Are modern churchmen 'pertinacious'—or just 'mentevacante'?
Juan de Lugo explains 'pertinacity,' and we consider whether it can be applied to modern churchmen or not.
Juan de Lugo explains the nature of 'pertinacity'—which helps us consider whether modern churchmen can be construed as pertinacious, or defended with the 'mentevacantist' theory.
Introduction
Juan de Lugo SJ (1583–1660) was a Spanish Jesuit theologian and cardinal, described in the Catholic Encyclopedia as one of the most eminent theologians of his time. Pope Urban VIII made him a cardinal after recognising his theological learning, and his works were widely studied across Europe. St. Alphonsus Liguori ranked him “immediately after St. Thomas Aquinas,” and Benedict XIV called him “a light of the Church.”
His treatises on moral and dogmatic theology, including De virtute fidei divinæ, were noted for their influence in resolving disputed questions. His writings remain a key source on the nature of pertinacity in heresy. The relevant sections were translated by John S. Daly (available here).
Daly’s text is long. What follows is a summary of the relevant sections, examining pertinacity in heresy both in its essence (what it is intrinsically) and in its practical recognisability (how we know when it exists).
The first part addresses its theological definition, while the second considers its application in the external forum. We then proceed to an examination of the ‘mentevacantist’ objection, which seeks to defend modern churchmen by claiming that they have ‘empty heads’ and so are not pertinacious, but actually in good faith.
Clarification and caveat
This article primarily addresses the open partisans of the Vatican II revolution, along with its moderate collaborators—those who actively promote or passively accept the new religion.
It is not claiming that every bishop or cleric formed after the Council is necessarily pertinacious, which seems neither necessary nor possible. De Lugo himself distinguishes between the general category of sins against the faith and heresy; we must also distinguish further between heresy which is sufficiently manifest to have external effects, and that which is merely internal or occult.
There are those who, in varying degrees, reject or criticise the conciliar system, and who strive—however imperfectly—to adhere to the old religion. Different principles may apply in such cases, and make it impossible to render a definitive judgment against them:
Consequently, just as he who denies [an article of] faith through even culpable ignorance does not lose faith or forsake it, so too one who withdraws from the doctrine of the Catholic Church through even culpable ignorance does not lose catholicity, or withdraw from the Catholic Church; and therefore he is not a heretic, because, notwithstanding that sin, he can still sincerely say that he believes most firmly everything which the Church has proposed and taught.
This shows that not every man who errs—even culpably—is thereby a heretic. But such “grey cases” do not excuse the system itself, nor the men who designed it—nor the many men who propagate it and defend it at the expense of the true religion today.
While culpable ignorance, in the abstract, does not sever a man from the Church, the public, consistent, and conscious defence of the new religion against defined Catholic doctrine amounts—in light of their status, education, and the sustained nature of their rejection—to pertinacity itself.
Pertinacity in itself
What is pertinacity?
Pertinacity in heresy is the obstinate adherence to an error against faith, knowingly opposing the Church’s doctrine.
“It undoubtedly signifies vicious and obstinate adherence to one’s own opinion against the mind of the Church.”
Does pertinacity require an explicit intent to oppose the Church?
Pertinacity does not require an explicit intent to oppose the Church as such; knowingly rejecting a defined doctrine for any reason suffices.
“It is enough to know the contradiction between an idea and the mind of the Church and nonetheless to hold it, whatever end this may be done for – whether financial gain, renown or some other motive – which they term an indirect wish.”
What if someone claims to accept the Church’s authority but demands to be convinced by argument before submitting to a doctrine?
Refusing to submit to a defined doctrine until convinced by argument and internal reasoning is already pertinacity, as it denies the Church’s authority as the sufficient motive of faith.
“The first consequence of this is that a man is not excused from pertinacity sufficient to make him a heretic just by being prepared to be put right and to acquiesce in the teaching of the Church if he is convinced by her through argument, as is noted by Sanchez, with Vasquez, Ledesma and others”
If someone claims to be a Catholic, does this mean that he cannot be pertinacious?
A person is pertinacious even if he claims to accept the Church’s authority, provided he knowingly denies a sufficiently proposed dogma.
“So for someone to be a heretic, i.e. pertinaciously to oppose the authority of the Church, it is enough that (a) the infallible authority of the Church and (b) its definition of the contrary dogma should be proposed to him in such a way that, even if he chose not to believe either, nonetheless he could have done so, having seen the duty to believe both, and having seen that they could not prudently be denied, doubted or hesitated over.”
