Anger and revenge can be virtuous: St Thomas explains
The psalm, repeated by St Paul says: 'Be angry, and sin not.' What does this mean, and how does it work in the Christian life?
The psalm, repeated by St Paul says: 'Be angry, and sin not.' What does this mean, and how does it work in the Christian life?
The Fifth Commandment
The fifth commandment is “Thou shalt not kill.” However, in the Sermon on the Mount, Our Lord teaches that the demands of this commandment extend far beyond the actual shedding of blood—it prohibits certain kinds of speech (such as detraction and calumny), and even thoughts which are entirely internal and secret.
This passage, which is read on the Fifth Sunday after Pentecost in the Roman Liturgy, is challenging—and easily misunderstood.
One reason for this is that the word anger refers both to a passion, and a sin.
Anger as a passion
King David says in the Psalm:
“Be ye angry, and sin not.” (Ps. 4.5)
St Paul refers to this text in his Epistle to the Ephesians (Eph. 4.26). It clearly introduces a distinction between anger and the sin of anger.
As a passion, anger pertains to the sensitive appetite, and is good. It is defined as the movement of the irascible appetite, which is roused by the presence of an evil obstructing the good. The Gospels depict Christ being angry on several occasions:
And he saith to them: Is it lawful to do good on the sabbath days, or to do evil? To save life, or to destroy? But they held their peace.
And looking round about on them with anger, being grieved for the blindness of their hearts, he saith to the man: Stretch forth thy hand. And he stretched it forth: and his hand was restored unto him. (Mark 3.4-5)
St Thomas treats anger as a “desire for evil,” in the sense that any punishment is a kind of evil for the person punished, whilst also a good when considered under the aspect of justice and order.
Although original sin has led to disorder in the passions, they still can and must be governed; and they must be governed by reason. For example, St Thomas writes:
They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above (Q[78], A[4]), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some ‘the particular reason,’ because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. (ST Ia, Q 81)
As such, anger is not a matter of desiring evil so that good may come; that would simply be to confuse the language used. This is how St Thomas explains it:
The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good. (ST IIa IIae, Q 158, A 2)
He also teaches that “anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance,” adding that this will be good or bad in the person who is angry, depending on various circumstances. Elsewhere, he writes that “the desire for revenge,” which he treats as constituitive of anger, “may be desired both well and ill.”
This is why St Thomas says that “if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one’s anger is deserving of praise” (In ST IIa IIae, Q 158, A 1). He cites St John Chrysostom:
“He that is angry without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger: for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked.”
When the “desire for evil” (properly understood) of anger is in accordance with reason, it can indeed be good, and morally virtuous.
But this gives rise to another question. Is not vengeance a sin?
The virtue of revenge
According to St Thomas, vengeance is (or can be) a virtue, and a part of the cardinal virtue of justice:
[T]o every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupiscible.
Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done.
And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says that by “vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure [i.e. derogatory], either by self-defense or by avenging it.”
Therefore vengeance is a special virtue. (IIa IIae, Q 108, A 2)
In other words, it is that virtue which governs the redressing of wrongs, and our Lord’s cleansings of the Temple seem to be examples of this virtue in action.
As with anger itself, seeking this vengeance or redress will be morally good or bad depending on whether it is in keeping with the order of reason. If it is sought in due proportion and for the sake of justice, it is good; if it is sought out of proportion, and for the sake of hatred, it is wrong:
Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned.
Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger.
For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another's evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Romans 12:21): “Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.”
If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed. (IIa IIae, Q 108, A 1)
He addresses the objection based on the words of Scripture (“Revenge to me, and I will repay”) as follows, emphasising the importance of due order:
He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Romans 13:4) of the earthly prince that “he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” If, however, a man takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God's and therefore sins. (Resp. 1)
In many cases, vengeance may well be improper to the average person. It is not the place of the average person to inflict vindictive punishment on others; this is for the temporal authority.
Given our fallen nature, our judgment of these factors may be clouded by our passions, and we may thus be lead into err and to sin. This is why St Thomas adds:
The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbour. For Chrysostom [Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: "It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God's wrongs is most wicked." (Resp. 2)
Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to seize him (2 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (2 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i). (Resp. 4)
In brief, vengeance taken in a disproportionate way, motivated by hatred, and usurping the position of the proper authority will be a sin; otherwise, as simply the redress of wrongs, in accordance with reason, justice and charity, it may be virtue.
This, in turn, sheds light on when and how anger itself is sinful.
Anger as a sin
This leads us to anger as a sin. St Thomas distinguishes the sin of anger from the passion of anger, by saying that the former is inordinate, viz. not in accordance with reason.
He gives the following examples of such inordinate anger:
Desiring punishment of one who has not deserved it
Desiring disproportionate punishment
Desiring punishment beyond the order prescribed by law
Desiring punishment without regard for the maintenance of justice and the correction of faults.
This kind of “desire for evil” is indeed evil.
St Thomas adds that anger can be inordinate in the way in which one is angry—namely by being “immoderately fierce,” whether internally or externally.
He also adds, when commenting on the Gospel passage at hand:
[O]ur Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury of his neighbour: and should the consent of reason be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin. (Ibid. A 3 Resp. 2)
Conclusion
To summarise what we have seen in this piece:
The passion of anger is a good part of our nature, experiencing it is morally indifferent, and it may turn us to an act of virtue or of sin, depending on the circumstances.
The sin of anger is that which is not regulated by the order of reason, and it may be a mortal or venial sin depending on the circumstances.
Losing sight of these distinctions has caused much confusion in our day, as have confused explanations of this particular Gospel passage. This confusion can lead to attempts to control anger and the other passions by the will alone, expecting them to obey the will instantly, without regard for reason. But this is an error, as St Thomas says:
[T]he intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason.
For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands.
And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.
The failure to appreciate the goodness of anger, and attempts control it without regard to reason in turn can lead to several evils:
The atrophy of the normal and good passion of anger, leading to apathy and paralysis
The hypertrophy of other passions seemingly used to suppress anger (such as fear)
Explosions of anger which are not controlled by reason, when the attempts to suppress it fail.
As the Catholic psychiatrist Conrad Baars wrote:
The emotion of anger is of great importance in every person's life. Unfortunately, its function as a natural and necessary psychological motor has been largely misunderstood, and consequently many people have been emotionally crippled.1
Our Lord’s purpose in the passage from the Sermon on the Mount is to present the scope of the Fifth Commandment, rather than to present a thorough analysis of anger, or the passions in general. The central point is that the Fifth Commandment includes words and interior malice—not that anger can never be justified.
It is a salutary warning – first, because it is true; second, because in some cases, what we feel to be justified anger may not really be so.
While we must not confuse the passion and the sin of anger, Our Lord’s words may serve as a salutary check on a wounded sense of self-love, and hold us back from sinful forms of anger, or the seeking of revenge in a way that is inordinate and disproportionate.
Seeking redress can be appropriate, but we must always remember that we will be held to the standard to which we hold others:
Judge not, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again.
And why seest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye; and seest not the beam that is in thy own eye? Or how sayest thou to thy brother: Let me cast the mote out of thy eye; and behold a beam is in thy own eye?
Thou hypocrite, cast out first the beam out of thy own eye, and then shalt thou see to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye. (Mt. 7.1-5)
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Psychic Wholeness and Healing, p 15
That's what the passions are, essentially. They respond to external stimuli and prompt a response, informed by reason and executed by thenwill. In Adam, they were always guided by reason, and assisted his will. In us they are not, but they can and do work in the same way, just unreliably so.
This was a fascinating article.
What does Baart mean by a “psychological motor”?