduced from two premisses of faith [80-85]), have nevertheless remained faithful and profound expositors of the doctrine of Saint Thomas on the matter of the relations between the authority of the Church and our faith.
“In this, note that the formal motive of believing through theological faith is not the testimony of God taken precisely, but as applied to the article which we believe by such faith […]
“Hence, it is necessary that the testimony of God be certainly and infallibly applied, if the assent of faith is to be certain and firm, and consequently may be elicited by theological faith. For otherwise, this assent will waver because of this. Moreover, the certainty and infallibility of this application arises in two ways. In one way, it may arise by a man evidently knowing the fact of divine revelation; that is, the fact of God speaking to him, as happened to prophets and those who received knowledge of the mysteries of faith immediately from God.
“In another way, it may arise insofar as the revelation is asserted and applied by an infallible rule, constituted by God for this purpose – which is the Church.
“Hence the formal motive of theological faith with respect to us is the testimony of God proposed and applied by the Church. Thus, this testimony is the formal reason of believing; but the proposition or application made through the Church is the necessary condition for this testimony to be infallibly applied […]”
“For since theological faith is an intellectual virtue, it has an infallible ordering to the truth, and cannot elicit a false assent. But in the heretic, it cannot import such an ordering: while faith may have an infallible ordering to the truth, it is not sufficient that the motive of assent be infallible in itself, but it must be infallibly applied to the object of assent. It matters little that the motive be infallible in itself, if it has no or only a contingent conjunction with the object.
“For the same reason, an opinable or contingent conclusion is often inferred from a necessary principle, because it lacks a necessary connection with the object.
“But the testimony of God, although infallible in itself, cannot be infallibly applied to the object of assent in a heretic. Such application is made neither through evidence which the heretic might have of divine revelation, nor is it made through the infallible rule of the Church. […] It remains, therefore, that he does not apply the testimony of God with a certain and infallible application, whether of evidence (of revelation) or of proposition of the Church, but because he himself thus judges it to be so.”14
As we already said, if we change the word “heretic” for “theologian” in these texts, we will see what kind of assent can be given to theological conclusions deduced by fallible human reasoning, before the definition of the Church.
155. Cardinal Gotti
So as not to weary the reader with citations from other commentators, we shall end with the words of Cardinal Gotti. Speaking of the “two assents” (theological assent and the assent of faith) says thus:
“There is no room for two assents concerning the conclusion (one concerning the conclusion in itself, another concerning it as inferred); the conclusion, whether considered in itself, or as inferred, always pertains to the same habit, namely science.”15
And on the necessity of the definition of the Church for every act of our divine faith, he concludes thus:
“The student of theology can easily infer these and other similar things, by having always before his eyes the truth that nothing can be immediately of faith, if it has not been proposed by the universal Church as being revealed in the word of God.”16
Marìn-Sola’s Conclusion
We have already provided a translation of Fr Marín-Sola’s conclusion in Part II. Here it is again.
In a word, for St. Thomas, nothing purely human can enter into the act of divine faith; all its elements must be divine. Anything human must necessarily enter only as directed by God or as a mere instrument of the divine. Faith has two elements, the object and its proposition or explanation, and both must be divine.
In immediate revelation, both elements are inherently divine: both the revealed truth and its proposition and explanation come directly from God. For those who receive immediate revelation, there is no need for the Church.
However, in mediate revelation, where the revealed truth comes from God, but its proposition and explanation come from humans, a human element is involved. For this to be an act of divine faith, the proposition and explanation must be made not by fallible human reason (theology, exegesis, history, etc.) but by God Himself, meaning by human reason assisted by God, or through the Church’s definition.
The Church, according to Saint Thomas, becomes a true rule and a true reason for every act of our divine faith. This rule and reason do not pertain to our faith in its divine aspect, or in itself, but rather to divine faith insofar as it is ours [quoad nos]. They condition or modify the same First Truth or revealed deposit, not in themselves but in relation to us. This rule and reason are not about the formal object of faith but about its proposition and explanation.