Are warnings necessary for someone to be pertinacious?
A heretic is pertinacious before any warning if he knowingly rejects doctrine.
“For by the very fact of, on the one hand, dissenting, and, on the other hand, denying that the Church has infallible authority in proposing, or – if he grants that the Church has this authority – of denying that the dogma contrary to his opinion has in fact been proposed by the Church, he has already pertinaciously rejected the teaching of the Church sufficiently proposed to him.”
“It might more plausibly be argued on the basis of these texts that one is not a heretic […] for as long as one has not been admonished; but this conclusion would be excessive, as we have seen above.”
“But in the forum of God who examines hearts, if in his heart he were not truly prepared to correct his error, but rather already well knew that it was contrary to the understanding of the Church, the want of an external warning would not excuse him from contracting the stain of heresy."
Can someone be pertinacious without denying doctrine?
Someone may be pertinacious even without knowingly denying a defined doctrine.
"A person can also be pertinacious and a heretic without knowingly denying anything defined and proposed by the Church if he (a) does not know what the Church has defined in some matter, but (b) adheres to his error with the disposition of not abandoning that opinion even if he knew that the Church had defined the contrary."
Pertinacity as known to us
Once the theological concept of pertinacity is understood, its practical application in the external forum must be considered.
Can ignorance mitigate against pertinacity?
Someone who denies a dogma through ignorance is not pertinacious, unless he also intends to withdraw from the belief of the Church.
“[T]he infused habit of faith is never expelled on account of a sin against faith committed through ignorance. This is because a man does not lose the habit of faith as long as he remains able to elicit acts of Divine faith concerning the articles which have been sufficiently proposed to him. […] no-one is simply and absolutely a heretic unless he knowingly withdraws from the [belief of the] Church; for one who withdraws through ignorance remains in such a disposition that he can accept and most firmly believe whatever is sufficiently proposed to him as being a dogma of the Church. Consequently, just as he who denies [an article of] faith through even culpable ignorance does not lose faith or forsake it, so too one who withdraws from the doctrine of the Catholic Church through even culpable ignorance does not lose catholicity, or withdraw from the Catholic Church; and therefore he is not a heretic, because, notwithstanding that sin, he can still sincerely say that he believes most firmly everything which the Church has proposed and taught.”
Should ignorance or pertinacity be presumed in the external forum?
If a doctrine is well known and has been sufficiently proposed, its rejection can be sufficient to prove pertinacity if accompanied by other indicators that exclude reasonable doubt.
“… not even in the external forum is a warning and preceding correction always required for someone to be punished as pertinacious and that this is not observed in the practice of the Holy Office. For if it be certain by some other means—for example, if the doctrine in question be well known, or if it be obvious from the kind of person and other circumstances involved—that the accused person could not have been ignorant of the opposition of his doctrine to that of the Church, he will automatically be judged a heretic.”
What if the person has expressed Catholic doctrine on other occasions?
A past protestation of faith does not prove that pertinacity is absent, since pertinacity can be formed in an instant; what matters is whether the person now knowingly rejects a doctrine the Church has sufficiently proposed, regardless of his past orthodoxy.
“… such a protestation can provide grounds for conjecture that the person who made it [if he affirms something heretical] was saved from sin by invincible ignorance, or that at least some kind of ignorance, perhaps vincible, ensured that there was no heresy strictly so-called (see next section); since someone who protests that he wants to think with the Church in all things is presumed not to want to put himself in opposition to the same Church five minutes later. But to be accurate, this does not constitute a definite proof that the pertinacity required for heresy is absent, especially if the protestation was made just before, but at some distance (morally computed). For this pertinacity, as we have seen, can be consummated in an instant or in a very short time. Hence, just as one who at one moment intends to keep all the commandments of God, nevertheless, only an hour later, when some occasion or some grave temptation presents itself, may sin mortally, so too the intention to agree with the Church can, when temptation arises, be changed into pertinacity against the Church. […]”
Aren’t warnings necessary?
Insisting on official warnings misunderstands their purpose, as they are sometimes manifestly unnecessary
“The reason for this is clear: the external warning can serve only to ensure that the erring party become aware of the opposition between his error and the doctrine of the Church. So if he knows the whole subject much better himself from books and conciliar definitions than he could from the words of anyone admonishing him, there is no reason for a warning to be necessary for him to be pertinacious against the Church.”
Must there be an extended passage of time in order to establish pertinacity?
