The Pope is absolutely above Councils, can't submit to their coercive judgment
Bellarmine shows the Pope is absolutely above both the rest of the Church and general councils, and that no authority can judge or coerce him. This is why the ‘fifth’ opinion is true.

Bellarmine shows the Pope is absolutely above both the rest of the Church and general councils, and that no authority can judge or coerce him. This is why the ‘fifth’ opinion is true.
Editors’ Notes
There are a variety of inventive ways proposed to take Bellarmine’s clear statement…
“Therefore, the true opinion is the fifth, according to which the Pope who is manifestly a heretic ceases by himself to be Pope and head, in the same way as he ceases to be a Christian and a member of the body of the Church; and for this reason he can be judged and punished by the Church.”
… and transform this clear statement either into the “fourth opinion” against which it was defended—which holds that…
“… the manifestly heretical Pope is not ‘ipso facto’ deposed, but can and must be deposed by the Church.”
… or into what we have called a “sixth opinion,” whose advocates claim to hold the fifth opinion, but actually hold that while the manifestly heretical pope does indeed fall from office once his heresy is manifest, some sort of “official” declaration simply and absolutely necessary for the heresy to be sufficiently manifest.
(Not very ipso facto, in that case.)
This sixth opinion is similar (or identical to) the opinion of Suarez, who has been characterised as holding the fifth opinion. In fact, it is either the fourth opinion, or a hybrid between the fourth and fifth opinions. It is precisely the claim to be holding the fifth opinion, whilst conflating it with aspects of the fourth opinion, that makes this sixth opinion distinct from both.
This series of translations
This series of translations was undertaken so that readers can see exactly how Bellarmine’s words have been misapplied or misconstrued in support of these alternate opinions.
In order to address these misrepresentations, and to refute these arguments, we previously provided a new translation of Chapter 9-11 from Book I of Bellarmine’s Fourth General Controversy—On Councils. That section features several texts which are variously mistranslated or presented out of context, as a means of denying (or “nuancing”) what the Doctor of the Church had taught elsewhere.
We also presented Chapters XIII and XIV of Book II of the same work, in which Bellarmine sets out the various opinions and objections regarding the comparative status of the pope and the council.
The reason for publishing Chapters XIII and XIV is that certain comments made by the saint in the later Chapter XIX are also taken out of context and set to the same use mentioned above. It is vital that we get all the key texts on the table and in their full context if we can hope to arrive—together—at the true teaching of Bellarmine, and the truth of the matter itself.
In addition, we have also published Bellarmine’s ex professo treatment of the heretic pope question, along with some comments on a proper methodology and hermeneutic.
In the following sections (Chapters XVII and XVIII) Bellarmine explains that the pope is absolutely above the council, and precisely why. In so doing, he makes absolutely clear that it is impossible that the pope submit himself to the coercive or legal judgment of a council.
Before we start, let’s consider a few points of particular interest.
What sort of heresy separates a man from the Church?
If the “sixth opinion” is false—namely, if heresy can (under some circumstances) be “manifest” without any kind of legal declaration by authority, then what exactly is it that constitutes manifest heresy, sufficient to separate a man from the Church, and prevent him from holding ecclesiastical office?
Cardinal Louis Billot gives a helpful explanation to answer this question:
“For baptism by its own nature places a man in the visible body of the Catholic Church, and always has this effect, unless there is some obstacle in the baptized person, i.e., something incompatible with the social bond of the unity of the Church. But the social bond in itself and by its nature is external and public.
“So as long as heresy is not professed openly, but exists only in a person's mind, or is manifested only in ways that are not sufficient to make it public, it does not exclude participation in the visible body of the Church, and thus the baptismal character (by which we are attached to the body of the Church) necessarily retains its power, or rather retains its natural consequence, which is not blocked or opposed by any contrary action.”1
In other words, the primary fact here is the visible unity of the Church. Once a person’s manifestation of heresy rises to a level of publicity which is sufficiently “incompatible with the social bond of the unity of the Church”—such that one would be compelled to say: “If he is a Catholic, then the Church is no longer united in faith”—it is by that fact sufficient to “exclude participation in the visible body of the Church.” Billot writes:
“The proof of the first assertion [‘The first condition is that the social bond of the unity of Faith not be broken by formal heresy or even by merely material heresy’] from what we have said in general about the unity of the Church.