They are as necessary for every act of our divine faith as the proposition of the object by intelligence is necessary for the act of the will. A true act of the will cannot occur without this proposition, and it is reduced to a mere act of passion or sensitive appetite when this proposition is lacking. The proposing or proximate rule must belong to the same order as what is regulated.
Anyone who acts against this rule of the Church’s definition, acts against divine faith – committing an act of heresy.
Anyone who acts without this rule commits an act without divine faith – an act of mere science or human faith.
Any explanation of the implicit or inclusive virtuality of the revealed deposit made against the Church’s definition is heretical. If made without the Church’s definition, it is purely scientific or human. If made by the Church’s definition, it is a divine explanation, a dogma of faith.
The theological conclusions drawn through inclusive or explanatory minor premises (and even, in our judgment, those deduced from two revealed premises, though this is secondary to our purpose) do not belong to our faith, and cannot merit anyone’s true act of divine faith without the Church’s solemn or ordinary magisterial definition. Before that definition, they certainly have the formal motive of our theology, which is the inclusive deduction from the revealed datum; however, they lack one of the indispensable conditions of the formal motive of our faith – the definition of the Church.
Appendix: Garrigou-Lagrange
We should also note that, although Marìn-Sola does not provide the text, Fr Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange taught the same doctrine. Here is what he said, from Matthew Minerd’s translation of On Divine Revelation, Vol. I, n. 413 (with Minerd and Garrigou’s footnotes).
413.(4) Second doubt: Does the proposition (or testimony) of the Church pertain to the formal motive of faith, or is it only a necessary condition?
“The Thomists commonly respond, against Durandus of Saint Pourçain, Cardinal de Lugo, and [Miguel] de Medina, that the Church’s proposing does not pertain to the formal motive of faith in any way but instead is only a necessary condition for it. For this proposing does not formally influence the intellect and will of the believer but, rather, only applies already-existing revelation to us. The only thing that moves us to believe is the authority of God actually revealing.
“Likewise, a professor proposing St. Thomas’s teaching to his students is only a necessary condition. St. Thomas’s authority is the formal motive for their acceptance of this teaching, not the authority of this professor.
“Likewise, the intellect gazes upon the truth of the first principles on account of their [self-]evidence, and the explanation of the terms in which these principles are expressed was only a [necessary] condition [for grasping their self-evidence].
“Likewise, the will is moved by the good itself, but the will can only love the good if the latter is proposed by the intellect, although this proposing is only a [necessary] condition for its love.17
“Moreover, the testimony of the Church is something created. However, nothing created can enter into the formal motive of faith, nor into hope and charity. Otherwise, they would not be purely divine theological virtues.18
“Nonetheless, against the Protestants, we must hold that the Church’s proposing of the truth of revelation is a necessary condition [conditio sine qua non] for our faith. Protestants posit private inspiration in place of this proposing by the Church divinely established by Christ. However, as is shown in the treatise on the Church,19 this rule is not divinely instituted, nor certain, nor sufficient for settling controversies.
“These points suffice for explaining the act of faith from the perspective of its object and formal motive.”
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The distinguished Porrecta, whose commentaries often are placed alongside those of Cajetan, says that St Thomas’s teaching in this article is worthy of being inscribed with letters of gold for the instruction of Catholics and heretics.
“Let these things be said for Catholics, and against heretics, as memorable, golden, perpetual truths “ (In loc.cit. of St. Thomas)
Cardinal Toledo rates it as most beautiful.
“St. Thomas's reason is most beautiful. The reason of faith is not the First Truth absolutely, but restricted with this condition, that it be manifested by the Church. Now, if this necessary condition of the object be set aside, the whole habit is removed.” (TOLEDO, Com-ment. in loc.cit.)
On the other hand, Suarez, preoccupied with the nature of private revelations, thinks that art. 3 of question 5 is inconsistent with art. 1 of question 1, and adduces the doctrine of each of these two articles as favouring two opposed theories on the formal object of faith, without adverting to the fact that one of the articles deals with the formal object of faith in itself, and the other deals with the formal object of our faith. (SUAREZ, loc.cit., nn. 1-2)
Cajetan, In 2-2, q.1, a.1, and q.5, a.3.