Pertinacity, and therefore heresy, exists independently of lengths of time and ecclesiastical warnings.
“So the common and most true judgement of theologians teaches that there is no need for this warning, or for length of time or delay, for someone to become a heretic and incur the penalties of heretics, but that it is sufficient for him to embrace error with full deliberation and express what he sees to be at odds with the understanding and definition of the Church.”
“Good evidence of this is adduced from the contrary act – the act of faith – which a man can elicit very quickly, reverently submitting himself to the Church and embracing her teaching. Seeing that the nature of contraries is the same, no more time is required for a man pertinaciously to withdraw from the Church than constantly and most firmly to adhere to her.”
What are private individuals to do before the matter has been officially established by the Church?
Warnings establish pertinacity in a public, definitive way and justify public action; however, it does not follow that warnings are necessity in order to create pertinacity or render it manifest; further, private individuals are obliged to draw their own conclusions as soon as they are aware of the situation.
“Nor is this contradicted by the words of St. Paul which are alleged in opposition; on the contrary, as Suarez remarks, they imply that the individual in question is already a heretic before the warning, because he says: ‘A man that is a heretic, after the first and second warning avoid.’ The warning is required, therefore, to justify our separating ourselves from him – his incorrigibility being established by the warning – lest we endanger ourselves and waste our efforts with no hope of recovering him. We may add that this text is addressed to Titus, who, as he was a bishop, had to seek after wandering sheep after the manner of a shepherd in order to bring them back to the fold of the Church. But to private individuals it will often be more salutary to avoid a heretic straight away if they know that he sins not through ignorance but through malice; for they must look to their own good and beware lest, wishing to heal him, they expose themselves to danger of infection.”
In judging ignorance and pertinacity, what role is played by the accused’s status and level of knowledge?
The presumption of pertinacity differs based on a person’s status and knowledge. A theologian or bishop is presumed to know the Church’s teaching and cannot claim ignorance.
“If, however, the subject is one of which knowledge is presumed, the principle does not apply, and a protestation of faith does not excuse from heresy and pertinacity. The circumstances of the subject, the person involved, etc., must all be weighed up to assess whether they are such as to outweigh the presumption of pertinacity in the external forum or to leave it in force: among other authors who address this topic reference can be made to Farinacius [reference given].”
In what way can ignorance make it both harder and easier to establish pertinacity?
An unlearned man may sometimes be excused from pertinacity initially, but may have a lower threshold after being warned—because his lack of learning means that he lacks the ability to evaluate theological arguments and therefore should submit to authority more readily.
"For we have seen above […] that lesser motives of credibility suffice for a rustic man to oblige his belief than for a learned man who better penetrates the grounds for doubt; for which reason sometimes a rustic person who does not acquiesce in the judgement of the bishop or inquisitors cannot be excused from the pertinacity of heresy although a learned theologian could be excused from that degree of pertinacity required for heresy if he brought forward some probable reason for his not being obliged, which the rustic could not bring forward as he would not know one.”
To what sort of standard are bishops and theologians to be held?
However, a learned person, especially a bishop or theologian, is presumed to know the Church’s teaching and cannot claim ignorance.
“… a learned man is more easily presumed pertinacious than an unlearned and rustic man if he dissents from mysteries proposed to him, because a rustic man can more easily be unaware of the rules of faith and the obligation of believing. […] This rule must be understood with a distinction. For if it applies to the judgement of an accused person in respect of some propositions which he has uttered and taught, a learned man is more easily presumed to have said them with a heretical disposition, because it is presumed that he knew them to be opposed to the teaching of the Church and of councils, which a rustic man could have been unaware of, as is remarked, with Albertinus and many others, by Diana (loc. cit., in the chapter beginning “Notandum est tamen”).”
This shows that even unofficial “warnings” from subjects and inferiors can be sufficient to establish pertinacity. This is because the role of warnings is to render the reality of pertinacity definitively and publicly manifest—and this may be achieved even by an inferior.
This is a summary of key points in a by Cardinal Juan de Lugo, translated by John S. Daly (available here).
Inescapable dilemma of an argument that cuts both ways
The last points above—about the respective positions of the learned and unlearned, and the differing points at which pertinacity may be assumed—create an inescapable dilemma for our opponents.
On the one hand, theologians and bishops might be presumed to know the Church’s teaching; they therefore cannot claim ignorance; and they therefore can be presumed to be pertinacious.