“For if, as we proved in Question 3, the unity of the profession of faith, which is dependent on the visible authority of the living magisterium, is the essential property by which Christ wanted His Church to be adorned forever, it follows clearly that those cannot be part of the Church who profess differently from what its magisterium teaches. For then there would be a division in the profession of faith, and division is contradictory to unity.”2
The visible continuation of such men in a defective profession of “faith”, once it is morally certain that they are aware of its incompatibility with the magisterium’s proposition of revelation, and the Church’s visible unity of faith, demonstrates the necessary pertinacity, and shows that (in Bellarmine’s words) “they have already been condemned by their own sentence.”3
It should be clear that although a self-confession from a heretic, or the declarations or official ecclesiastical acts, might be useful in such a scenario, they are not necessary to render this incompatibility knowable and visible. By definition, this incompatibility is that which is visible by its very nature.
But how public or visible does this need to be?
When does heresy become manifest?
Internal heresy, or heresy manifested to a few discreet people, would not be sufficient to do this.
While both Bellarmine and Billot were writing before the 1917 Code of Canon Law, and thus distinguished degrees of publicity in a more fluid way, modern canonists can help clarify the issue. In particular, McDevitt strongly indicates that what Bellarmine referred to as “manifest”, and Billot as “notorious,” should be understood as “public” in modern terminology.
McDevitt states that:
“[T]he defection from the faith [sufficient to constitute tacit renunciation of office] may be public by reason of the fact that it is already known to a notable part of the community. The law does not prescribe any special number as being necessary to constitute a notable part of the community. Determination of this point is left to man's prudent judgment.”
Other canonists suggest that about six persons can be sufficient.
All this represents a bar which is considerably lower than some would wish it to be.
Do Bellarmine’s comments about the ‘chief steward’ counter the fifth opinion?
In discussing the status of the pope as the “chief steward” or œconomus of the household, Bellarmine makes the following comment:
“Here, you see, the Lord reserves the judgment of that servant to himself and does not entrust it to the household. The same is taught by the custom of all households: for there is no household in which it is permitted to the lower servants, even if gathered together, to punish or expel the chief steward, however wicked he may be; for such a matter belongs solely to the lord of the whole household.”
The partisans of the fourth and sixth opinions might well try to present this as an argument against the clear meaning of the fifth opinion, and for the necessity for the involvement of a Council or some other process.
But in fact, it has nothing to do with a pope losing office ipso facto (or being impeded from acceding to the office), nor with Catholics recognising such facts: in fact, as is clear from the context, Bellarmine is using this explanation and image expressly to deny the idea that a Council can depose a pope.
Do comments about being judged for sins against faith counter the fifth opinion?
When presenting the testimony of the popes in favour of his thesis, Bellarmine writes as follows:
Innocent III, in Sermon 2 on the Consecration of the Pontiff, declares:
“Faith is so necessary to me that, although for other sins I have God as my judge, for the sin of faith alone I could be judged by the Church.”
Boniface VIII, in the Extravagantes, Viam sanctam, on Supremacy and Obedience, affirms:
“If the earthly power deviates, it shall be judged by the spiritual power; if the lesser spiritual authority deviates, it shall be judged by the greater. But if the supreme spiritual authority deviates, it can be judged only by God, not by man.”
Let us also consider the testimony of St Boniface, Bishop of Mainz, who, although not a supreme pontiff, was of the highest authority. He writes, as is found in Distinction 40, Canon Si Papa:
“He who is to judge all cannot be judged by anyone, unless he is found to have deviated from the faith.”
A few comments necessary here.
First, we should note that if the fourth or sixth opinions were true, then this would be the perfect time for Bellarmine to confirm them, or clarify the application of these points to the fifth—but, he does not. As such, he leaves the clear and ex professo teaching of On the Roman Pontiff intact. It makes little sense to interpret the clear and ex professo presentation of the fifth opinion in light of these less clear, passing references.
Second, it is essential that we note the context of these texts, rather than presenting them as proof-texts. The immediate context is a section of his book on the “absolute” superiority of the Pope over the Council. But can a superiority with an exception be called an absolute?
Possibly. Further, it is true that in On the Roman Pontiff, Bellarmine states:
“First, [that a heretical Pope can be judged] is clearly stated in the canon Si papa Dist. 40, as well as in Innocent’s Second Sermon on the Consecration of the Pontiff, that an heretical pope can be judged.
“And further, in the acts of the Eighth Synod, Act 7, the proceedings of the Roman Council under Hadrian are recorded; in them it is stated that Pope Honorius was rightly deemed anathematised because he had been convicted of heresy, for which reason alone one of lesser rank may judge a superior. Here it must be noted that, although it may be probable that Honorius was not an heretic, and that Pope Hadrian II was deceived by corrupted copies of the Sixth Synod—mistakenly thinking Honorius to have been an heretic—we cannot deny that Hadrian, together with the Roman Council, and indeed even the entire Eighth General Synod, held the view that in a case of heresy the Roman Pontiff could be judged.”4
In other words, Bellarmine does not allow for the pope to err in a dogmatic definition as pope, but he does allow that the pope might personally fall into heresy if he denies a pre-defined truth, and does so in a sufficiently public way.