Bañez, In 2-2, q.1, a.1, dubit.4.
Loc.cit., ad 4, argumentum.
Loc.cit., q.5, a.3, ad1, argumentum.
John of St Thomas, De Fide, d.1, a.1, n.27
Loc.cit., nn. 28-29.
Loc.cit., d.2, a.4, solution of the arguments, n.3
Loc.cit., d.7, De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis, Proemium
Gonet, De Fide, d.1, n.53
Gonet, loc. Cit., d.8, n.30
Contenson, Theologia mentis et cordis, De Fide, 1.8, d.2, c.l.
Contenson, Loc. Cit.
Salmanticenses, De Fide, d.8, dub. 3, nn. 32-33
Theologia Scholastica Dogmatica, vol.1, tr.1, q.1, dub.3, n.14.
Ibid., dub. 4, n. 20
“Thus, presupposing knowledge of the motives of credibility, without a vicious circle, we can supernaturally believe in the infallible authority of the Church on account of revelation as upon the motive for our faith, and believe in revelation on account of the authority of the Church as applying revelation itself. The expression ‘on account of’ has a different meaning in each of these two cases. In the first proposition, it is taken formally, though not in the second. A vicious circle, by contrast, would only exist if we passed between these two claims while understanding this expression in the same manner in each of them. It is quite ordinary for causes to be causes of each other, though in different genera of causality. Thus, the intellect objectively moves the will and is itself moved by the will as regards exercise. Likewise, the senses provide the matter for intellection while being judged by the intellect.”
[Trans. note: On the topic of the mutual dependence of causes, see Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The Order of Things: The Realism of the Principle of Finality, trans. Matthew Minerd (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Academic, 2020), 319–347.]
See Gonet, Clypeus theologicae Thomisticae, De fide, disp. 1, a. 2.
“[Trans. note: By which Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange seems to mean texts like that of his confrere Fr. Reginald Schultes, whose course was a continuation of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange’s course De revelatione. As Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange noted above, this perspective should not be confused with a theology of the Church in its own mystery (like what one finds in Journet’s multi-tome L’église du verbe incarné. Rather, Schultes’s De ecclesia (and, likewise, I would suspect the Tractatus de ecclesia spoken of by Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange here) is primarily concerned with the Church’s divine institution and authority, not her inner mystery. It thus remains part of apologetics as one integral part of the unified science of theology. As Schultes himself explains in Reginald Schultes, De ecclesia catholica praelectiones apologeticae (Paris: Lethielleux, 1925), 2: ‘The proper object of our treatise is the institution and divine authority of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church can be considered from various formal perspectives: we can consider either [1] its historical development and influence in the past (church history), [2] its intimate nature as the Mystical Body of Christ having the sacraments as its means of conferring grace, along with other such matters (dogmatic theology), or [3] it can be considered as being divinely instituted and endowed with divine authority. This last perspective will be that which is taken in our treatise on the Catholic Church.”
For some reflections on the issue of the Tractatus de ecclesia, see Joseph Clifford Fenton, “Toward an Adequate Theological Treatise De Ecclesia,” in The Church of Christ: A Collection of Essays by Monsignor Joseph C. Fenton, ed. Christian D. Washburn (Tacoma, WA: Cluny Media, 2016), 1–19.]”
Excellent work, Sean! Keep these coming! His Excellency Bishop Sanborn is using Minerd's translation of Garrigou's work "On divine revelation" as one of the textbooks in his Apologetics course for the school year of 2025-2026. Would you recommend that people purchase a copy of Minerd's work? I've known about the two volumes for years but have always hesitated to buy them because of Minerd's commitment to Vatican II. Thank you.
Our faith then cannot exist as a supernatural virtue without the infallible teaching of the Church which presuposses our faith in the doctrinal infallibility of the Church which in turn would necessitate the doctrinal infallibility of its head, the Roman Pontiff? For this reason Leo would be the guarantor of the doctrinal certainty of what he's proposing for our belief. I don't even think that he believes this.