However, our opponents argue that such individuals are ignorant and badly-formed, and therefore cannot be presumed pertinacious.
But this does not excuse such individuals, as this ignorance only increases their responsibility to submit to the Church’s teaching when presented to them. Their ignorance or poor formation heightens their obligation to seek out and accept the truth; and de Lugo says that their failure to do so is culpable and sufficient to establish pertinacity.
Objection: Modern Churchman are incapable of pertinacity
An argument, dubbed that of “mentevacantism,” proposes that post-conciliar churchmen have minds so corrupted by liberal ideology that they sincerely act in ways that are objectively destructive to the Church.
It attempts to reconcile the mysterious iniquity of these churchmen with their preservation as valid hierarchy, whilst avoiding the sedevacantist position.
First, this argument seems to prove the opposite of what it intends. It is hard to see how someone who is mentally incapable of adhering to heresy and to rejecting the faith can be mentally capable of accepting or professing the faith. But professing the faith is a criterion of membership of the Church; and membership of the Church is a criterion of holding office in the Church.
Second, this argument pertains to a) the dedicated partisans of the new religion, and b) those who have collaborated with them, perhaps with less enthusiasm than the dedicated partisans, but without any opposition to their new religion. Different factors are in play for those who have acted in different ways.
Now, let us evaluate this argument in light of the material from de Lugo on pertinacity and heresy:
1. Pertinacity and Liberalism
De Lugo makes clear that heresy involves pertinacious rejection of Church doctrine. Pertinacity does not require explicit malice or conscious rebellion; it suffices to knowingly reject defined Church teachings, regardless of motive. According to this standard:
The argument of "sincerity" fails to excuse pertinacity: If a churchman embraces a form of liberalism that contradicts defined doctrine, his subjective sincerity does not excuse him from being pertinacious if he knows that these ideas oppose the Church’s teaching—or if his rejection, given his state and formation, clearly and visibly implies a culpable refusal to know what has been sufficiently proposed.
“Liberalism” is no excuse: De Lugo shows that ignorance due to negligence, refusal to learn, or affectation does not always excuse a person from heresy. If these churchmen embraced liberalism through neglect of theological truth or deliberate rejection of reality, they remain culpable.
Thus, if post-conciliar churchmen have knowingly upheld liberal errors, their sincerity does not exempt them from the charge of pertinacity, if they are aware—and how could they not be?—that their liberal ideas are contrary to truths proposed by the Church. A metaphorical “mental sickness” cannot excuse their actions if they retain the natural use of reason, and a disposition contrary to submission to the Church.
2. Can liberalism be considered a cause of invincible ignorance?
The objection sometimes claims that the Conciliar Popes are "sincerely wrong" due to their immersion in the unreality of the modern world. In de Lugo's terms, this would suggest invincible ignorance, which can excuse from the guilt of heresy. However:
De Lugo insists on the obligation to know the faith: Relating specifically to the papal claimants, these men putatively had the highest duty to safeguard and uphold doctrine. Their position presumes knowledge of the Church’s teachings, particularly on matters where dogma has been clearly defined. The same applies to bishops.
Invincible ignorance is not plausible in their case: De Lugo notes that ignorance may excuse an unlearned man, but not a theologian or bishop, and certainly not a Pope. The Popes’ obligation to uphold the Deposit of Faith makes their claims of ignorance or "mental sickness" untenable as a defence against pertinacity.
3. Can a metaphorical ‘mental sickness’ be a cause of invincible ignorance?
The argument hinges on the idea that the conciliar churchmen have a "mental sickness" prevents them from realising the reality of their actions. However:
This “mental sickness” is a metaphorical term for a voluntary adoption of a false philosophy: If we were discussing an actual mental sickness which destroyed the use of reason (i.e., bouts of insanity), then expressions of heresy would not be considered culpable; but this is not the case here at all.
De Lugo emphasizes deliberate rejection over mental capacity: Pertinacity is not contingent on mental clarity or "health." It is judged by the act of will in rejecting what is sufficiently proposed by the Church. Even if their minds are clouded by liberalism, these churchmen’s deliberate actions in implementing Vatican II reforms signify rejection of prior Church doctrine.
Even affected ignorance remains culpable: If these churchmen failed to recognise their errors through negligence or refusal to confront Church teaching, they are still pertinacious. A "vacant mind" does not excuse a deliberate rejection of truth.