However, elsewhere in the same work he clarifies this matter specifically in reference to Si papa, showing that it is more of a hypothetical and cautious statement, than a practical ruling:
“I respond, first of all, that all those canons are speaking about the personal error of a Pontiff, not a judicial one. For, if a Pontiff is a heretic, he will be such only by denying some truth previously defined, but he cannot be a heretic, when he defines something new, for then he is not thinking contrary to something defined by the Church. The cited canons, however, are speaking expressly about heresy; therefore they are not speaking about a judicial error, but a personal error of the Pontiff.
“Secondly, I say that those canons do not want to say that the Pontiff also as a private person can err, but only that the Pontiff cannot be judged; because it is not absolutely certain whether or not a Pontiff can be a heretic; therefore for greater caution, they add this condition, unless he should become a heretic.”5
This brings us to the third point, which is that we cannot make sense of Bellarmine’s passing comments about Si Papa without reference to the clear and ex professo treatment of the matter in On the Roman Pontiff.
Even if we conceded an exception to that absolute superiority with reference to popes who are merely suspect of heresy, the treatment of the five opinions must have primacy, and not be “nuanced away” by equivocal or less clear references elsewhere.
This section is very helpful for making sense of the apparent exception presented here. In that section, he states that manifest heretics are “already […] condemned by their own sentence”; that the reason that a putative pope who is a manifest heretic “can be judged and punished by the Church” is that he is already neither a Christian nor a pope; and that these principles were “the opinion of all the ancient Fathers”:
“[H]eretics already before being excommunicated are outside the Church and deprived of all jurisdiction. For they have already been condemned by their own sentence, as the Apostle teaches (Tit. 3:10-11), that is, they have been cut off from the body of the Church without excommunication, as St. Jerome affirms. […]
“Therefore, the true opinion is the fifth, according to which the Pope who is manifestly a heretic ceases by himself to be Pope and head, in the same way as he ceases to be a Christian and a member of the body of the Church; and for this reason he can be judged and punished by the Church. This is the opinion of all the ancient Fathers, who teach that manifest heretics immediately lose all jurisdiction […]”
However, if we were to concede Si papa and the similar texts mean that a pope who is simply an occult heretic and thus merely suspect of heresy can be judged by an imperfect council on an exceptional basis, this still has nothing to do with our own time. Elsewhere, Bellarmine defines an occult heretic as follows:
[T]hose who neither possess internal faith nor any Christian virtue, and yet, for some temporal benefit, outwardly profess the Catholic faith and mingle in the communion of the Sacraments with true faithful.6
It is completely clear that none of the post-conciliar claimants to the papacy fit into Bellarmine’s definition of an occult heretic. Some may consider these men to be doubtful popes, but Bellarmine explains elsewhere that a doubtful pope is no pope at all.
But in none of these situations is it the case that a council is the only way by which the heresy of a putative pope may be established as manifest. For this reason, even if we accept that the ideas of Si papa represent a true exception to the rule, this has no bearing on our current situation at all.
Summary of key points
Of course, applying this principle to a real-life scenario remains fraught with prudential questions, especially about how and when heresy is sufficiently manifested. But Bellarmine’s theological principle itself is clear.
The pope is absolutely above a council, and is absolutely in-judicable.
He cannot be tried and judged by a council in any kind of coercive sense
The qualified “trial” and “judgment” discussed in Chapter XVIII are unable to form the basis of the “sixth opinion,” namely that a putative pope does not lose his office ipso facto until he is declared to be a manifest heretic by a council. Such a declaration is utterly without legal force, and as such it is gratuitous to make it a requirement for a legal effect. On the contrary, the “legal effect” of loss of office (or failure to attain office) arises from the public heresy itself, in the same way that the canonical category of notoriety can arise from either notoriety of law or notoriety of fact.
As mentioned, previously, we fully agree that Councils can often be a better means than others of achieving certain ends. In addition, they may be effective at making the recognition of certain facts (such as the non-papacy of an antipope) clear and obligatory on all.
We are also inclined to agree—although not in any sense that involves a council judging a true pope—that declarations and an imperfect gathering of bishops may well be an effective means of clarifying such situations.
But it is obviously a non sequitur to say that a Council being an effective means of achieving an end means that it is the only means; especially when this involves the contradiction of the absolute superiority of pope over council.
In other words, such a declaration is a recognition of an already-lost (or never attained) office, not a deposition that actively removes a pope. As Arnaldo da Silveira writes:
“Every other opinion as to how a heretical Pope loses his office presupposes at least one jurisdictional act of an imperfect Council, the College of Cardinals, or some other ecclesiastical organ. The only opinion of the classical doctors which does not resort to a juridical pronouncement against a still reigning Pope is that of St. Robert Bellarmine, also adopted, and in some points complemented and enriched, by Ballerini, Wernz-Vidal, Billot and others.
“Let me repeat: St. Robert Bellarmine’s position is the only explanation of how the heretical Pope forfeits his office that does not require the intervention of any ecclesiastical organ. All others merit the criticism that St. Robert Bellarmine makes of Cajetan’s when he shows that any intervention of an official organ in the removal of a Pope would involve jurisdiction, i.e., the judgment of the Pope by the Church.”7
We have already presented the explanation of Arnaldo da Silveira explaining why, and refuting what he held to be a misrepresentation of both Bellarmine’s thought and of sound doctrine:
The next part of this series will deal with the various objections that arose in the course of Bellarmine’s treatment, distinguishing the cases of doubtful and wicked popes from a manifestly heretical pope, and showing that Bellarmine cannot justly be cited as an authority for the fourth or sixth opinions.
S.D. Wright
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Fourth General Controversy—On Councils
St Robert Bellarmine
Book II—On the Authority of Councils
Chapter XVII: That the Supreme Pontiff is Absolutely Above the Council
Chapter XVIII: The Pope Cannot Subject Himself to the Coercive Judgment of Councils
Available from Google Books. Headings and line breaks added by The WM Review. Base text of translation by AI; scrutinised and edited line by line by humans.
Chapter XVII: That the Supreme Pontiff is Absolutely Above the Council
Third Proposition:
“The Supreme Pontiff is, simply and absolutely, above the universal Church and above a general Council, so that he acknowledges no judgment on earth superior to himself.”
This is also almost a matter of faith and is proved, first, from the two preceding propositions: for if the Pope is the head of the universal Church, even when it is assembled together—and if the universal Church, even when assembled, does not have any power by virtue of its totality [without him]—then it follows that the Pope is above the Council and above the Church, but not the contrary.
Reasoning founded in Holy Scripture
Secondly, it is proven by reasoning founded in Scripture. For all the titles attributed to Christ in Scripture, which establish Him as being above the Church, are also attributed to the Pontiff.
First, Christ is the paterfamilias in His own house, which is the Church. The Pontiff is in the same house the supreme steward, that is, the paterfamilias in the place of Christ, as it is written in Luke 12: “Who, then, is the faithful and prudent steward whom the Lord has placed over His household?”
For here, by the steward (or œconomus, as it is rendered in Greek) is understood the bishop. Ambrose, on this passage, as well as Hilary and Jerome in Matthew 24, where a similar statement is made, interpret it in the same way. And although the Fathers do not explicitly speak of the Roman bishop, nevertheless, without doubt, the meaning of that Scripture is as follows: just as particular bishops are the chief stewards in their respective churches, so too is the Roman bishop in the universal Church. Hence Ambrose, commenting on 1 Timothy 3 (“That thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave in the house of God”) says, “The house of God is called the Church, whose ruler today is Damasus.”
And Chrysostom, in Book II of On the Priesthood, near the beginning, interprets the very passage, “Who then is the faithful servant?” as referring to Peter.
That the chief steward (œconomus) is above the household and cannot be judged or punished by it is evident from this same passage. For the Lord says: “Whom the Lord hath set over his household.” And again:
“But if that servant shall say in his heart, ‘My lord delayeth his coming,’ and shall begin to strike the menservants and maidens, to eat, and to drink, and to be drunken: the lord of that servant will come in a day when he expecteth not and will divide him, and appoint his portion with the unfaithful.” (Luke 12:45)
Here, you see, the Lord reserves the judgment of that servant to himself and does not entrust it to the household. The same is taught by the custom of all households: for there is no household in which it is permitted to the lower servants, even if gathered together, to punish or expel the chief steward, however wicked he may be; for such a matter belongs solely to the lord of the whole household.
[See comments in the introduction on these texts.]
The second title of Christ is that of Shepherd, as in John 10: “I am the good Shepherd.” This same title is communicated to Peter in John 21: “Feed my sheep.” But it is evident that the shepherd is so placed over the sheep that he cannot in any way be judged by them.
The third title is the head of the body of the Church, as in Ephesians 4. This same title is communicated to Peter, as we see in the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, session 3, where the legates pronounce judgement on Dioscorus, and in the letter of the Council to Leo. Now, it is contrary to nature for the head to be governed by the members and not rather to govern them, just as it is contrary to nature for the members to sever the head, even if it is gravely ill.