4. Practical Implications
The mentevacantism argument implies that the Conciliar hierarchy remains valid but is incapacitated by liberalism. This view has significant weaknesses:
It undermines the Church’s indefectibility: It implies that men who publicly and knowingly reject defined doctrine—and impose a new religion on the Church—could remain her visible head and authoritative teachers.
It fails to resolve the crisis: De Lugo’s emphasis on the necessity of rejecting heretics supports our critique: pertinacious heretics lose authority and should be recognised as such to protect the faithful.
It excuses ongoing destruction: By attributing the crisis to "mental sickness," mentevacantism risks normalising error, and offers no solution beyond enduring the destructive papacies, through the adoption of ideas influenced by the various anti-papal systems of Eastern Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Gallicanism and Old Catholicism.
It presents the aggressors as the victims: The papal claimants and the collaborationist clergy are not suffering victims, but aggressors. The men who have attempted to destroy the Church are no proper objects of sympathy, any more than it is the responsibility for the laity to create the conditions for the clergy to act properly in this crisis.
Conclusion
In light of de Lugo’s teaching on pertinacity, the mentevacantism argument fails to excuse the conciliar hierarchy from culpability. Their liberalism and sincerity do not negate their responsibility to uphold Catholic doctrine, nor do they exempt them from the charge of pertinacity if they knowingly rejected defined truths.
This article follows de Lugo in distinguishing between grave sins against the faith (including culpable ignorance) and the formal sin of heresy, which requires knowingly rejecting a truth sufficiently proposed by the Church. It is true that not all errors or sins against faith result in loss of membership of the Church—however, we may legitimately judge pertinacity to exist in the external forum, and act accordingly, when certain visible indicators are present. As St Robert Bellarmine wrote:
“Men are not bound, or able to read hearts; but when they see that someone is a heretic by his external works, they judge him to be a heretic pure and simple [simpliciter], and condemn him as a heretic.”
The famous fifteenth century text Malleus Maleficarum witnesses to the same idea:
“There are two kinds of judgment, one belonging to God, Who sees inner matters, and the other to men, who can pass judgment on inner matters only through outer ones, as the third argument admits. Now the man who is judged to be a heretic in the judgment of God is truly a heretic according to reality, since God judges only a person who has an error of the Faith in his understanding to be a heretic. As for the person who is judged to be a heretic in the judgment of men, it is necessarily the case not that he is a heretic according to reality, but that he has committed an act by which it is apparent that he has a wicked opinion about the Faith and consequently is considered a heretic by the presumption of the law.”1
Furthermore, in relation to alleged popes, the mentevacantism objection does address the damage caused to the Church’s traditional ecclesiology, in that it entails saying that the Church’s supreme teachers and governors can lead the faithful into grave error, while still retaining authority—and requiring the faithful to resist them according to their own private judgment.
On the contrary, the consistent approach, expressed by the authorities of the Church and based on St Paul himself, involves recognising the conciliar papal claimants (and much of the putative hierarchy) as pertinacious heretics, who have long since forfeited their claim to legitimacy.
An error which is not resisted is approved; a truth which is not defended is suppressed… He who does not oppose an evident crime is open to the suspicion of secret complicity.2
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Due to the controversy of this source, I want to emphasise that I am treating it as a witness rather than an authority.
Henricus Institoris & Jacobus Sprenger, Malleus Maleficarum, 490. 1486, published in English as The Hammer of Witches, ed. Christopher S. Mackay, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009.
Cited by Pope Leo XIII in Inimica Vis, n. 7, 1892.
What a great article!
The whole thing can be condensed down to this excerpt:
"Thus, if post-conciliar churchmen have knowingly upheld liberal errors, their sincerity does not exempt them from the charge of pertinacity, if they are aware—and how could they not be?—that their liberal ideas are contrary to truths proposed by the Church. A metaphorical “mental sickness” cannot excuse their actions if they retain the natural use of reason, and a disposition contrary to submission to the Church."
And of course, by their own admissions, many of the conciliar fathers HAVE knowingly upheld liberal errors. I'm thinking of von Balthasaar saying "We must raze the bastions," or Congar admitting certain provisions of Dignitatis Humanae "say materially the opposite" of the Syllabus of Pius IX, or saying that "the Church has had peacefully its October Revolution," and on, and on, and on.
This is the kind of stuff that makes WM Review worth paying for!
"Henricus Institoris & Jacobus Sprenger, Malleus Maleficarum, 490. 1486, published in English as The Hammer of Witches, ed. Christopher S. Mackay, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009." Well, what an excellent Father's Day gift this will be to myself.