The fourth title is that of Husband or Bridegroom, as in Ephesians 5: “Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church and gave Himself for her.” This title is also attributed to Peter, as we see in the General Council of Lyons, where, in the chapter Ubi Periculum, concerning the election of the Roman Pontiff, the Council states:
“Let the useful and necessary provision for the whole world be made swiftly by giving a fitting bridegroom to that Church.”
But it is against the Apostle’s teaching in Ephesians 5 and against the order of nature for the bride to rule over the bridegroom and not rather to be subject to him.
Testimony of the Councils
Secondly, this thesis is proven from the explicit words of Councils and Pontiffs. For since this controversy pertains to the power of Councils and Pontiffs, if Councils and Pontiffs agree among themselves, what need is there for us to dispute?
First, we have the Council of Sinuessa under Marcellinus, where we read at its conclusion: “The first see is judged by no one” (though the authenticity of this Council is uncertain). Shortly after, the Roman Council under Sylvester stated similarly in its final canon: “No one shall judge the first see.”
Editor’s Note—Pope Marcellinus
The history of Pope Marcellinus is contested. St. Robert Bellarmine’s treatment of this case exemplifies his method of addressing objections from multiple angles to demonstrate their insufficiency.
For example, he distinguishes between coerced external acts and internal heretical assent, arguing that Marcellinus’s actions under duress would not have compromised his papal authority. He anticipates objections by addressing both possibilities: that Marcellinus retained the papacy or voluntarily abdicated, and resolves the issue with his martyrdom. He also highlights the unreliability of historical accusations, relying on credible sources like St. Augustine to disprove claims of apostasy.
This layered approach, which does not shrink from proposing counter-arguments that may contradict each other, ensures that the central objection against papal authority collapses, regardless of the resolution. Here, for example, is his treatment of Marcellinus from the Third Controversy (On the Roman Pontiff), Book IV, Chapter VIII:
“The tenth Pontiff is Marcellinus, who sacrificed to idols, as is certain from the Pontiff Damasus from the council of Sinuessa and from the letter of Nicholas I to Michael. But Marcellinus neither taught something against the faith, nor was a heretic, or infidel, except by an external act because of his fear of death. But whether because of that external act he lost the pontificate, or not, makes little difference; since he immediately abdicated from the pontificate, and shortly thereafter he was crowned with martyrdom. I believe, however, that he did not ipso facto lose the pontificate, because it is sufficiently certain to all that he sacrificed to idols only out of fear. You can add to this what St. Augustine in his book on baptism in chapter 16 against Petilian says, namely, that Marcellinus was innocent, and none of the ancient historians mention this moral fault.”
It should be clear that this case does not clearly involve Marcellinus being a manifest heretic in the relevant sense, nor with teaching and imposing a false religion on the Church. As such, Bellarmine’s comments have no bearing on the question of the “fifth” opinion.
End of Editor’s Notes
Moreover, from the Council of Chalcedon, it is evident that the Pontiff is greater than the Council. For in session 3, many letters written from various places to the Council are read, all of which begin thus:
“To the most holy and blessed universal Patriarch of great Rome, Leo, and to the holy universal Council assembled in the city of Chalcedon.”
No one in the entire Council objected to the precedence given to the Pontiff over the whole Council. Indeed, at the end of that session, the Council addressed a letter to Leo, recognising him as both their head and father.
Moreover, in the same session, Dioscorus, along with the entire Second Synod of Ephesus, was condemned, both for other reasons and especially because he had dared to judge and condemn the Roman Pontiff, Leo. For as Nicholas I states in his letter to Michael, Dioscorus was not condemned so much for heresy as for the horrendous presumption by which he dared to pass sentence on the supreme Pontiff.
Moreover, it must be noted that if Dioscorus, who was the Patriarch of Alexandria (that is, the first after the Roman Pontiff in rank) could not lawfully judge the Roman Pontiff even with the authority of a general council, then it clearly follows that a council is not above the Pontiff. For why could it not judge the Pontiff if it were truly above him, indeed his judge, as the adversaries claim?
Similarly, the Roman Council V under Symmachus approved and adopted as its own the decrees of the book of Ennodius, a deacon, wherein it is written:
“God willed that the causes of other men be terminated by men. But He reserved the judgement of the prelate of this see to Himself without question. He willed that the successors of Peter owe their innocence to heaven alone.”
In the Eighth General Council, Session 7, we read that the Roman Pontiff has judged the prelates of all churches, but no one has ever judged him—understand this to mean lawfully, so that such a judgement would be accepted by the Church.
Platina, in his Life of Leo III, and Paul the Deacon, in his History of the Franks, book III, report that when Charlemagne came to Rome to investigate accusations against Pope Leo III, and a great council of bishops assembled, all the bishops unanimously declared that no one on earth has the authority to judge the supreme Pontiff. Upon hearing this, Charlemagne refrained from acting as a judge, and Leo, through an oath, cleared himself of the accusations.
Furthermore, the Lateran Council under Alexander III, as recorded in the chapter Licet in De Electione, states:
“In the Roman Church, something special is constituted, for there can be no recourse to a superior.”
This Council teaches that the Roman Pontiff must be elected with greater care than other bishops: for if an unworthy bishop is chosen, he can be corrected and deposed by the Roman Pontiff; but if an unworthy supreme Pontiff is chosen, there is no remedy, for he has no superior who can depose him.
In the Council of Constance, a bull issued by Martin V, with the approval of the Council, commanded those suspected of heresy to be interrogated regarding their belief in the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff in the Church of God. Certainly, supreme authority is that which has no superior and to which none is equal.
Finally, the last Lateran Council under Leo X, Session 11, explicitly and definitively taught that the Pontiff is above all Councils, and rejected the contrary decree issued by the Council of Basel. It stated:
“It is manifestly evident that the Roman Pontiff alone, as having authority above all Councils, possesses the full right and power of convoking, transferring, and dissolving Councils, not only from the testimony of Sacred Scripture, the sayings of the holy Fathers, and the declarations of other Roman Pontiffs but also from the confession of those same Councils themselves.”8
To this passage, no adequate response can be made, unless one argues either that it was not a general council, that it was not received by the Church, or that it did not define this matter as a point of faith.
However, to say it was not a general council is scarcely plausible, for although very few bishops attended—indeed, they did not even reach one hundred—the council was nonetheless open to all, all were summoned, and the true and undoubted supreme pontiff presided over it.
As to the suggestion that it was not received, at least universally, this matters little: for the decrees of councils do not require the approval of the people, since they derive their authority not from them. It is true that decrees concerning customs, if not received and if the pontiff does not enforce them, may eventually be abrogated by custom; but this does not arise from any need for the people’s approval. Rather, it occurs because such decrees are mutable, and when the pontiff observes that they are not observed over a long period and remains silent, he is deemed to have abrogated them.
However, decrees concerning Faith are immutable and cannot be abrogated in any way, once they have been established; but the decree under discussion here belongs to this category. It is doubtful whether this council defined the matter in question strictly as a decree to be held by Catholic faith; therefore, those who hold the contrary opinion are not properly heretics, but they cannot be excused from grave rashness.
Testimony of the Popes
Third, let us now proceed to the testimony of the popes. Leo, in Epistle 84 to Anastasius, concludes:
“By the great disposition of God, it has been provided that not all would claim all things for themselves, but that in individual provinces there would be individuals whose judgment would have the first place among their brethren; and again, some were appointed in greater cities to assume broader care, through whom the care of the universal Church would flow to the one see of Peter, so that nothing would ever dissent from its head.”
Now, if the care of the universal Church pertains to Peter, then it certainly pertains also to [the care of] a council, which serves as the representative of the universal Church.
Gelasius, in his letter to the bishops of Dardania, writes:
“The Church throughout the world knows that the sacred Roman See holds the right to judge all matters, and that it is not lawful for anyone to pass judgment on its decisions.”
Nicholas I, in his letter to Michael, reiterates:
“It is clear, indeed, that the judgment of the Apostolic See, whose authority is greater than any other, may not be retracted by anyone.”
Gregory, in Book IX, Epistle 39 to Theoctista the Patrician, states:
“If blessed Peter, when he was reproved by the faithful, had considered the authority he had received over the holy Church, he might have responded in such a way as to prevent the sheep from daring to reprove their shepherd. Yet if he had invoked his power in his reply to the complaint of the faithful, he would not have been a teacher of humility; rather, with humility, he appeased them by a reasonable response.”
Pope Paschal, as found in Chapter Significasti, extra. de electione, asserts:
“They say that it is not found to be established in councils, as though any councils had prescribed a law to the Roman Church, since all councils have been both convened by the authority of the Roman Church and received their strength from it, and in their statutes, the authority of the Roman pontiff is explicitly acknowledged.”
Innocent III, in Sermon 2 on the Consecration of the Pontiff, declares:
“Faith is so necessary to me that, although for other sins I have God as my judge, for the sin of faith alone I could be judged by the Church.”
Boniface VIII, in the Extravagantes, Viam sanctam, on Supremacy and Obedience, affirms:
“If the earthly power deviates, it shall be judged by the spiritual power; if the lesser spiritual authority deviates, it shall be judged by the greater. But if the supreme spiritual authority deviates, it can be judged only by God, not by man.”
Let us also consider the testimony of St Boniface, Bishop of Mainz, who, although not a supreme pontiff, was of the highest authority. He writes, as is found in Distinction 40, Canon Si Papa:
“He who is to judge all cannot be judged by anyone, unless he is found to have deviated from the faith.”
[See comments in the introduction on these texts.]
Appeals from councils to the pope
The thesis is proved fourthly by appeals from a council to the pope; for without controversy, appeals are always made from a lesser authority to a greater one. That appeals are made from a council to the pope, and not the reverse, is evident from Gelasius in his letter to the bishops of Dardania:
“To the Apostolic See,” he says, “an appeal must be made from any part of the world, but no one is permitted to appeal from it.”
And lest we think he is speaking of appeals from individual bishops and not councils, he adds that Roman pontiffs have often overturned unjust decisions of councils, for which there are most notable examples.
For instance, Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria, and Paul, Bishop of Constantinople, deposed by a council, appealed to Pope Julius and were restored to their sees by him, as Sozomen attests.9 Similarly, Flavian, Bishop of Constantinople, appealed from the Second Council of Ephesus to Pope Leo, as Leo attests in Epistle 25 to Emperor Theodosius.
Likewise, Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrrhus, appealed from the same Ephesian Council to the same Pope Leo, as is evident from Liberatus,10 and from Theodoret’s own epistle, which is found at the end of the works of Leo.
Finally, John Chrysostom, deposed by a council, appealed to Pope Innocent, as Gelasius records in the aforementioned letter, and as is also evident from Chrysostom’s letters to Innocent.
The approval and rejection of councils
Fifth, the thesis is confirmed by the approval and rejection of councils. Ultimately, all decisions are subject to the examination of the Roman pontiff; those he approves are received, and those he disapproves are rejected, as Gelasius testifies in the same letter to the bishops of Dardania. Indeed, that the pope approved many councils at their request is evident from the acts of the councils themselves, especially the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth.
That the popes have at times rejected the decrees of councils, which is a clear sign of their superiority, is evident from Basil, who, in his letter to Athanasius (Epistle 52), writes that it seemed good to him to request the Roman bishop to send some to Greece to annul the Council of Ariminum in his name.
Similarly, Pope Damasus, in his letter to the bishops of Illyria, rejects that council. Leo, in Epistle 55 to Pulcheria, states:
“We annul the confessions of the bishops which are contrary to the rules established by the Nicene canons and utterly void them by the authority of blessed Peter the apostle.”
Blessed Gregory, in Book IV, Epistle 34, declares:
“All the acts of that synod were nullified by the contradiction of the Apostolic See.”
Chapter XVIII: The Pope Cannot Subject Himself to the Coercive Judgment of Councils
Fourth Proposition:
“The supreme pontiff cannot submit himself to coercive judgment by a council or any man, but only to a discernment.”
Note that in a perfect judgment, two things are found.
First, the power to examine the cause, discern, and judge what ought to be done.
Second, the power to compel the one at fault to comply with the sentence pronounced against him.
Both are found in a proper judge, such as a prince or a praetor appointed by the prince. However, only the first is found in arbitrators/mediators, namely those whose decisions men are bound to follow by natural law (since we are bound to keep promises) but not by force of their decision, as arbitrators cannot compel compliance.
Therefore, the supreme pontiff cannot establish a judge above himself in a proper sense, but only arbitrators, and in a certain manner—whose decisions, if he does not comply with them, will mean that he will be doing what he ought not to do, but not what he is unable to do.
The first part is proven, first, because the pope’s authority over all is of divine law, as is evident—and the pope cannot dispense with divine law.
Secondly, because an inferior cannot commit to someone else a judgment reserved to a superior. For a bishop cannot delegate to his penitentiary the authority to absolve in cases reserved to the pope. But judgment in the case of the pontiff is reserved to God, as we have demonstrated above.
A bishop, for instance, cannot authorise his confessor to absolve cases reserved to the pope. But judgment in the pope’s cause is reserved to God, as we have shown.
Thirdly, because it would follow that the pope would be both superior and not superior with respect to the same matter, which involves a contradiction. This conclusion is demonstrated as follows: the supreme pontiff, when he entrusts himself and his cause to the judgment of another, does not cease to be pope, and therefore does not cease to be superior to any Christian. Yet, nevertheless, he would not be superior but rather inferior if he could be compelled; therefore, he would simultaneously be superior and not superior.
The second part is evident from the cases of Sixtus VIII, Leo III, Symmachus, Leo IV, and others who, when accused, chose to have their cases examined by a council of bishops, as is evident from Canon Mandastis and Canon Auditum, II. Question 5, and from the Fourth Council under Symmachus. Yet the bishops did not dare to judge them. Thus, in the Fourth Council under Symmachus, all the bishops, when subscribing, affirmed that they left the entire judgment to God.
In the next part, Bellarmine confronts the arguments of those who challenge the supremacy of the Roman Pontiff.
He demonstrates that neither councils nor the Church as a whole possess authority over the pope, whose power is directly instituted by God.
Historical Cases: Bellarmine examines examples such as Marcellinus and Liberius, revealing that these incidents confirm, rather than contradict, the unique authority of the papacy.
Theological Arguments: He refutes the claim that the pope, as a member of the Church, is subject to its judgment, asserting that the Church cannot act above its divinely appointed head.
Conciliar Misinterpretations: He exposes the errors of the Councils of Constance and Basel, showing that their claims of authority over the pope were either illegitimate or misunderstood.
He shows us that the Church’s unity and indefectibility rest entirely upon the divine authority of the papacy, which cannot be subordinated to any human institution or collective.
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Louis Cardinal Billot, Tractatus de Ecclesia Christi, Tomus Prior, Prati ex Officina Libraria Giachetti, Filii et soc, 1909. Thesis XI, § 2, p 291. All translations are by Fr Julian Larrabee unless otherwise mentioned.
Billot 294. Billot then goes on to explain:
But notorious heretics are those who by their own admission do not follow the rule of the ecclesiastical magisterium. Therefore they have an obstacle that prevents them from being included in the Church, and even though they are signed with the baptismal character, they either have never been part of its visible body, or have ceased to be such from the time they publicly became heterodox after their baptism. (Ibid.)
But it would not be logically sound to seize on the idea of a self-admission as if it accounted for the matter in an completely exhaustive way. Treating the matter in this way would be to posit a obligatory legal fiction and lead to a complete epistemological deadlock, and would require ignoring the other salient points in this passage and in his treatment.
For example, if we say that self-admission or legal declaration are indeed exhaustively and absolutely necessary in order to render heresy notorious and thus remove the heretic from the Church, then we are also saying that the visible unity of the Church in her profession of faith is compatible with a radical and very visible disunity of faith, provided that all her putative members claim to recognise the authority of the magisterium, no matter how implausible and obviously false such a claim would be. This is, once again, the unsound method of denying a more fundamental truth taught ex professo, on the basis of something less fundamental and mentioned in the course of another subject.
Further, this does nothing more than place Catholics at the mercy of cunning modernists. In his book El Liberalismo es Pecado, which was famously praised by Rome in the nineteenth century, Don Felix Sarda y Salvani wrote the following on the faithful’s ability to judge the orthodoxy of a statement:
“Of what use would be the rule of faith and morals if in every particular case the faithful could not of themselves make the immediate application, or if they were constantly obliged to consult the Pope or the diocesan pastor? […]
“It would be rendering the superior rule of faith useless, absurd and impossible to require the supreme authority of the Church to make its special and immediate application in every case and upon every occasion which calls it forth.” (Don Felix Sarda Y Salvany, Liberalism is a Sin, 1899, p 154-5. Trans. Conde B. Pallen, TAN Charlotte, North Carolina, 2012.)
He describes the contrary view—that Catholics are unable to use their reason to judge such matters—as “a species of brutal and satanic Jansenism.” (155) Of this view, he says:
“If this Liberal paradox were true, it would furnish Liberals with a very efficacious weapon with which, practically speaking, to annul all the Church’s condemnations of Liberalism.” (155)
On such principles, we should give no credence to the idea that an explicit, verbal confession of heresy is necessary in order for it to be a level of publicity sufficient to separate the man from the Church.
An extract from St Robert Bellarmine’s, De Romano Pontifice, lib. II, cap. 30.
St Robert Bellarmine, Controversies of the Christian Religion, trans. Fr Kenneth Baker SJ, Keep the Faith Press, USA, 2016, 971. On the Roman Pontiff, Book IV, VII.
Book III, Chapter X
DH 1445:
For it is clearly established that only the Roman pontiff in office at the time, as holding authority over all councils, has the full right and power to summon, transfer, and dissolve councils, (as is known) not only from the witness of Sacred Scripture, the sayings of the holy Fathers, and indeed other Roman pontiffs, Our predecessors, and the decrees of the sacred canons, but also from the confession of the councils themselves...
Book III, Chapter 7 of his Ecclesiastical History
In his Breviarium, Chapter 12
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